IEH was breached by a phishing attack that exposed its Microsoft 365 inbox, including emails and potentially export-controlled military data. IEH Corporation is a U.S. defense and aerospace manufacturer based in Brooklyn, New York. The company specializes in high-reliability electrical connectors, particularly hyperboloid connectors used in demanding military and aerospace environments. Its connectors are used […] Because attacks of this type can go unnoticed for extended periods, the window between initial compromise and detection is often the deciding factor in the eventual impact. Beyond patching, organizations should inventory exposed services, disable unused functionality, and require multi-factor authentication wherever it can be deployed.
N-able has released a fresh round of hotfixes for N‑central as part of its investigation into ongoing exploitation of a recently disclosed security flaw in the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) product. "We are proactively expanding protections in response to ongoing monitoring of threat actors as they evolve their attack techniques," the company said. "This is not a duplicate of our The reporting underscores the importance of treating third-party software and infrastructure as part of your own attack surface, since trust in a vendor is only as strong as the vendor’s own security posture. Beyond patching, organizations should inventory exposed services, disable unused functionality, and require multi-factor authentication wherever it can be deployed.
Healthcare software company Unlimited Technology Systems reported that more than 3.8 million people were impacted by a data breach incident that occurred in October 2025. The reporting underscores the importance of treating third-party software and infrastructure as part of your own attack surface, since trust in a vendor is only as strong as the vendor’s own security posture. Beyond patching, organizations should inventory exposed services, disable unused functionality, and require multi-factor authentication wherever it can be deployed.
A recent wave of cyber attacks targeting financial services, private equity, and professional services has been attributed to a data extortion group known as UNC6671. "UNC6671 continues to rely on voice phishing (vishing) to target enterprise employees, posing as IT help desk staff facilitating mandatory, urgent security migrations. Significantly, the threat actor often contacts employees via their personal mobile devices," Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant said in a report. These calls are designed to trick victims into spoofed login portals where adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) infrastructure intercepts credentials and multi-factor authentication (MFA) tokens. The threat actors then leverage the captured data to establish session persistence and deploy automated Python and PowerShell scripts for data exfiltration from enterprise cloud environments and SaaS applications, including Microsoft 365 and Okta.
Entra ID researcher Dirk-jan Mollema demonstrated that malware already running in a signed-in Windows session can silently use the victim's Windows Hello for Business key to authenticate to Microsoft Entra ID. The attacker can then establish longer-term cloud access, register a device it controls, obtain a Primary Refresh Token (PRT), and add further authentication methods where tenant policies This development is consistent with broader industry trends, where threat actors increasingly reuse proven techniques and commodity tooling rather than investing in novel malware. Security teams should review their detection rules, keep threat-intelligence feeds current, and validate that incident-response runbooks are tested before an incident occurs.
Entra ID researcher Dirk-jan Mollema demonstrated that malware already running in a signed-in Windows session can silently use the victim's Windows Hello for Business key to authenticate to Microsoft Entra ID. The attacker can then establish longer-term cloud access, register a device it controls, obtain a Primary Refresh Token (PRT), and add further authentication methods where tenant policies permit. On TPM-backed systems, the attacker does not extract the private key, recover the PIN, or trigger a biometric prompt. Windows ticketing keeps private-key operations available while the user is interactively signed in, allowing code running as the user to ask Windows to sign authentication data. Administrator privileges are not required. The technique requires code execution in the victim's signed-in session. Mollema describes the behavior as a consequence of how Windows Hello for Business works and says it was left as-is. The disclosure does not report active exploitation or victims. Mollema recommends monitoring unexpected device registrations.
A GitHub issue opened by an account with no repository privileges was enough to execute code on the CI runners behind Anthropic's and Google's own coding-agent repositories. On OpenAI's, it was enough to hijack the next agent run. Novee Security ran the attack against each vendor's agent in the configuration that the vendor ships by default, and presented the work at Black Hat USA on August 5. Two CVEs came out of it. Both are patched. Gemini CLI carries the worst of the two. CVE-2026-12537 (CVSS 4 score: 10.0) is an OS command injection in the container launcher, reached through a crafted .gemini/.env file, which lets an unprivileged attacker run code on the host of a headless CI platform before the sandbox starts. It is fixed in Gemini CLI 0.39.1 and run-gemini-cli 0.1.22. In Claude Code, CVE-2026-54316 turned Hugging Face's public download counter into an exfiltration channel that leaked an API key one character at a time, and is fixed in 2.1.163. Every Claude Code release from 0.2.54 up to 2.1.163 is affected. Anthropic says exploitation required getting untrusted content into a Claude Code context.
Security flaws in agent infrastructure from Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google, and Vercel let untrusted or forged instructions reach an agent's tools with no check that a model turn had authorized them. In several of the attack paths, the model never ran at all, so system prompts, content filters, and model-level guardrails never got a chance to intervene. The affected products include Amazon Bedrock AgentCore's InvokeHarness API, Google's Agent Development Kit (ADK) for Python, and the Vercel AI SDK harness packages for the Codex and OpenCode coding agents. AWS has fixed the managed service, Google addressed the issues in ADK 2.5.0, and Vercel patched @ai-sdk/harness-codex in version 1.0.29 and @ai-sdk/harness-opencode in version 1.0.28. These are not identical vulnerabilities and do not share the same attack conditions. AWS involved an authenticated remote request, Google's paths required attacker-controlled session events or user-authored function calls, and Vercel's flaws required untrusted code already running inside a Linux sandbox.
Connor Riley Moucka pleaded guilty in Seattle federal court on Wednesday to computer fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and a related conspiracy over the 2024 breaches of Snowflake customer accounts. The intrusions reached at least 165 organizations and exposed records belonging to at least 100 million people. Moucka, 26, of Kitchener, Ontario, personally took at least $495,000 from The incident highlights how adversaries continue to evolve their tradecraft, combining increasingly accessible tooling with targeted social engineering to slip past traditional perimeter defenses. Beyond patching, organizations should inventory exposed services, disable unused functionality, and require multi-factor authentication wherever it can be deployed.
Connor Riley Moucka pleaded guilty in Seattle federal court on Wednesday to computer fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and a related conspiracy over the 2024 breaches of Snowflake customer accounts. The intrusions reached at least 165 organizations and exposed records belonging to at least 100 million people. Moucka, 26, of Kitchener, Ontario, personally took at least $495,000 from ransoms and data sales. He is due to be sentenced on October 27 and faces a two-year mandatory minimum on the identity theft count and up to 30 years on the rest. What got the attackers in was old passwords. The credentials had been harvested years earlier by infostealer malware and never rotated, and the accounts had multi-factor authentication (MFA) switched off. No exploit, no flaw in the platform. The Justice Department has never named the company, in Wednesday's announcement or in the October 2024 indictment, identifying the victim only as a U.S. software-as-a-service (SaaS) provider. Snowflake and Mandiant named the platform themselves in 2024.
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