AI is accelerating vulnerability discovery, putting pressure on systems built to enrich, prioritize, and remediate flaws at a slower pace. Action1 explains why defenders increasingly need to correlate multiple intelligence sources and turn vulnerability data into faster remediation.
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds ownCloud, Linux Kernel, and JFrog Artifactory flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the following vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog: CVE-2023-49105 ownCloud Improper Authentication Vulnerability CVE-2026-53362 Linux Kernel Unspecified Vulnerability CVE-2026-66384 JFrog Artifactory Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory Vulnerability CVE-2023-49105 (CVSS score of 9.8) is an improper-authentication flaw in ownCloud Server’s WebDAV functionality. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim’s username can read, alter, or delete that user’s files when no signing key is configured, because the application can accept pre-signed URLs without properly validating that condition. The issue affects ownCloud core versions 10.6.0 through 10.13.0, before version 10.13.1. Organisations running affected ownCloud instances should treat remediation as urgent, review exposed WebDAV services, and investigate unusual file access, deletion, modification, or downloads. CVE-2026-53362 (CVSS score of 7.8) is an out-of-bounds memory-write vulnerability in the Linux kernel’s IPv6 networking subsystem. A local attacker who can create UDP sockets could exploit an incorrect parameter-length calculation during fragmented IPv6 packet handling to overwrite kernel memory, potentially causing a system crash, corrupting data, or escalating privileges.access. Shortly after the Hugging Face incident became public, OpenAI said its models had identified and exploited a zero-day vulnerability in JFrog’s Artifactory package registry manager. The report also describes a separate incident on July 19. In that case, some AI agents exploited the Linux kernel vulnerability, CVE-2026-53362, to gain higher privileges inside an OpenAI environment. The agents detected that the Linux kernel on their machine was vulnerable, found a public exploit, modified it to work in their environment, and used it to gain root access to the underlying worker node. This allowed them to escape the Artifactory container and move laterally to other parts of the connected environment. CVE-2026-66384 (CVSS score of 5.3) is a path-traversal vulnerability in JFrog Artifactory’s Docker cache handling. Under specific remote-repository conditions, an authenticated user can manipulate a file path and write data outside the intended cache directory, potentially affecting other locations on the Artifactory host. According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaw CVE-2026-66384 by September 10, while the remaining must be addressed by August, 30, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
Over 8,300 Internet-exposed Gitea instances are still unpatched against a critical security flaw exploited in ongoing remote code execution attacks, according to cybersecurity watchdog Shadowserver. The code injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-60004) targeted in these attacks was reported by Salesforce security researcher Shai Rod, and it allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Gitea service account by submitting malicious patches via the diffpatch API endpoint. While successful exploitation requires repository write access to repositories hosted on vulnerable servers, Gitea comes with self-registration enabled by default, allowing unauthenticated attackers to register an account, create a new repository, and trigger the vulnerability without prior credentials.
Hasbro, one of the world's largest toy and game companies, has disclosed that attackers have accessed the personal and financial information of an undisclosed number of employees. Founded in 1923, Hasbro is a publicly traded American multinational entertainment conglomerate on the NASDAQ and owns many brands, including Monopoly, Clue, Nerf, Transformers, Play-Doh, Peppa Pig, Scrabble, Magic: The Gathering, Dungeons & Dragons, and many others. The company has filed data breach notification letters with the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, but didn't disclose the total number of affected individuals or when the incident was detected. "The information involved varied by individual but may have included your name and one or more additional personal information elements such as email, address, phone number, national ID number, or financial information," Hasbro said.
