Security Affairs Malware newsletter includes a collection of the best articles and research on malware in the international landscape Malware Newsletter Akira Hits Safe Mode: Ransomware Rebooting Around EDR Multi-Functional Linux Botnet “Evooo1Bot” StubMaker RubyGems Campaign Delivers a Windows Infostealer Hunting MacSync Stealer infrastructure through behavioral pivots Manic: Blend between Banking Malware & Spyware Clop Returns with Custom Implant in Mass-Extortion Campaign The ToxicPanda Never Sleeps: ToxicPanda 2.0 Prepares its Next Strike on Mobile Striking gold: Inside the GoldDigger Android malware SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia Prompting the Payload: How an npm Supply Chain Attack Delivers the RedC2 AI-Powered Linux Implant The invisible passenger in your car Malware Crypting Services and the Threat Actors Who Sell Them Grandoreiro goes north: From Brazil to Mexico with a new DLL sideloading campaign Survival of~the~Stealthiest: Evolving Low-Entropy Ransomware via~Genetic Algorithms Malformer: A Multi-Modal Malware Detector Using Transformers XAI-Guided Graph-Based Feature Engineering and Heterogeneous Ensemble Learning for Android Malware Detection An Explainable Deep Learning Pipeline for Malware Family Classification: GAF Image Encoding and API-Grounded LLM Interpretation Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)
The ToxicPanda Android malware has evolved with new malicious functionality, expanding its targeting to 349 applications and adding support for 167 remote commands. The malware now requests VPN service permissions to create a local interface that allows it to control network traffic passing through it. The feature enables ToxicPanda 2.0 to block communication from Google Play and Google Play Services. Control at the network level permits the malware to interfere with various security checks and actions, such as app verifications, updates, Play Protect communication, or legitimate disruptions designed to protect users. After obtaining VPN service permissions, ToxicPanda 2.0 blocks communications to Google Play before extracting and installing its payload, then requests Accessibility Service permissions.
Iran-linked hackers shut down a UK power plant for four days in the first confirmed attack of its kind, concurrent with water infrastructure attacks across 12 US states. Iran-linked hackers shut down a British power plant for four days in what The Telegraph describes as the most successful cyberattack of its kind against UK energy infrastructure. “Iran shut down a British power plant for four days in an unprecedented cyber attack, The Telegraph can disclose.” reads the report published by The Telegraph. “It is thought to be the first time that hackers affiliated to the Iranian regime have succeeded in closing down such a facility in the UK, and is believed to be the most successful cyber attack of its kind.” British officials did not name the power plant because of security concerns. Staff worked for four days to restore it, but the plant was small and the outage did not affect the UK’s wider power supply. Still, the government warned power companies and businesses about the incident and provided guidance on how to respond. The attack was reported to the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), part of GCHQ, which helps protect the UK’s critical infrastructure. The NCSC did not comment on the specific incident. The US water infrastructure attacks hit dozens of wastewater treatment plants across 12 states, causing flooding and loss of pressure from taps. Authorities in affected areas told customers to boil water. The first reports came from Minnesota on July 26, followed by similar breaches in Michigan, Georgia, South Dakota, and New Jersey. The FBI attributed those incidents to “malicious cyber actors”; US government sources later confirmed the threat most likely originated in Tehran. The UK attack is not thought to have been designed to harm civilians. The more probable intent was to demonstrate that hackers linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could gain access to UK infrastructure and shut it down at will. A four-day outage at a small generator that nobody outside the industry noticed is, from that perspective, a successful proof of concept. Iran has accelerated its cyberattacks on Western countries since the US and Israel began air strikes in February. Suspected Iranian operations have been reported in Germany, Poland, Finland, Belgium, and Albania, with Israel and other Middle Eastern countries remaining the most frequent targets. In March, the NCSC advised British organisations to review their security posture in light of the wider conflict. NCSC chief executive Richard Horne said in June that the agency had handled more than 200 attacks on critical national infrastructure in the previous year alone. The timing is awkward for the intelligence and security committee, which oversees UK spying agencies. “Experts have long warned that the UK is unprepared for the scale of the threat of malicious cyber attacks from foreign adversaries, and the intelligence and security committee, which oversees spying