uCreater is Android spyware disguised as trusted apps, stealing credentials, messages and wallet data through a rentable platform. uCreater is a rentable Android spyware platform that hides inside repackaged legitimate apps, targeting messaging services and mobile wallets. Its YingGai framework can intercept one-time passwords, steal account and chat data, collect contacts, manipulate sessions and spoof camera feeds to bypass identity checks. Victims may install modified versions of Telegram, WeChat or GCash through sideloading or social engineering. Researcher Ovi found stolen data on a control server, but the number of victims and links between operators and customers remain unconfirmed. “The repackaged APK can be relatively thin: target-specific instrumentation is retrieved after installation from the operator’s Alibaba OSS and MinIO infrastructure, including buckets and paths named Huuk_<target> and fengzhuang-app (literally, “packaging”). Distribution hosts include telegram-apk.uzyzx.com.” researcher Ovi states. “I could reconstruct much of the post-installation execution chain from the recovered code, but I could not directly establish the initial delivery mechanism for every victim.” Ovi rebuilt most of the chain from recovered code but couldn’t establish how every victim got the first install. The product is older than the samples. The package com.ucreater.autotool dates to about 2014, Windows tools tied to ucreater.com were signed between 2016 and 2019, and the YingGai mobile line shows up in records from September 2021. The samples Ovi studied run from 2024 to 2026: uip.exe builds from February to December 2024, Telegram repacks from July and November 2024, the WeChat host and Telegram framework from December 2024, and the Onion Box client from March 2026. The control server’s ICP filing, 湘ICP备2024061212号, dates to 2024. The infrastructure hints at scale, though not at victim numbers. Ovi counts about 20 target apps with confirmed code support, six operator domains with dozens of subdomains, three Redis buses, two MQTT buses, and a cloud-phone cluster in Changsha spread across several ISPs. A Censys search for the operator’s Tengine gateway fingerprint returned roughly 48 hosts. It looks like a multi-year product sold to many downstream operators, but he can’t say how many customers used it or how many devices fell. Attributing the platform to a specific legal entity is more difficult. Hunan Youchuang Technology is linked to the ucreater.com brand and a self-signed certificate on videoflow.cn. Changsha Sukai Network holds the ICP filing for the control server’s main domain, qianxuncc.cn, while Changsha Zhuoqing E-commerce appears as the signing identity on uip.exe, using a DigiCert certificate. A common owner is plausible but unproven. Another lead involves hunanzhijing.com, a domain belonging to the Hunan Intelligent Police Public Safety Technology Research Institute. It shares the same gateway fingerprint, and an official Hunan document connects the institute to an intelligent-policing research project. However, shared cloud infrastructure establishes only co-tenancy, not ownership or operational involvement. There is no evidence that the police developed or operated uCreater. Other infrastructure links also require caution. A Thailand-based relay used by the Telegram component, hosted on Huawei Cloud, also served gambling websites, an advertising-account service and an SMS service. The cloud-phone web client displayed a certificate for another vendor, while the gateway served a Vue application titled 舆情交易, meaning “public-opinion trading”. These observations are leads for further investigation, not proof of common ownership. uCreater relies on app virtualization, a technique already identified by Zimperium as a growing mobile threat. VirtualApp runs another application inside a container, LSPatch merges code hooks into repackaged apps without requiring root access, and Pine hooks Android’s runtime. Together, these components allow malicious code to operate inside a legitimate app while it is signed in and has access to decrypted data. “uCreater is notable because it turns these techniques into a reusable, remotely managed product.” the researchers continues. Operators distribute modified versions of Telegram-X, Telegram-Web and other messaging apps, integrating modules through LSPatch or loading them from an asset called TgJarPine.dex. WeChat can instead run inside a VirtualApp container, including the va_vx or Onion Box host. LSPatch also stores the original APK under cache/lspatch/origin/*.apk. The presence of this path or the specific asset can help identify an infected device. The approach differs from GodFather, a banking trojan documented by Zimperium that runs apps in a virtual container and displays fake overlays to