Attackers are buying expired domains to exploit their reputation, traffic and DNS history, using them for malware delivery, scams and C2 infrastructure. Every day, roughly 65,000 domain names that once belonged to someone else get re-registered by a new owner. Infoblox Threat Intel calls these dropcatch domains, and in the first half of 2026 they accounted for nearly 20% of all new domain registrations, meaning one in five “new” domains has a prior life. Some end up with legitimate investors or researchers. Others end up with attackers who have figured out that a domain with history is worth more than a blank slate. “These domains can be particularly interesting, even dangerous, because they inherit reputation and sometimes connections from their previous life. For example, a domain that was originally registered 10 years ago, later dropped, and then acquired by someone else may still carry signals associated with its long history.” reads the report published by Infoblox. “Researchers, security products, and reputation-based algorithms may view it more favorably than a genuinely brand-new registration. Threat actors know this and take advantage of it.” Among gTLDs, the average is 50,400 per day, with 15 TLDs accounting for about 92% of all dropcatch activity. .net and .xyz have the highest rates, with nearly 30% of new registrations previously registered, while .com reaches 24.5%. Determining who buys these domains and how they are used remains difficult due to WHOIS privacy, transfers, parking, and auctions. The inherited value isn’t just a better reputation score. Expired domains also come with residual web traffic from old backlinks, email still arriving for the previous owner, cached search results, and in some cases lingering DNS records that point to infrastructure no longer under the original owner’s control. One in every five new domains has all of that already baked in before the new registrant does anything. Infoblox tracked one threat actor it calls Sable Squirrel, which has spent nearly $7 million acquiring expired domains to build a criminal operation spanning illegal sports streaming, gambling promotion, and malware infrastructure. The actor controls more than 10,000 domains and runs streaming platforms under brands like Xoilac, Cakhia, and 90phut that direct Vietnamese, Korean, Japanese, and Australian users toward betting sites, while a subset of those same streaming domains double as command-and-control servers for malware including Quasar RAT, AsyncRAT, DCRat, and Remcos RAT. Among the expired domains Sable Squirrel has acquired are healthymagination.com, originally a General Electric health initiative, and rezilion.com, a cybersecurity company whose assets were sold to GitLab in 2024. The actor bought the reputation of a defunct infosec firm and pointed it at malware infrastructure — which is either darkly ironic or exactly what you’d do if you understood how security tools evaluate domain age. “For threat actors specifically, the inherited reputation isn’t the only thing valuable about acquiring a dropped domain. They also come with a variety of lingering connections: email intended for the original domain holder (see watchTowr Labs’ The Perils of Expired Domains: We’re Reading Your Email), cached search results, inherited web traffic, and in some cases, a ready-made platform for code injection on already compromised sites.” continues the report. “Lingering DNS records can also create opportunities for threat actors. We previously discussed dangling CNAME attacks in our blog post, Who Knew Domain Hijacking Is So Easy?.” Once Sable Squirrel re-registers a domain, it moves fast: 24% go live the same day, 76% within seven days, 94% within two weeks. The whole point is to start capturing traffic before security systems have updated their assessments. Infoblox is also tracking three scavenger actors, Stuffy Squirrel, Shady Squirrel, and Swiping Squirrel, that operate differently: rather than buying domains wholesale for a planned operation, they acquire expired domains that were previously compromised by other attackers and simply inherit the existing infection traffic. Shady Squirrel, assessed to be Russian-speaking and active since at least July 2023, feeds that traffic to SocGholish and tech support scam networks. SocGholish reportedly regained access to thousands of compromised sites by teaming up with Shady Squirrel days after its own infrastructure was disrupted by law enforcement. The practical lesson for defenders is uncomfortable: domain age and reputation are inputs worth questioning, not trusting, because an old domain in new hands is only as trustworthy as whoever currently holds it. “This is just one story of how threat actors use dropcatch domains to further their schemes. We’ll cover many more in the next two parts of this research: Part 2, $7 Million in Expired Domains Fuel a Streaming Empire with a Malware Secret, where we examine Sable Squirrel, a threat actor that has spent millions of dollars acquiring dropped domains, and Part 3, Dropcatch Scavengers: Expired Malicious Domains Become Cash Cows, where we explore actors that scavenge expired malicious domains and inherit traffic from previously compromised websites.” concludes the report. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Expired domains)
A new Mirai-based modular Linux botnet malware called Evooo1Bot has been targeting internet-facing gateway devices, turning them into SOCKS5 traffic relay nodes. The malware's capabilities extend beyond turning devices into proxy nodes and include credential theft, SSH brute-forcing, and launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Since at least July, Evooo1Bot has been targeting devices from Alcatel, NETGEAR, Tenda, Mitsubishi Electric, Telesquare, and D-Link across various regions by exploiting known vulnerabilities. “While the malware reuses the DDoS engine from the publicly leaked Mirai source code, it extends the original framework with numerous capabilities, including encrypted C2 communications, an SSH brute-force scanner, a SOCKS relay module, a credential sniffer, and an integrated exploit arsenal targeting multiple known vulnerabilities,” Fortinet researchers found.