agencies, reported last year that the chance of an Iranian cyber attack on British infrastructure was “unlikely”.” continues the report. A Cabinet Office risk assessment published last month placed the probability of a serious and successful cyberattack on domestic infrastructure at between five and twenty-five percent. The same document warned that AI is making attacks faster and cheaper to run, and is lowering the technical bar for anyone wanting to attempt them. The government’s public response leaned hard on the size of the target. A government source told The Telegraph: “We have thresholds for important generators to legally notify us of cyber activity, and this site is nowhere near. It’s a very small-scale site, less than a rounding error compared to grid capacity.” A government spokesman said the UK has a strong and resilient energy system and that the incident never threatened the wider power network. While both statements are technically true, they do not answer a key question: should it be considered acceptable for even a small power plant to remain offline for four days? Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Iran-Linked Hackers)
A new round of the weekly Security Affairs newsletter has arrived! Every week, the best security articles from Security Affairs are free in your email box. Enjoy a new round of the weekly SecurityAffairs newsletter, including international press. ToxicPanda 2.0 Gets a Major Upgrade, Expanding Attacks Across 16 CountriesMalware Hijacks Android Car Head UnitsCritical Flaw in NASA/JPL Open-Source Spacecraft Command Software Allowed Unauthenticated Command ExecutionU.S. CISA adds Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogYour Shredded Visa Card May Still Work at the CheckoutSix Maximum-Severity Flaws Found in Cisco ProductsFake Conferences, OAuth and WhatsApp: Inside Russia’s New Espionage TacticsGitLab Warns of Active Exploitation of Critical GraphQL FlawPoland’s CERT Warns of Active Exploitation of Critical Zimbra Collaboration Suite FlawU.S. CISA adds TrueConf Server flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogCl0p Targets 40+ Organizations Through PTC Windchill FlawManic: The Android Malware That Exfiltrates Data Even When the Phone Is OfflineNSA, CISA, FBI, DOE, and EPA Warn of Active AI-Assisted Attacks on Siemens S7 PLCsU.S. CISA adds an MLflow flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogUS Indicts 17 Iranians Over Years-Long Cyber Espionage CampaignStopAndProtect Turns 2,000 Hacked WordPress Sites Into a Criminal NetworkInside Operation CameraSwarm: How One Actor Took Over 14,000 Dahua CamerasMicrosoft Tracks MacSync Stealer by Its Behavior, Not Its Domains50,000 Stripe Secrets Leaked in Public CodeU.S. CISA adds Apple macOS, Microsoft SharePoint, Broadcom VMware vCenter, and Microsoft IKE flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogHackers Expose Data of 1.2 Million Heights Finance CustomersProject noRecognition: Teaching AI to Fool Surveillance CamerasGitLab Patches Critical Unauthenticated GraphQL VulnerabilityU.S. CISA adds a Ray-Project Ray flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogNew Mirai-Based Evooo1Bot Botnet Targets Linux DevicesSafePal Says 39,798 Customers Hit by Data BreachLiteLLM Supply-Chain Attack – Technology, Banking and Healthcare the Most AffectedInvisible AI Prompts Trigger Court SanctionsMcDonald’s Employee Data Appears in Leak, Seller Claims 1.7M Records StolenAkira Ransomware Uses Safe Mode to Bypass EDRDDoS Attacks Cause Major Threema OutagesMustang Panda Upgrades CoolClient With a Kernel RootkitSophisticated Cyberattack Exposes Data of 678,000 French TaxpayersAPT36 Suspected in PATCHCORD Espionage Campaign Using Google Sheets C2 International Press – Newsletter Cybercrime McDonald’s employee data listed for sale in wider Entra campaign $7 Million in Expired Domains Fuel a Streaming Empire with a Malware Secret Live Stripe keys for 659 merchants, published for free Clop Returns with Custom Implant in Mass-Extortion Campaign Justice Department Secures $400M Settlement with TikTok and ByteDance to Resolve Children’s Privacy Litigation Malware Akira Hits Safe Mode: Ransomware Rebooting Around EDR Hunting MacSync Stealer infrastructure through behavioral pivots Manic: Blend between Banking Malware & Spyware The ToxicPanda Never Sleeps: ToxicPanda 2.0 Prepares its Next Strike on Mobile The invisible passenger in your car Grandoreiro goes north: From Brazil to Mexico with a new DLL sideloading campaign Hacking Large-scale DDoS attacks disrupted Threema secure messaging service The LiteLLM Supply-Chain Attack — TeamPCP “SANDCLOCK” CI/CD Credential-Harvesting Campaign via a Backdoored Trivy GitHub Action Actively exploited vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite AI-assisted tool helped secure satellite communication system after 2022 Russian hacking Expired credit cards revived by researchers to make unauthorized payments CDN Tsunami: Exploiting HTTP/3-HTTP/1.1 Conversion for DoS Attacks When the NASA Ground Station Has No Lock on the Door: Unauthenticated Command Execution in AIT-GUI (GHSA-p9r8-2q67-fp86) Zero-click Grok data theft: Cryptographic Context Injection attack leaks chat histories Intelligence and Information Warfare Operation CameraSwarm: Over 14,000 Dahua cameras compromised across Ukraine and Russia 17 Iranians Charged with Conducting Massive Cyber Theft Campaign on Behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Other Iranian Entities Defending Against an Active Threat to Siemens S7 Series PLCs Rust Supply Chain Attack on arrayref: Significant Overlap with DPRK Campaigns Going with the Flow(s): Distinct Clusters Target Individuals of Interest to Russia SilkParasite: Tracking a China-Nexus APT Across Central Asia Revealed: Cyber spies used malware from GitHub to hack EncroChat cryptophone network Cybersecurity France probes unprecedented cyberattack after tax data of 678,000 users stolen Person Hides Prompt Injection in Legal Filing Telling AI to Side With Them SafePal Unauthorized Access To A Subset Of Customer Order Information This ‘adversarial’ pattern can prevent surveillance cameras from detecting you France’s cybersecurity problem demands strong political will The Powerful Chinese AI Model Experts Warned About—and Waited for—Is Here OpenAI president says companies should do 10 things ASAP to defend against AI cyber threats Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)
New Cryptographic Context Injection technique bypasses AI guardrails via AES-encrypted payloads, leaking full Grok chat histories zero-click Adversa AI researcher Rony Utevsky devised a new attack technique, called Cryptographic Context Injection, that bypasses AI safety filters by sending instructions as AES-encrypted ciphertext and tricking the model into decrypting them inside its own code execution runtime. The technique was demonstrated against two live production systems: xAI’s Grok and Google’s Gemini. “Cryptographic Context Injection hides malicious instructions inside AES-encrypted text so guardrails can’t read them, then tricks the AI into decrypting and trusting them as its own.” reads the report published by Adversa AI. “In Grok, an ordinary “summarize this page” steals the user’s chat data with no click or warning. In Gemini, it produces content the model normally refuses. Both are live production systems.” The Grok case is the more serious of the two. A user asks Grok to summarize a webpage containing an encrypted payload and instructions to decrypt it. Grok visits the page, decrypts the payload in its Python sandbox, and follows the hidden instructions. It then accesses the user’s private session data, including their name, location, subscription plan, and full chat history, and puts this information into a URL that it opens automatically. The user receives no warning and does not need to click anything. The key technical distinction from earlier cipher-based prompt injection work is what happens during decryption. “Static safety guardrails classify inputs as text; they do not execute them. An attacker ships ciphertext along with the key material and an instruction to decrypt it, and the model runs that decryption inside its own code execution sandbox.” continues the report. “Everything a guardrail’s scanner would need is right there on the page, but recovering the plaintext means running PBKDF2 and AES-256-GCM, which no content classifier does at inspection time. “ Prior techniques like CipherChat and CodeChameleon used substitution ciphers, XOR, or base64, schemes the model can decode natively in its own context without an interpreter. AES-256-GCM can’t be decoded that way. Recovery requires the runtime, and that’s the channel the attack depends on. Once the runtime decrypts the payload, the attacker’s instructions appear as the output of code the model just ran, not as untrusted external content. “The runtime execution launders attacker-controlled data into trusted instructions the agent will act upon. That is how the attack got its name: cryptography helps fabricate trusted context for the agent.” states the report. “The same cryptographic backbone works whether the injection is direct or arrives indirectly, for example through the browsing channel.” The attacker payload inherits a credibility the same text would never get if pasted directly into the prompt. The Grok demo hides the data theft behind what looks like a normal request. The payload tells the model to create a “decryption key,” but the key is actually a template containing the user’s private data, such as their name, location, subscription tier, and chat history. Grok then uses this information as a URL parameter when opening an attacker-controlled website to “fetch additional context.” The data is sent through the URL as part of a seemingly normal web request. Adversa said the attack was still reproducible on August 19, 2026. Adversa traces the structural problem to Grok’s agentic framework, not to any model-layer failure. The framework lets instructions from an untrusted external page drive the invocation of a privileged, internet-connected tool. It allows private session metadata and conversation history to be resolved into the inputs of outbound calls. It enforces no egress boundary or consent gate on that path. Adversa’s description maps