capture credentials. uCreater operates inside the real application without relying on an overlay. It uses XposedBridge hooks, reflection and access to the app’s own database interfaces. This allows it to reach beyond login screens and potentially support any application for which the vendor develops a module. Ovi found no evidence linking the two platforms. One distinguishing feature is a local command server embedded in each hooked application. It exposes around 40 numbered handlers, with descriptions and parameters that allow operators to discover available functions. The code supports device monitoring, contact and SMS collection, installed-app enumeration, message sending, chat-history retrieval, session management and account-related actions. The Telegram module can execute SQL queries directly against the application’s live database through its own interface. Its Db_MessagesStorageRawQuery handler accepts operator-supplied SQL and returns results through compatibility classes that recreate Telegram objects. This can expose information that would otherwise be protected in the app’s encrypted or locally stored data while the application is running. The module also hooks Telegram’s SRPHelper.getX routine, capturing the two-step verification password in cleartext before hashing and storing it for exfiltration. The code provides functions to list or reset sessions, change or confirm a linked phone number, delete an account and lock users out. It can also remove its own session from the victim’s device list, potentially concealing the operator’s access. Ovi stresses that the source code demonstrates these capabilities, not that every action has been successfully performed against victims. The implant retrieves its control-server address from Redis using the Domain key, optionally selecting a value for a particular channel. It caches the address and can fall back to a hardcoded value, explaining why callback domains differ between builds. Signed JSON beacons report to endpoints under /api/callback/Tg*, while command requests include a device fingerprint and signature and use retries with increasing delays. Updates and additional code arrive through Alibaba Object Storage Service (OSS) and MinIO. The Telegram module retrieves an update manifest and hooks from designated storage paths, while a contacts.vcf file can supply contact information. The WeChat component subscribes to a Redis channel identified by a device-specific machine ID, with its host and credentials embedded in a child code file. The WeChat module focuses on account access rather than chat-history collection. Its _2_0_UploadAppLoginInfo command retrieves login identity information, after which the app data can be packaged, uploaded to OSS and used in account cloning. Ovi found no evidence that the examined sample accessed WeChat’s encrypted database. Ovi tested uCreater on a Pixel 10 Pro running Android 17 and found that its bundled Pine engine fails because of changes to Android’s internal APIs. The latest sample, dated July 29, 2026, still uses the outdated engine. Although this creates obstacles for operators, updating Pine could restore functionality, and other devices remain untested. Ovi also identified five samples that successfully contacted the control server, confirming active deployments targeting Telegram, Telegram-X and WeChat. Ovi and researcher Jurre discovered the platform’s source code after finding an exposed GitLab server. Other infrastructure was protected by IP allowlists, but this server contained the control platform’s source code, configuration and operational details. The repositories revealed Spring Cloud services for command dispatch, authorization capture, data collection, backups and message bridging, alongside a Vue-based administration console. Thirteen repositories contained commit histories identifying roughly three dozen developers, with activity timestamps consistent with China time. At least one commit used a corporate email domain associated with Tanzhou, a Changsha software firm. uCreater’s backend is a rented, multi-tenant platform that lets operators manage infected devices, steal account data and automate contact collection. Kafka, RocketMQ, Redis and Nacos coordinate commands and schedule activity to avoid triggering security controls. The infrastructure runs on Aliyun and Huawei Cloud, with control services and storage hosted in China. Although GitLab records identify developers behind key components, Ovi stresses they are not confirmed operators. The recovered backend did not appear to support Telegram, and some callback domains are no longer active. Ovi attributes the platform to a vendor in Changsha and Hunan operating through three companies, each linked to a different technical or infrastructure artifact. The reseller model, focus