Hackers are exploiting a macOS Screen Sharing flaw to gain root access and install Monero miners on Macs with port 5900 exposed online. The Dutch National Cyber Security Centre confirmed active exploitation of a critical macOS authentication flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-65400 (CVSS score of 9.8), less than two weeks after Apple shipped the fix. The bug sits in macOS’s built-in Screen Sharing feature, the remote desktop tool baked into every Mac. Apple’s fix improved how the system manages authentication state, closing a gap that let attackers on the network authenticate to Screen Sharing without valid credentials at all. Apple patched this issue with the release of macOS Tahoe 26.6.1, macOS Sequoia 15.7.9, and macOS Sonoma 14.8.9, crediting researcher Alfredo Pesoli (@__rev) at Bynario Atlas (bynar.io) for the discovery. “An attacker on the network may be able to authenticate to Screen Sharing without valid credentials” reads the advisory. That’s a fast, coordinated fix by industry standards. It just wasn’t fast enough to beat whoever started scanning for exposed systems. NCSC-NL says it received reports of active abuse hitting multiple systems where port 5900, the port Screen Sharing runs on, was reachable directly from the internet. “The vulnerability concerns an authentication issue in the Screen Sharing functionality where network attackers can gain access without valid credentials. This is made possible by insufficient state management during the authentication process. As a result, unauthorized individuals can perform authentication attempts that would normally not be accepted.” reads the advisory. “The NCSC has received a security advisory indicating that active exploitation of this vulnerability has been observed on multiple systems where port 5900 was accessible from the internet. In all these cases, root access was obtained on the affected system and a Monero crypto miner was placed.” In every case documented so far, attackers gained root access and dropped a Monero cryptocurrency miner on the compromised machine. Cryptomining is a relatively boring payload compared to what root access on a Mac could actually enable, which makes this look more like opportunistic scanning than a targeted campaign, for now. This flaw sits in the same source code file as two other Screen Sharing bugs Apple patched a month earlier in macOS 26.6, one of them a genuinely pre-authentication flaw that a researcher going by @osxreverser described needing nothing but a target’s IP address to exploit, no password, no username, nothing. That researcher claimed to have found around 40,000 exposed Screen Sharing hosts on the internet during a scan, nearly half of them in the US, spanning residential connections, university networks, and at least a few corporate servers. What ties both bugs together is how mechanically simple they are to trigger. Security firm Calif, which analyzed the flaws, found no memory corruption, no exploitation trickery, no race condition to win, just logic errors that let a couple of correctly ordered packets walk straight past authentication. Calif also said it built a working exploit for both vulnerabilities in about four hours using an AI coding agent, which is the detail that should worry defenders more than the Monero miner itself: the gap between a patch note and a working exploit keeps shrinking, and it’s shrinking because building the exploit barely takes effort anymore. If you’re running a Mac with Screen Sharing enabled and haven’t updated yet, do it now rather than after finishing this article. And if updating isn’t possible immediately, turn Screen Sharing off entirely under General, Sharing, until you can; leaving port 5900 open to the internet at this point is less a risk than an open invitation. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Monero)