BlueDelta (APT28) uses webhook.site and Microsoft Edge to hide HOOKEDGE espionage traffic targeting European governments. Recorded Future’s Insikt Group documented a campaign by BlueDelta, the Russian GRU-linked group that overlaps with the group APT28, running an entire espionage operation against European government targets using webhook.site, a service built for developers to test HTTP requests, as its command-and-control backbone. The campaign ran from late September 2025 through early April 2026, targeting government and diplomatic organizations in Romania, Spain, and Türkiye. “The campaigns delivered a lightweight Windows batch-script backdoor, dubbed “HOOKEDGE,” via macro-enabled Microsoft Word documents using diplomatic-themed lures, including material impersonating Spain’s Ministry of the Presidency, Justice and Relations with the Cortes, created shortly after a September 2025 meeting between Spanish and Moldovan officials.” states the report by Insikt Group. “Insikt Group assesses with moderate confidence that this activity was conducted by BlueDelta (which overlaps with APT28, Fancy Bear, and Forest Blizzard), a Russian state-sponsored threat group attributed to the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).” The attackers used a fairly old-school trick: macro-enabled Word documents. One of them looked like a real meeting agenda from Spain’s Ministry of the Presidency and appeared shortly after an actual meeting between Spanish and Moldovan officials. The timing was interesting because it came just before Moldova’s September 2025 parliamentary elections. The document looked credible enough to make the phishing attempt believable. The backdoor, called HOOKEDGE, is surprisingly simple. It uses a Windows batch script and relies on two webhooks. One receives commands, while the other sends the stolen data back to the attackers. Every 30 minutes, a scheduled task downloads a command file through Microsoft Edge, runs it and sends the results to another endpoint. The malware uses Edge to make the traffic look like normal web activity, making it harder for security tools to spot. That reliance on a real browser for both tasking and exfiltration is the cleverest part of the whole design. “A notable aspect of HOOKEDGE is its use of msedge.exe for both tasking and exfiltration. By generating network traffic through a legitimate web browser rather than a commonly abused LotL binary (LOLBin) or a custom binary, the malware blends its communications with normal enterprise browsing activity.” continues the report. Recorded Future explains, and that’s really the entire evasion strategy in one sentence: don’t build something exotic, just make your traffic look exactly like an employee checking a website. BlueDelta didn’t build HOOKEDGE from scratch either. It shares deep code and structural overlap with HEADLACE, a backdoor the same group used years earlier, right down to identical JavaScript variable names and the same base64 encoding scheme for automated downloads. “HOOKEDGE’s code and structural design have significant overlap with HEADLACE, a backdoor used by BlueDelta in previous campaigns.” states the report. Recorded Future assesses with moderate confidence that HOOKEDGE is a direct evolutionary successor, maintained by the same operators rather than a fresh tool built by a different team, which fits BlueDelta’s long-documented habit of refining working tradecraft instead of reinventing it. The operation also included a triage mechanism worth understanding on its own. Once a victim showed signs of being worth deeper attention, active communication with the initial webhook endpoints, BlueDelta deployed a second HOOKEDGE payload configured to check in every five minutes instead of thirty, giving operators much faster interactive control over higher-value targets. That two-tier setup also solved a practical infrastructure problem: webhook.site’s free tier caps out at 100 requests per endpoint, so spreading routine and high-priority tasking across separate endpoints kept any single one from getting exhausted mid-operation. BlueDelta kept tuning the operation continuously rather than treating it as a finished product. Beaconing intervals stretched from 30 minutes to 61, deliberately timed to slip past sandbox environments that typically only watch a sample’s behavior for an hour. The group added canary tracking pixels named things like mailopened.jpg and docopened.jpg to monitor exactly when a phishing email got opened versus when the document itself