on mobile wallets and theft of authentication codes suggest financially motivated crime, but the researcher presents this as an assessment rather than a proven fact. The technical findings show that uCreater goes beyond a conventional banking trojan or a tool that merely steals credentials. By embedding code inside legitimate applications, it can manipulate sessions, access account data, collect contacts and potentially take control of messaging accounts. Its rented, multi-tenant architecture also allows different operators to use the same underlying platform. The scale of the infrastructure indicates a substantial operation, but neither the number of customers nor the number of compromised devices has been established. Likewise, infrastructure overlaps and developer records provide investigative leads, not conclusive proof of who operated the spyware or who was responsible for individual attacks. “Mapping points to a commercial resale structure, and targeting driven by wallets and OTPs. My assumption is financially-motivated crimeware.” concludes the report. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)
Cyfirma links PHP2Shell scans of 216 vulnerable hosts to a suspected North Korean campaign using AI to rank public exploits. On October 21, PHP released emergency patches for two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, both rated 9.2 on the CVSS scale. The flaws affect all PHP versions that handle web requests. The vulnerable code dates back to PHP 5.4, released in 2012, and resides in the PHP engine itself rather than in individual applications. Attackers can exploit the flaws to execute code remotely by sending specially crafted HTTP requests, without authentication. Exploitation attempts increased rapidly after the vulnerabilities became public. Cloudflare researchers reported tens of thousands of attempts within the first 45 minutes, hundreds of thousands in just two hours, and millions by October 22. Cyfirma reported that a group of North Korea-linked group has identified 216 hosts that may still be vulnerable to PHP2Shell. The operators communicate through a private I2P channel that Cyfirma has monitored since October 22. On October 24, they reported that 216 hosts appeared to be unpatched or only partly protected, earlier than Cyfirma expected. They are checking the systems from 21 compromised machines. At the time Cyfirma captured the conversation, the operators had already checked about one-third of the targets. “Two handles active since March 2026, coordinating in a closed I2P channel; staging infrastructure shared in-channel.” states the cybersecurity firm. “Target set and scan nodes. “On 24 October the operators reported 216 unpatched or partially mitigated hosts and named 21 scan nodes; the same addresses were seen performing web-shell tooling and upload-progress session-poisoning attempts.” The scanning is slow on purpose. Volume stays low, the machines rotate, and any node that shows filtering or rate limiting gets pulled and never reused. That’s why a rate-based alert will probably stay quiet. Who’s behind it? Cyfirma assesses with moderate confidence a link to the Lazarus family of North Korean groups, based on language, operating style and old habits with PHP web shells and hijacked web servers. It has no shared malware or infrastructure to point to yet, and it admits that a Korean-speaking criminal crew without state backing would fit the same facts. Its confidence in the campaign itself is high. Government agencies and banks come first. Next in line are logistics, ports, airports and aviation, manufacturing, and online transaction and trading platforms. The countries named are the US, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, Taiwan, India, Singapore, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the EU. Cyfirma has not named any victims or seen the full list of targeted systems. The operators have not announced when they plan to launch attacks, and the researchers have not confirmed that this group has compromised systems on a large scale. Cyfirma gives the campaign an imminence score of 78 out of 100. The operators plan to check all 216 hosts, select the most promising targets, and decide which publicly available exploits to adapt. The group does not appear to be developing new exploits. Instead, its members use a local AI model to rank public exploit repositories, then test the results manually in a lab. Cyfirma believes this approach could help attackers turn newly disclosed vulnerabilities into working attacks more quickly. However, researchers warn that some proof-of-concept exploits shared online are fake and may contain malware, so downloading and running them can be dangerous. Technical details leaked on October 20, ahead of coordinated disclosure, and the PHP