cleanly to SQL injection: a system that can’t distinguish its own trusted state from attacker-supplied data flowing through the same channel. The Gemini case uses the same basic trick but in a different way. A prompt asks Gemini to run a Python script that decrypts some data and returns a small JSON result. Instead, the decrypted data contains a fake Python error message with hidden instructions designed to bypass Gemini’s safety rules. Because Gemini treats the sandbox output as trusted context, those instructions can influence its behavior. Adversa used the technique to make Gemini generate detailed instructions for building an incendiary device. A modified version also exposed Gemini’s system instructions. Adversa reported the Grok issue to xAI on June 3, 2026, but received no further response after the initial acknowledgment. The attack was still working shortly before publication. The Gemini issue was not formally reported because Google’s bug bounty excludes jailbreaks. Adversa said Gemini’s vulnerability rate has nevertheless dropped sharply since June. For defenders, Adversa’s guidance is that nothing about this attack requires a fix at the model layer. Every control that bounds it sits in the harness around the agent. Untrusted content should be processed in a context with no tools and no credentials, returning only structured data to the privileged context. Outbound network calls and writes outside the workspace should require explicit confirmation with fully resolved arguments visible before approval. Per-session tool traces with resolved arguments should be logged, because without them there’s no forensics and no detection. Detection should alert on sequences, not individual payloads: untrusted content enters context, code executes, agent contacts a host outside its normal dependency graph. That chain is the signal, not any single ciphertext blob. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Cryptographic Context Injection)
ToxicPanda 2.0 targets 349 financial apps and abuses Android Wireless Debugging to gain deeper device access and steal banking credentials. ToxicPanda used to be a Europe-focused nuisance targeting a manageable list of banks. That version is gone. Zimperium’s zLabs team just documented ToxicPanda 2.0, and the numbers alone tell the story: 349 targeted financial institutions across 16 countries, up from 16 apps in the previous version, plus a command set that ballooned to 167 remote instructions. The infection starts with a fairly standard trick dressed up in a new coat of paint. The malware poses as a dropper, requesting VPN permissions through a fake installation screen, then quietly uses that access to block communication from Google Play Protect while it decrypts and installs the real payload hiding inside the app’s own asset files. Once installed, it leans on Android’s Accessibility Service, the same feature legitimate screen readers and automation tools rely on, to see and interact with everything happening on the victim’s screen. ToxicPanda was once a malware mainly targeting a small number of European banks. That has changed. Zimperium’s zLabs team has documented ToxicPanda 2.0, which now targets 349 financial institutions in 16 countries, compared with just 16 apps before. It also has 167 different commands that attackers can send remotely. The attack starts with a common trick. The malware pretends to be a legitimate app and asks for VPN permissions through a fake installation screen. It then uses this access to block Google Play Protect while secretly installing the real malware hidden inside the app’s files. Once installed, ToxicPanda abuses Android’s Accessibility Service. This feature is normally used by legitimate tools such as screen readers, but the malware uses it to monitor the victim’s screen and interact with apps and data on the device. “By abusing the Android Accessibility Service, threat actors can steal every UI element on the screen, alongside an overlay-based credential theft mechanism targeting 349 financial institutions, compared to the previous version, which targeted only 16 banking applications, the latest iteration demonstrates a significant expansion in targeting scope and capabilities.” reads the report published by Zimperium’s zLabs. “Several commands previously identified as unimplemented in Cleafy’s analysis are now fully operational, expanding the malware’s remote control and fraud capabilities.” What sets this version apart isn’t just scale, it’s a genuinely new privilege escalation trick built around a feature most people have never touched: Android’s Wireless Debugging framework. The malware automates the entire process of turning it on, tapping the build number seven times to unlock developer options, toggling wireless debugging, and then scraping the six-digit pairing code straight off the screen using accessibility permissions. From there it performs the actual cryptographic pairing handshake itself, gaining shell-level access to the device without the victim ever realizing developer mode got switched on. ToxicPanda was once a malware mainly targeting a small number of European banks. That has changed. Zimperium’s