GeoServer faces an unpatched zero-day enabling SQL injection and potentially RCE, with attackers already probing exposed systems. A newly disclosed GeoServer zero-day is already attracting active exploitation attempts, and there is no patch available yet. Organisations running the open-source geospatial platform should check their exposure. A security researcher with the handler q1uf3ng discloded the vulnerability that has yet to be assigned a CVE identifier. 实话说今天是非常不开心的一天 实际上最近一段时间我都非常沮丧 各种事情 所以我公布一个0day 希望让你们心情变的开心 GeoServer jsonArrayContains 未授权 SQL 注入 数据库sa的情况下理所当然的可以rce pic.twitter.com/0uTUyMNYU4 — 秋风 (@q1uf3ng) August 12, 2026 The flaw lies in the jsonArrayContains functionality and allows unauthorised SQL injection. Under some configurations, especially where the service can reach a privileged database account, that path may lead to remote code execution The vulnerability has yet to be assigned a CVE identifier. The issue was publicly disclosed on 12 August 2026. Within hours, watchTowr said it had begun seeing exploitation attempts, with hundreds of probes coming from a small number of IP addresses. “Within hours of public disclosure, we began observing exploitation attempts and have since recorded hundreds of attempts originating from a small number of source IP addresses. Yet another example of how quickly attackers move once a vulnerability enters the public domain,” said WatchTowr’s Jake Knott. That timing matters. Once a proof of concept or enough technical detail is public, attackers don’t need to wait for a polished exploit. They can scan broadly, trigger errors, compare responses, and build a list of systems worth revisiting later. It’s reconnaissance with an error message as a compass. Threat actors are probing vulnerable GeoServer systems, but no follow-up activity has been observed yet. However, researchers warn exploitation could soon escalate. “However, this is unlikely to remain the case for long: GeoServer has a track record of being targeted and exploited at scale, with multiple vulnerabilities listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog,” Knott added. “With no patch currently available and exploitation already underway, organizations running GeoServer should take this vulnerability seriously and, where possible, identify exposed instances, restrict public access, and monitor for a vendor fix,” Attackers are probing GeoServer systems for the unpatched zero-day, triggering errors to identify vulnerable targets before likely exploitation. GeoServer is a popular platform for publishing and sharing geographic data through web services. It appears in public-sector portals, environmental platforms, mapping projects, utilities, transport systems, research institutions, and internal business applications. That makes a remotely reachable instance more than a technical footnote; it may expose geospatial information, backend services, credentials, or a route into a wider network. The absence of a patch changes the usual response. Teams cannot simply schedule an update and move on. They need to identify every GeoServer instance, determine whether it is internet-facing, restrict access wherever possible, inspect logs for unusual requests and database errors, and limit the permissions available to the application’s database account. This is also not GeoServer’s first encounter with active exploitation. In 2024, attackers used the critical GeoServer GeoTools vulnerability CVE-2024-36401 (CVSS score of 9.8), to pull compromised systems into DDoS and cryptocurrency-mining botnets and residential proxy networks. That history does not prove that every exposed instance will be compromised this time, but it does make complacency hard to defend. The practical priority is exposure reduction. Put GeoServer behind a VPN, a reverse proxy, IP allow-listing, or another access-control layer if the service does not need to be public. If public access is unavoidable, treat it as a temporary high-risk exception, watch it closely, and prepare to apply the vendor fix as soon as it arrives. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, zero-day)
The Netherlands’ National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is warning that hackers are actively exploiting a macOS authentication bypass vulnerability after public exploit code emerged. The security issue lies in macOS Screen Sharing, a built-in remote desktop feature that allows remote desktop control over a network, using the VNC protocol over TCP port 5900. Apple fixed CVE-2026-65400 on August 6 in macOS Tahoe 26.6.1 and earlier releases. The flaw allows network-based attackers to gain access without valid credentials. An attacker could use this access to open applications remotely, access files, change security settings, and perform various other actions. In an update to the initial advisory, the Dutch agency said it received a report indicating that the vulnerability is being exploited in the wild in attacks where port 5900 is exposed to the internet.
