U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds a Ray-Project Ray vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added a Progress LoadMaster vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-62593 (CVSS score of 9.4), to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. CVE-2025-62593 is a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Ray, an AI compute engine. Versions before 2.52.0 insufficiently protected the Ray dashboard/API against browser-based attacks. Its defense relied on checking whether the HTTP User-Agent header started with “Mozilla”, but browsers can modify this header. By combining this weakness with DNS rebinding, an attacker could potentially execute arbitrary code on a developer’s machine simply by getting them to visit a malicious website or view a malicious advertisement while running Ray. The vulnerability affects Firefox and Safari. Ray 2.52.0 fixes the issue. “This vulnerability is due to an insufficient guard against browser-based attacks, as the current defense uses the User-Agent header starting with the string “Mozilla” as a defense mechanism. This defense is insufficient as the fetch specification allows the User-Agent header to be modified.” reads the advisory. “Combined with a DNS rebinding attack against the browser, and this vulnerability is exploitable against a developer running Ray who inadvertently visits a malicious website, or is served a malicious advertisement (malvertising).” “An attacker exploited a code injection vulnerability in Ray AI Compute Engine via a DNS rebinding attack, leading to remote code execution. This allowed the attacker to escalate privileges within the system, move laterally across the network, establish command and control channels, exfiltrate sensitive data, and ultimately disrupt operations.” reads the analysis published by Aviatrix. According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the vulnerability by the end of this week, on August 20, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
Evooo1Bot is a Mirai-based Linux botnet that hijacks routers and IoT devices for DDoS attacks, credential theft and criminal proxy services. Fortinet’s FortiGuard Labs disclosed Evooo1Bot in mid-August, a previously undocumented Linux botnet that’s been active since July 2026. The bot borrows Mirai‘s DDoS engine but adds encrypted command-and-control communications, an SSH brute-force scanner, a credential sniffer, and a SOCKS5 proxy module on top. “FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.” reads the report published by Fortinet. “While the malware reuses the DDoS engine from the publicly leaked Mirai source code, it extends the original framework with numerous capabilities, including encrypted C2 communications, an SSH brute-force scanner, a SOCKS relay module, a credential sniffer, and an integrated exploit arsenal targeting multiple known vulnerabilities.” The botnet targets 18 known CVEs, some of them dating back to 2007, including: CVE-2007-3010: Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2016-6277: NETGEAR Multiple Routers Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2018-14558: Tenda AC7, AC9, and AC10 Routers Command Injection Vulnerability CVE-2019-14931: Mitsubishi Electric Europe B.V. ME-RTU devices and INEA ME-RTU devices remote Command Injection vulnerability CVE-2020-10987: Tenda AC1900 Router AC15 Model Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-46422: Telesquare SDT-CW3B1 Command Injection vulnerability CVE-2022-37055: D-Link Routers Buffer Overflow Vulnerability CVE-2024-29269, Telesquare TLR-2005KSH Command Injection Vulnerability CVE-2025-10123, D-Link DIR-823X Command Injection Vulnerability CVE-2025-55583: D-Link DIR-868L B1 router Command Injection Vulnerability The bot communicates exclusively over port 443, which is intentional: the traffic blends into expected HTTPS flows at the network perimeter. After gaining initial access through one of its exploit modules or via brute-forced SSH credentials, the bot runs a loader script that clears Bash history to erase evidence of the intrusion before pulling the architecture-appropriate binary from an external server. The breadth suggests the operators are scanning opportunistically for anything unpatched rather than targeting specific organizations. “This capability significantly increases the value of an