zLabs team has documented ToxicPanda 2.0, which now targets 349 financial institutions in 16 countries, compared with just 16 apps before. It also has 167 different commands that attackers can send remotely. The attack starts with a common trick. The malware pretends to be a legitimate app and asks for VPN permissions through a fake installation screen. It then uses this access to block Google Play Protect while secretly installing the real malware hidden inside the app’s files. Once installed, ToxicPanda abuses Android’s Accessibility Service. This feature is normally used by legitimate tools such as screen readers, but the malware uses it to monitor the victim’s screen and interact with apps and data on the device. The real danger comes from its ability to use Android Debug Bridge (ADB). Once connected, ToxicPanda can run commands through ADB without showing the usual permission requests. This allows it to give itself more permissions, remove Android restrictions on background activity, enable important components without the user knowing, and maintain access to the device. “The malware also introduces an automated click-based mechanism to abuse Android Wireless Debugging (ADB), enabling privilege escalation and shell-level access on compromised devices. Additionally, it can steal lock screen credentials by placing overlays on top of the lock screen.” continues the report. The credential theft itself runs on two separate tracks. For banking and crypto apps specifically, the malware watches which app the victim opens, matches it against a list of 349 targets, and either overlays a fake login screen or deploys an invisible transparent layer to capture every touch and PIN entry directly. Separately, it can now overlay a convincing fake version of the phone’s own lock screen to steal the device PIN, pattern, or password outright, which hands attackers a way back in even after the initial infection window closes. Several capabilities that security firm Cleafy had previously flagged as unfinished in an earlier ToxicPanda variant are now fully working. The malware can automatically click through OEM-specific permission dialogs across Xiaomi, Samsung, Huawei, and other manufacturers’ customized Android builds, request Device Administrator privileges using a fake “system service” prompt, and even remotely force-reset a victim’s lock screen password using legitimate Android device management APIs. It can also load an attacker-controlled webpage inside a full-screen overlay on command, a feature that simply didn’t exist in prior versions. Distribution has shifted too, with samples now getting served from Amazon AWS-hosted storage buckets rather than whatever ad-hoc infrastructure earlier campaigns used. “The updated campaign also reveals a shift in distribution methods, with ToxicPanda 2.0 samples being delivered through Amazon AWS-hosted buckets, indicating the attackers are leveraging cloud infrastructure for malware delivery.” states the report. Using major cloud providers for malware delivery isn’t new, but it does complicate blocking efforts, since flagging an entire AWS IP range as malicious tends to take down a lot of legitimate traffic along with it. None of this requires a sophisticated zero-day, which is honestly the more unsettling part. Every capability here abuses a feature Android ships intentionally, Accessibility Services, Wireless Debugging, Device Administrator APIs, all designed for legitimate accessibility and enterprise device management. “As mobile banking threats like ToxicPanda become increasingly sophisticated, conventional signature-based security layers are no longer sufficient to protect enterprise mobile endpoints.” concludes the report. If you’re responsible for securing mobile endpoints, this is less a “patch something” problem and more a “detect abnormal use of normal features” problem, and that’s a considerably harder thing to build detection around. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, ToxicPanda 2.0)
A supply-chain attack targeting Android-based car head units is using a legitimate device-update app to spread malware that enlists compromised devices in a proxy botnet or uses them for ad fraud. Kaspersky researchers analyzed the malware and attributed the operation to the MoYu group, a threat actor previously associated with the BadBox malware botnet. The researchers note that this is the first documented case of a malware infection chain specifically created for the targeted car head unit. MoYu's operation targets systems from DoFun, a Chinese automotive software and hardware provider owned by Shenzhen Driving Control Technology Co., Ltd. DoFun is an automotive software, cloud services, and hardware provider that sells generic Android-based head units, which act as the command center for a car's infotainment, navigation, and settings systems.
Windows named pipes provide fast interprocess communication, but weak access controls can expose privileged services to untrusted processes. ThreatLocker explains how endpoint verification, command authorization, strict input validation, and narrowly scoped privileges can help secure named-pipe communication.