The ShinyHunters extortion group stole personal information from 1.6 million RingCentral accounts after hacking the company in July, according to the data breach notification service Have I Been Pwned. RingCentral is a cloud-based collaboration and communication platform used by over 600,000 businesses for services such as calling, messaging, and voicemail. The company disclosed the incident on July 28, revealing that its systems were compromised following what it described as a "sophisticated social engineering campaign." "We have not seen any new unauthorized activity since taking these remediation efforts. To date, this incident has affected data for a limited portion of RingCentral customers, and we are communicating with affected customers directly," it noted. "If you are not contacted by RingCentral, you are not affected. This incident did not impact the core RingCentral platform, and our services continue to operate without disruption."
Hardware wallet manufacturer Trezor disclosed a data breach affecting nearly 14,000 of its customers after ShipMonk, its shipping and logistics provider, was hacked. During the incident, the attackers gained access to customers' order data, including their full names, shipping addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers. As the company explained in a Thursday blog post, the resulting data breach affects customers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Colombia, Brazil, Italy, and Portugal who received orders between May 10th and August 8th, 2026. "On Monday, August 10, 2026, one of our shipping providers, ShipMonk, informed us of unauthorized access to their systems containing customer data," Trezor said. "The incident affects 11,742 customers with full exposure (name, email, phone number, shipping address) and 1,947 customers with partial exposure (name, city, email)."
More than 737 browser extensions published on the Chrome Web Store impersonated well-known VPN and proxy services while routing users’ traffic through SOCKS5 proxies operated by a single provider. Some of the extensions impersonated dozens of established brands, including Proton VPN, NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 public domain name system (DNS) resolver. Researchers at application security company Socket found that the campaign relied on 40 publisher accounts and used a shared analytics account. While on the Chrome Web Store, the extensions were downloaded nearly 75,000 times, mainly by Russian users looking for tools to bypass blocked services in the country. “With all browser traffic forced through it [the relay], the threat actor’s server is positioned to read every destination, every TLS SNI value, the victim’s source IP, and any request body sent over plain HTTP,” Socket explains.
A newly disclosed flaw in the way OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google carried hidden AI reasoning between API calls let researchers recover internal reasoning and secrets from session logs, including API keys and passwords. The weakness affected encrypted reasoning objects used by the providers' reasoning APIs, where a block created in one session could be replayed into another and, during testing,
Kimwolf v7: The Android TV Botnet That Now Hides Its Traffic Behind Chrome Fingerprints and Ethereum Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 discovered Kimwolf v7 on February 3, 2026, while hunting threats following public disclosures of the botnet’s earlier activity. The new version substantially upgrades the DDoS capabilities and command infrastructure of a botnet that has been targeting Android TV boxes since August 2025, while its Linux counterpart AISURU has been active since mid-2024. The operators’ core objective hasn’t changed, build a large-scale DDoS platform, but the methods for sustaining it and hiding its traffic have become considerably more sophisticated. “This version upgrades its distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack capabilities and the resilience of its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. Kimwolf primarily affects Android TV boxes and set-top boxes. Kimwolf v7 adds an HTTP/2-based DDoS flood that constructs complete browser fingerprints. This makes attack traffic more difficult to distinguish from legitimate browsing.” reads the report by Palo Alto Networks. “The threat’s binary includes five hard-coded public Ethereum-based endpoints for resolving Ethereum Name Service (ENS) domains. ENS is a blockchain-based naming system used to obtain C2 addresses.” The nghttp2 library powers the HTTP/2 flood and constructs headers that mirror legitimate Chrome browser behavior at the protocol level, making rate-limiting and fingerprint-based DDoS mitigation significantly harder. On top of that, the botnet uses Ethereum’s naming service to resolve its command server address, querying five legitimate public blockchain RPC endpoints shuffled randomly before each attempt, which means blocking any individual endpoint does almost nothing. “Kimwolf also carries a hard-coded Tor .onion hidden service as a backup and a local proxy architecture for flexible