project shipped fixes on October 21. Apache mod_php with default settings and prefork is the confirmed worst case for 109618, with full unauthenticated code execution. For 109619, PHP-FPM is validated through the upload-progress path. One correction matters for your temporary controls. Early coverage tied the session upload-progress field to 109618, but PHP’s advisories put it under 109619 only. Disabling upload progress does nothing for 109618, so the two bugs need different stopgaps. Triggering the bug is easy, but reliable code execution isn’t. The attacker has to land a follow-up request on the same worker and shape heap data into the freed space, otherwise the worker crashes or answers normally. VulnCheck reports working code execution on x86-64 with ASLR enabled against PHP 8.4.10 to 8.4.26, while ARM64 only leaks memory so far. Short of code execution, attackers have already shown worker crashes, arbitrary file reads through OPcache and a leak of about 67 KB of process memory. The fixed releases are PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35. PHP 8.1, 8.0 and 7.4 get only minimal backports, and vendors such as cPanel EasyApache, CloudLinux, TuxCare and Plesk carry their own builds, so confirm coverage with yours. Anything from PHP 5.4 to 7.3 has no fix, so migrate or isolate it. Restart every worker after patching, because a reload that keeps old workers alive leaves the stale state in place. Isolate anything internet-facing that you can’t patch within hours, starting with Apache mod_php. If you suspect a host is compromised, capture memory and logs before you patch, since a restart destroys the CVE-2026-109619 state. Then rebuild the host from a trusted image and rotate every secret the PHP worker could reach. Hunt back to October 17, the earliest known exploitation, and use long time windows. The strongest single signal is a PHP or web server process spawning something it never normally spawns. Application logs will usually show nothing, because the bug fires before application code runs. Look for odd multipart POSTs to endpoints that never take uploads, bursts of worker crashes and memory errors, new PHP files in web roots, and new cron jobs, local users or SSH keys. Cyfirma includes Sigma, Splunk and YARA content, though it says the YARA set hasn’t been tested on real application code yet. It also lists 21 scan-node addresses, 17 source addresses from October 23 and 15 staging addresses, all defanged. Some scan nodes are described as compromised and may belong to victims, so hunt for prior contact before assuming who owns them. If you can’t patch yet, the advisory suggests limits such as a low post_max_size and disabling session upload progress for 109619. Cyfirma is clear that none of it replaces patching. The operators’ own selection rule is the most useful detail in the whole advisory, because they dropped every host that showed a fixed version or sat behind heavy filtering. That makes a current version string a cheap filter against you, and for once being boring pays off. “Hosts still bannering older PHP are the ones the operators kept.” Cyfirma states. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, PHP2Shell)
Two critical RCE vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619), collectively tracked as PHP2Shell, have been successfully exploited in the wild. The malicious activity was caught by Adel Karimi, detection and response lead at Perplexity, whose honeypots recorded evidence of confirmed remote code execution against an Apache mod_php installation running PHP 8.4.26. "This is now confirmed RCE with usable memory disclosure, not just a crash followed by a suspicious process. The response delivered an 800 KiB decoded cookie dump, and a function address derived from that dump using the public exploit's offsets appears in the subsequent execution payload," Karimi shared. "The client acknowledged the full response; the shell command then ran about 1.6 ms after the execution request's final captured byte."
Researchers found a malicious AGENTS markdown instruction file in a customer’s Downloads folder that tricked an AI coding agent into installing a rogue npm package. They reproduced the attack against OpenAI Codex and demonstrated a related technique against Claude Code to leak OAuth tokens and hijack the account using only the malicious instructions. Markdown files such as AGENTS.md are plain-text files that contain project-specific instructions for AI coding agents, such as the tools to use, how to run tests, and the coding conventions to follow. Researchers at Forever Security, a company that monitors for risks introduced by AI agents and autonomous software, discovered the tactic on a customer’s computer, where a coding agent attempted to install the malicious npm package ‘function-color.’