got opened versus when macros actually executed, essentially building analytics for their own phishing funnel. “The malicious document also contains a hidden image referencing a remote webhook URL: hxxp://webhook[.]site/62114596-33f5-47fb-9012-0223529e5a13/docopened[.]jpg. This serves as a document-open “canary,” alerting BlueDelta operators when a victim opens the lure. Later variants used the filename doc.jpg in place of docopened.jpg.” states Insik. “Insikt Group also identified webhooks using the filename mailopened.jpg, indicating that BlueDelta likely used a similar canary mechanism to monitor when recipients opened phishing emails, providing operators with visibility into campaign delivery success before any payload execution.” That kind of detailed tracking of what victims do would look very familiar to a marketing team. The difference is that here the targets are victims, not customers. For defenders, the useful indicators are quite clear. Block macros in documents downloaded from the internet, monitor scheduled tasks that launch scripts from user-writable folders, and flag Microsoft Edge running in headless mode or making automated connections to file-sharing and webhook services that the organization does not normally use. You don’t need sophisticated tools to spot these behaviors. Even a well-configured monitoring system should be able to detect them early. The worrying part is that a persistent, state-backed group can still rely on a small set of behaviors that defenders can identify and block. For defenders, the actionable pieces here are concrete rather than abstract. Block macro execution from documents that arrived over the internet, watch for scheduled tasks spawning script interpreters from user-writable folders, and specifically flag Microsoft Edge running in headless mode or making automated requests to file-hosting and webhook services your organization doesn’t actually use for anything legitimate. None of this requires exotic tooling to catch, which is oddly reassuring: a threat group this persistent and state-backed is still, at its core, relying on the same handful of detectable behaviors that a properly configured monitoring setup would catch on day one. “BlueDelta is likely to continue conducting initial access campaigns against European government and diplomatic organizations in support of Russian intelligence collection. Given the enduring strategic importance of European governance, NATO-related affairs, and diplomatic engagement with former Soviet republics, the intelligence requirements driving this activity are unlikely to diminish in the near term.” concludes the report. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, BlueDelta)
ServiceNow released security patches for three new maximum-severity AI Platform vulnerabilities that can be exploited in code injection, SQL injection, and privilege escalation attacks. The ServiceNow AI Platform (formerly known as the Now Platform) is an enterprise-grade Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) that helps integrate AI into core enterprise workflows and powers more than 100,000 enterprise AI apps at 85% of all Fortune 500 companies. In a Thursday advisory, the company said it patched its cloud-based platform against the three critical security flaws (CVE-2026-18885, CVE-2026-18886, and CVE-2026-74820) and advised customers to secure their self-hosted instances. The first is a code injection vulnerability that can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, the second stems from a code injection weakness that enables them to escalate privileges, and the third allows threat actors to access or modify instance data through SQL injection attacks.
Microsoft released the KB5120998 preview cumulative update for Windows 11 versions 25H2 and 24H2, which comes with 35 changes, including improvements to the Start menu, taskbar, and Windows search. KB5120998 is a preview update that lets IT administrators test Windows bug fixes, improvements, and new features before they roll out to all users during next month's Patch Tuesday release. However, unlike cumulative updates, monthly optional updates do not include security fixes and provide only quality improvements. After installing the August 2026 preview update, users can move the taskbar to the bottom, top, left, or right side of their screen in Settings > Personalization > Taskbar > Taskbar behaviors > Taskbar position, with most customization settings, like never combining taskbar icons, working in every position.