routing between clearnet and Tor.” continues the report. “The malware developers added this function to directly respond to C2 server takedown efforts in December 2025.” The three-tier structure, Ethereum ENS, then Tor hidden service, then local proxy on 127.0.0.1:23075, is a direct operational response to two takedowns the botnet suffered in December 2025. The local proxy routes all C2 traffic through the same local address regardless of whether it’s going to the clearnet or Tor, which means the proxy component can be updated independently without redeploying the main bot binary. Unit 42 also identified what it assesses with moderate confidence to be an operator-controlled RPC facade at eth.rpcuniverse.com, based on its single-tenant hosting, registration timing, and exclusive presence in Kimwolf samples. Kimwolf spreads by abusing residential proxy services to reach Android TV boxes that ship with Android Debug Bridge enabled on port 5555. Once tunneled into a local network through a proxy endpoint, attackers can install the malware without any authentication. The botnet masks itself as “netd_service” to blend in with legitimate Android system processes, and Unit 42 found eight APK packages distributed between October and December 2025 that masquerade as a system service called SystemService, probing for root access before executing a bundled kernel payload. Version 7 also strips out all scanning, exploitation, and brute-force functionality from the main binary — the operators have separated the propagation pipeline from the DDoS core. External loaders now handle initial access, while the Kimwolf binary handles attacks and acts as a relay. The attack method count was consolidated from 43 text-named commands in earlier versions to 15 numbered methods covering layers 3 through 7, including the new HTTP/2 flood, a high-performance UDP flood with ARM NEON SIMD acceleration optimized for the processors in Android TV boxes, and a TLS/HTTPS flood. Unit 42 clustered C2 infrastructure across 22 IP addresses in Saint Petersburg, Russia, all sharing the same SSH host key between December 2025 and February 2026. The defensive guidance from Unit 42 is straightforward: treat Android TV boxes as untrusted devices and segment them from enterprise networks. Disabling ADB or restricting it to USB-only access removes the primary way this botnet gets onto devices. For detection, watch for outbound HTTPS connections to Ethereum RPC endpoints from devices that normally have no business touching blockchain services, Tor circuit activity or SOCKS5 proxy traffic from TV boxes, connections to localhost port 23075, and any Android consumer device running a process named “netd_service.” “Kimwolf v7 is a focused evolution of an already large-scale botnet. The HTTP/2 flood with Chrome browser fingerprinting complicates application-layer DDoS mitigation, as attack traffic now mirrors legitimate browser behavior at the protocol and header level.” concludes the report. “The three-tier C2 system (Ethereum ENS, Tor .onion, local proxy) indicates that the operators are investing in infrastructure built to withstand takedown operations.” In March, the U.S. DoJ disrupted command-and-control infrastructure used by several IoT botnets, including AISURU, Kimwolf, JackSkid, and Mossad. The operation involved authorities from Canada and Germany, along with major tech companies, to target botnet operators and weaken their global cybercrime activities. The AISURU/Kimwolf botnet was linked to a record-breaking DDoS attack that peaked at 31.4 Tbps and lasted just 35 seconds. Cloudflare said the November 2025 incident was part of a surge in hyper-volumetric HTTP DDoS attacks observed in late 2025, all automatically detected and mitigated. Kimwolf is a newly discovered Android botnet linked to the Aisuru botnet that has infected over 1.8 million devices and issued more than 1.7 billion DDoS attack commands, according to XLab. The Kimwol Android botnet primarily targets TV boxes, compiled using the NDK and equipped with DDoS, proxy forwarding, reverse shell, and file management functions. It encrypts sensitive data with a simple Stack XOR, uses DNS over TLS to hide communication, and authenticates C2 commands with elliptic curve digital signatures. Recent versions even incorporate EtherHiding to resist takedowns via blockchain domains. Kimwolf follows a naming pattern of “niggabox + v[number]”; versions v4 and v5 have been tracked. By taking over one C2 domain, researchers observed around 2.7 million IPs interacting over three days, indicating a likely infection scale exceeding 1.8 million devices. Its infrastructure spans multiple C2s, global time zones, and versions, making it hard to estimate the total number of infections. The botnet borrows the code from the Aisuru family, however, operators redesigned it to evade detection. Its primary function is traffic proxying, though it can execute massive DDoS attacks, as seen in a three-day period issuing 1.7 billion commands between November 19 and 22. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Kimwolf v7)
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