infected host to attackers. The victim’s IP address can be used to disguise malicious traffic, bypass geographic restrictions, or provide access to internal networks through an already compromised machine.” continues the report. “In larger botnets, the same functionality could also be used to build a distributed proxy infrastructure, enabling anonymous traffic forwarding or monetization through residential and enterprise proxy services.” Evooo1Bot stands out because of its proxy module. A network of compromised routers, cameras, and firewalls acting as SOCKS5 relays is a valuable commodity; operators can use it themselves to obscure attack traffic, or sell access to other criminals looking for residential or enterprise IP addresses that don’t trigger geographic blocks. “Unlike typical botnet commands that focus on downloading payloads or launching attacks, the !socks module turns an infected host into a SOCKS5 proxy that the operator can use as a network relay. It supports two operating modes. In direct mode, it opens a SOCKS5 listener on the infected host on the default TCP port 1080 and waits for incoming client connections. The implementation first attempts to create a dual-stack IPv6 listener and falls back to IPv4 if that fails. Each accepted client is then passed to the session handler for proxying.” continues the report. “The botnet also implements a reverse relay mode. Instead of exposing a listening port, the bot establishes an outbound encrypted connection to an operator-specified relay server. This persistent control channel listens for commands such as RELAY_NEW:<session_id>, which indicate that a new proxy session should be created.” After establishing C2 contact, the bot accepts commands covering the full post-compromise toolkit: file upload and download, interactive shell access, persistence installation, binary updates, HTTP Basic Auth and Cookie header interception, DDoS over DNS, TCP, and UDP, and the HTTP exploit dispatcher. The credential sniffer intercepts authentication headers in transit, so any HTTP Basic Auth credentials passing through an infected device can be captured without any additional effort from the operator. If you’re still running devices with unpatched firmware from the CVE list above, or if any of your edge hardware is using default SSH credentials, Evooo1Bot is already scanning for you. “Beyond traditional botnet functionality, it features encrypted C2 communications, multiple layers of string obfuscation using AES-256-CTR, ChaCha20, and XOR-based key derivation, as well as a 28-command remote administration interface.” concludes the report. “These capabilities place Evooo1Bot well beyond the technical baseline of conventional Mirai-derived malware.” Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Evooo1Bot botnet)
A ransomware affiliate calling itself Ransom Busters has been spotted proactively sending emails to victim organizations and claims to delete stolen data from ransomware groups' servers in exchange for a fee ranging from $20,000 to $60,000. "In these messages, the third-party offers to help the victim recover from ransomware attack. This immediately stands out as anomalous," GuidePoint Research
A single piece of infrastructure has been pulling records out of Salesforce and ServiceNow customer portals across multiple industries for more than a year, according to research published this week by agent security platform Reco. The activity, which Reco has named the City Forum campaign after a domain tied to the attacker's IP address, traces back to one server: 158.220.87.79, hosted on a
A threat actor is selling employee databases allegedly stolen from the Microsoft Azure infrastructure of multiple Fortune 500 companies after gaining access using compromised credentials. Starting July 31st, multiple posts from someone using the alias “TheHatman” advertised data dumps from major organizations, including McDonald's, Gap Inc., Vodafone, Tata Consultancy Services, HCL Technologies, InterContinental Hotels (IHG), and Kyndryl. In total, the threat actor claims to have 3.64 million data records, with the most recent breach posted on Sunday, containing an alleged 1.7 million employee records from McDonalds. “I’m selling McDonald’s Corporation internal employee dump downloaded directly from Azure Tenant using compromised credentials,” the threat actor says in the post.