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds Red Hat, Linux Kernel, Ajax.NET Professional, Microsoft SQL Server, and Citrix NetScaler flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the following vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog: CVE-2015-3246 Red Hat Libuser Race Condition Vulnerability CVE-2015-5287 Red Hat Automatic Bug Reporting Tool Privilege Escalation Vulnerability CVE-2019-1068 Microsoft SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-23758 Ajax.NET Professional Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability CVE-2022-0995 Linux Kernel Out-of-Bounds Write Vulnerability CVE-2026-8452 Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer Vulnerability CVE-2015-3246 is a race condition in Red Hat libuser that could let an authenticated local user corrupt /etc/passwd to cause denial of service or escalate privileges. CVE-2015-5287 is a privilege escalation bug in Red Hat Automatic Bug Reporting Tool that could allow local users with certain permissions to gain higher privileges via a symlink attack on a predictable file. CVE-2019-1068 is a remote code execution flaw in Microsoft SQL Server that could allow an attacker to execute code in the context of the SQL Server Database Engine service account. CVE-2021-23758 (CVSS score not specified in the KEV notice) is a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in Ajax.NET Professional that could allow for remote code execution via arbitrary .NET classes. CVE-2022-0995 (CVSS score not specified in the KEV notice) is an out-of-bounds memory write vulnerability in Linux Kernel that could allow a local user to gain privileged access or cause a denial of service on the system. CVE-2026-8452 (CVSS score not specified in the KEV notice) is an improper restriction of operations within the bounds of a memory buffer vulnerability in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway that could lead to denial-of-service and has been observed under active exploitation in the wild. According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaws CVE-2019-1068 and CVE-2026-8452 by August 29, 2026, while the remaining must be addressed by September 9, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
A cyberattack on Manchester Airports Group exposed data of 8.7 million customers across Manchester, Stansted, and East Midlands airports. Manchester Airports Group disclosed that an unauthorised third party accessed customer data belonging to approximately 8.7 million people across three of England’s busiest airports: Manchester, London Stansted, and East Midlands. “Manchester, London Stansted and East Midlands airports have been hit by a cyber-attack in which hackers accessed the data of about 8.7 million customers.” reads the report published by The Guardian. “The incident involved data related to “car park, lounge and fast-track bookings and in-airport wifi sign-ups”, and the hackers obtained email addresses, phone numbers, vehicle registration numbers and postcodes, said Manchester Airports Group (MAG), which operates the three hubs.” MAG says it learned about the incident on Tuesday, August 25, after attackers breached the system over the weekend. The affected data included car park bookings, lounge and fast-track security reservations, and airport Wi-Fi sign-ups. Attackers accessed email addresses, phone numbers, vehicle registration numbers, and postcodes. The system did not store bank or payment details. According to MAG, most of the 8.7 million affected customers only lost their email addresses, while the impact varies depending on which services they used. The attack did not disrupt airport operations or flights. As a precaution, MAG temporarily suspended its Manage My Booking service, but all existing reservations remain valid. Customers who need to change a booking within the next 72 hours can use a dedicated phone line. “We would urge you to be particularly cautious of unexpected emails, calls or text messages claiming to be from us. We will never contact you unexpectedly to ask for payment or banking information. We apologise for any inconvenience or concern this may cause.” reads the email sent by Stansted to affected customers. That warning is relevant because the combination of an email address, a phone number, and the knowledge that someone recently made a parking or lounge booking gives a convincing starting point for a targeted phishing message. Attackers don’t need payment data if they can impersonate the airport convincingly enough to obtain it themselves. The timing adds pressure. The attack landed during the peak summer travel season, with millions of families flying back into the UK before the school year begins. The three airports combined handled around 54 million passengers last year, and MAG recently reported a record 66 million passengers across its network. The scale of the data exposure reflects the sheer volume of ancillary services these airports sell, and how much personal data those services routinely collect. The wifi registration system is the detail worth noting: signing into airport wifi typically requires a name, email, and phone number at minimum, and that information now belongs to whoever executed this breach. MAG says it quickly contained the incident, brought in external cybersecurity experts and notified the relevant authorities. No group has claimed responsibility, and investigators have not publicly linked the attack to any specific actor. The incident adds to a growing list of cyberattacks against UK infrastructure. Earlier in August, Iran-linked hackers took a British power plant offline for four days, marking the first confirmed case of Iranian actors shutting down a UK generator. Last year, attacks disrupted production at Jaguar Land Rover and targeted Marks & Spencer, Harrods and the Co-op. Heathrow also faced flight delays and cancellations after attackers disrupted check-in and boarding systems used by several European airports. MAG’s breach adds further pressure on UK infrastructure operators to strengthen their cyber defenses. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, UK Airport Operator MAG)
cPanel has released patches for a security flaw affecting domain parking and addon domain functionality in cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM), which could allow code execution as the root user. The vulnerability, assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2026-65643, impacts all supported versions of cPanel & WHM. cPanel described the issue as a critical security vulnerability and said that an
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