A critical flaw (CVSS 9.4) in NASA/JPL’s AIT-GUI let anyone send unauthenticated commands to spacecraft instruments. Cycode researchers found that AIT-GUI, the browser-based operator console in NASA/JPL open-source AMMOS Instrument Toolkit, shipped with no authentication, no session checks, and no CSRF protection on any of its state-changing endpoints. “AIT-GUI, the web front end of NASA/JPL’s open-source AMMOS Instrument Toolkit, starts an HTTP server with no authentication, no authorization, and no CSRF protection on any of its state-changing endpoints.” reads the report published by Cycode. “Anyone who can reach the port, or any website an operator merely visits in a browser, can: Issue arbitrary commands via POST /cmd Run server-side scripts via POST /script/run Execute command sequences via POST /seq“ The vulnerability is tracked as GHSA-p9r8-2q67-fp86, rated Critical (CVSS score of 9.4), and fixed in AIT-GUI 2.5.2. AMMOS (Advanced Multi-Mission Operations System) is an open-source framework used by NASA/JPL and other missions to control spacecraft and instruments, send commands, and process the data they send back. AIT-GUI is the web interface operators use to do this in real time. Sending a command through this software is not like filling out a simple online form. The vulnerability isn’t one thing. It’s four ordinary web weaknesses that compose into something with unusual consequences. The first is that the server reads its configured host setting into a variable and then ignores it, binding instead to 0.0.0.0, which means all network interfaces. An operator who sets host: localhost to keep the console on the loopback gets a server exposed to the entire reachable network anyway. The second and third weaknesses follow from the first. There’s no login requirement, no session gate, no CSRF token, and no cross-origin restriction on any route. POST /cmd takes whatever arrives in the command field, parses it, and hands it directly to the command bus: no check, no validation, nothing between the network and the hardware. The fourth weakness lives on POST /seq and POST /script/run, which build filesystem paths by joining raw user input onto a root directory with no confinement. A seqfile value of ../../../../something resolves outside the intended sequence directory. The researchers note that the correct confinement check already exists in the same codebase, on a sibling route called /scripts/load; the safe pattern was already written, just not applied consistently. The CSRF risk is especially serious because a firewall does not stop it. Browsers can send certain form requests from another website without first checking with the target site. So, if an operator opens a malicious page in the same browser they use for the console, it could send commands such as POST /cmd, POST /seq, or POST /script/run. The attacker does not need direct access to the system or its network port—they only need the operator to open a malicious link. Cycode’s research team used a combination of AI-assisted code analysis and human validation to find and confirm the issues. The AI handled the initial codebase review, flagging recognizable patterns: state-changing routes with no auth anywhere in their call path, user input flowing from a request parameter into a subprocess call without sanitization, and a configuration value that was read and then silently discarded. The human researcher then confirmed each pattern was exploitable and reduced each to a working proof-of-concept, including a self-contained CSRF demonstration that drove a real headless browser and recorded zero network preflights. That second step matters. A pattern match points to a candidate; a reproduced exploit confirms the finding is real. Cycode says explicitly it only reports the second kind. “More broadly: operational and ground-system software inherits the same web weaknesses as everything else, but with a far higher cost of failure. Auth, CSRF defense, and input confinement are not optional extras on a panel that commands hardware.” concludes the report. The fix is in AIT-GUI 2.5.2. Operators should upgrade immediately and verify the console port is not reachable from untrusted networks. Anyone who ran an exposed instance before the patch should treat it as a reason to audit command and sequence history, since an unauthenticated POST leaves no user-level trace by design. Maintainers hardening deployments should add authentication and CSRF protection to the command, script, and sequence routes; bind the server to the configured host instead of 0.0.0.0; and apply the existing path-confinement logic from /scripts/load to /seq and /script/run. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, NASA/JPL)
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) flaw CVE-2026-73570 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. CERT Polska, Poland’s national computer emergency response team, confirmed this week that threat actors are actively exploiting the critical vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite. The flaw allows unauthenticated remote code execution and was patched less than a month ago. “The CERT Polska team informs about an actively exploited OS Command Injection vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite.” reads the advisory published by CERT Polska. “The vulnerability, identified as CVE-2026-73570 , allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the zimbra user . The vulnerability affects instances that have the SNMP trap service enabled via the snmp_notify parameter and the swatchdog service running (enabled by default).” The vulnerability affects systems with SNMP trap notifications enabled and the swatchdog service running, which is enabled by default. The technical root cause is a sanitization failure in the SNMP monitoring component. Zimbra released version 10.1.20 on 20 July 2026 to address the issue. The fix came 28 days before active exploitation was confirmed, which is not a wide window, but apparently wide enough. The attack surface only exists when the optional zimbra-snmp package is installed and SNMP notifications are active, but swatchdog, the service that processes those notifications, is running by default on most installations. Below are recommendations by CERT Polska: “Due to the ongoing campaign exploiting this vulnerability, we recommend: verifying Zimbra logs /var/log/zimbra.log for the following entries: Service status change: <szkodliwy ładunek> changed from stopped to running Service status change: <szkodliwy ładunek> changed from running to stopped verification of files created by user zimbra in the last 30 days in the following directories: /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/ /opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps/ /tmp/ If you discover any signs of potential exploitation of this vulnerability, please contact our team immediately.” According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaw by August 24, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
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