The SANDCLOCK LiteLLM supply-chain attack exposed credentials across 2,038 repositories, affecting technology, finance, healthcare, retail and more. Resecurity (USA) estimated the most affected sectors by the “SANDCLOCK” backdoor, which was planted as a result of the code repository compromise. According to cybersecurity experts, LiteLLM / TeamPCP Supply-Chain Attack will have long-lasting consequences. By compromising a well-known component in AI applications, adversaries will multiply the blast radius—some of the victim organizations are still unaware of the backdoor and its impact. LiteLLM is a popular open-soure AI gateway and utility library that unifies API calls for over 100 large language model providers, such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, and local Ollama models. Such incidents involve substantial MTTD (Mean Time to Detect) and MTTR (Mean Time to Respond). The threat actor group “TeamPCP” compromised maintainer credentials for LiteLLM and published malicious package versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 to PyPI around March 2026 – creating a window of exposure lasting at least a few months. Over 2,500+ organizations and hundreds of thousands of CI/CD environments suffered full-credential exposure, compromising cloud infrastructure keys, repository access tokens, SSH credentials, Kubernetes secrets, and AI provider API keys (such as OpenAI and Anthropic). Resecurity has acquired the 150GB archive attributed to the LiteLLM supply-chain attack conducted by TeamPCP using the “SANDCLOCK” credential-stealer. Per published incident reporting — accompanying victim manifests enumerate 898 compromised GitHub owners (organisations/accounts) across 2,038 repositories. The affected owners include major global enterprises — among them Microsoft, Azure, IBM, NVIDIA, PayPal (Zettle), Deloitte, Bosch, S&P Global, Elevance Health, 84.51° (Kroger), Adeo (Leroy Merlin), Kärcher, Dräger, ID.me and 1inch. Top 10 the most impacted sectors (by victim organization profile): Technology / Software Banking / Finance / Insurance Healthcare / Pharma / Medtech Retail / E-Commerce Media / Gaming / Adtech Manufacturing / Industrial Professional Services Cybersecurity Crypto Government Resecurity enumerated 2,146 records by key name (values never inspected beyond structural masking). The composition is overwhelmingly GitHub CI-CD identity material, with a long tail of high-value cloud and registry credentials. Victim manifests (owners.txt, repos.txt) enumerate 898 distinct compromised GitHub owners across 2,038 repositories. The distribution is long-tailed: 631 owners have a single affected repo, while the most-affected owner (Cencosud-Cencommerce) has 64. Critically, the owner list includes major global enterprises and regulated organisations. Every organization affected by the LiteLLM incident should revoke or rotate GitHub App private keys, PATs, AWS/GCP/Firebase credentials, ECR/JFrog tokens, SSH keys, and signing passwords, and invalidate sessions. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)
GitHub is down for some users as a widespread outage is causing errors across the website, API, Actions, Pull Requests, and several other services. GitHub confirmed the outage at 9:40 AM EDT on August 17, 2026, when it said it was investigating reports of performance problems affecting some of its services. The problems quickly spread across several parts of GitHub that developers rely on, including API Requests, Actions, Webhooks, Issues, and Pull Requests. According to GitHub's status page, the company is seeing error rates of around 20% across its web experience and API traffic. GitHub says archive downloads and raw repository content downloads are experiencing error rates of approximately 50%. Likewise, authentication-related services are also having problems, with SAML and OIDC authentication, SCIM, and Team Sync affected by the incident.
Author: Len Noe, Solutions Architect, BeyondTrust Every mature Active Directory environment has a component that quietly holds more power than the people running it usually admit: the Certification Authority (CA). The thing your entire estate has agreed to believe. When it signs a certificate, every machine, service, and authentication flow downstream treats that signature as truth. That is an enormous amount of trust concentrated in one system, and most organizations manage it like a utility installed once and never thought about again. Certighost, tracked as CVE-2026-54121, is a reminder of what happens when that trust is misplaced. Researchers published a working proof-of-concept on July 24, 2026, demonstrating that a low-privileged Active Directory user (holding nothing more than a standard domain account) can coerce an Enterprise CA into issuing a valid authentication certificate for a Domain Controller, then use that certificate to become the Domain Controller.
Microsoft has reminded IT administrators that Windows Server 2022 is rapidly approaching its mainstream end date of October 2026, when it will switch to extended support. The company announced Windows Server 2022 in March 2021, and it became generally available in September 2021 as the Long-Term Servicing Channel (LTSC) release, with 10 years of support. "On October 13, 2026, Windows Server 2022 will reach end of mainstream support. The October 2026 security update will be the last mainstream support update available for this version," Microsoft said in a message center update on Friday. "After this date, Windows Server 2022 will transition to extended support, which includes security updates at no additional cost, and will continue to receive monthly security updates through October 14, 2031."
Tech giants General Electric (GE) and Philips have also confirmed they're investigating claims that the Clop ransomware gang breached their systems and stole data. While a GE spokesperson said the company is aware of the claim and is "working to assess the potential issue," a Philips spokesperson confirmed its systems were breached but said the incident has been contained and didn't affect customers. "Philips has identified and contained an attempted cybersecurity compromise of a specific enterprise server related to internal data," Philips said in a statement shared with Reuters. "This has no impact on customer environments." GE and Philips spokespersons have yet to reply after BleepingComputer also reached out to them for more details and to confirm the Clop ransomware gang's claims.
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