Pierluigi Paganini answers questions about the PHP2Shell vulnerability, early exploitation, AI-assisted attacks, and the risks to businesses, servers, and personal data. 1. Your latest report reveals that hackers began exploiting the PHP2Shell vulnerability four days before it was publicly disclosed. First, can you explain what PHP is, how widely it is used across the internet, and why this particular security flaw is so serious? PHP is a programming language widely used to build websites and web applications. It powers a significant share of the web. PHP2Shell is serious because it can allow attackers to execute commands on a vulnerable server remotely. Depending on the configuration and the server’s privileges, this could give threat actors access to sensitive data, applications and other systems. 2. According to AWS researchers, attacks were already underway before the vulnerability became public. How did researchers uncover this early exploitation, and what does it tell us about the ability of hackers to identify security weaknesses before developers can fix them? AWS researchers detected exploitation attempts against their honeypot network four days before public disclosure and the release of patches. This shows that attackers can discover or weaponize vulnerabilities before defenders have time to respond. AI-assisted analysis may accelerate this process, helping attackers turn technical information into working exploits in hours rather than days. However, detected attempts do not automatically mean successful compromises. 3. The vulnerability could potentially allow attackers to execute malicious commands on affected servers. What does that mean in practical terms, and what risks does it pose to websites, businesses and the personal information of their users? Remote command execution means an attacker may be able to make a server run commands without authorization. Depending on the attacker’s access, they could steal data, install malware, change website content, or use the compromised server to attack other systems. Businesses could face service disruption, financial losses and reputational damage. Users may also be exposed if their personal information is stored on an affected system. The actual impact depends on the server’s configuration and security controls. 4. The latest findings raise concerns about the gap between discovering a vulnerability and protecting systems against it. How quickly can attackers exploit these weaknesses, and are businesses adequately prepared to respond when critical security flaws emerge? The window can be extremely short. In some cases, attackers can develop or adapt an exploit within hours, leaving organizations little time to react. Many businesses still rely on patching schedules that are too slow for internet-facing systems. Organizations need continuous monitoring, rapid patching, tested incident response plans and clear visibility into exposed assets. They should also investigate suspicious activity dating back to before a vulnerability was publicly disclosed, because attacks may already be underway. 5. With PHP powering a significant portion of the internet, could we see further attacks exploiting this vulnerability? What should website operators do immediately to protect their systems, and should ordinary internet users be concerned about their data? Further attacks are possible, particularly against systems that remain unpatched or exposed. Website operators should apply the relevant security updates, check whether their PHP applications are vulnerable, and review logs for suspicious activity dating back to October 17. They should also restrict access and investigate signs of compromise. Ordinary users do not need to panic, but they should keep their accounts protected with unique passwords and multi-factor authentication where available. Whether personal data is at risk depends on which services they use and whether those systems were compromised. AI-assisted tools are increasingly being used to analyze code and identify vulnerabilities. How much of a role could artificial intelligence play in helping attackers discover and exploit flaws like PHP2Shell, and can defenders use the same technology to their advantage? AI can help analyze code, identify suspicious patterns and speed up the process of turning a vulnerability into a working exploit. This lowers some of the technical barriers for attackers and may shorten the time between discovering a flaw and exploiting it. However, AI is not the only factor, and we should not assume that every attack is AI-driven. Defenders can use the same capabilities to review code, prioritize vulnerabilities, analyze logs and detect suspicious behavior. The real advantage comes from combining AI with reliable data, skilled security teams and effective response processes. This case shows that attackers may exploit a vulnerability before a patch is available. Does this mean traditional vulnerability management is no longer enough, and how should organizations rethink their security strategy? Traditional vulnerability management remains essential, but patching alone is not enough when attackers may act before a fix becomes available. Organizations need to know which internet-facing systems they operate, understand their exposure and have additional controls in place. These include limiting access to vulnerable services, monitoring suspicious activity, applying temporary mitigations and preparing incident response procedures. They should also investigate whether systems were targeted before the vulnerability was disclosed. The goal is to reduce the opportunity for exploitation and detect attacks quickly, even when a patch is not yet available. Below is another interview I gave to TRT World discussing critical PHP vulnerabilities, the risks they pose to web servers, and the growing number of exploitation attempts. I explain why rapid patching and effective security measures are essential to minimize potential damage. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds Collabora Online flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added a Collabora Collabora Online – Built-in CODE Server flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-110447 (CVSS score of 9.2), to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Collabora Online – Built-in CODE Server is an app for Nextcloud that lets you open, edit and collaborate on documents, spreadsheets and presentations directly in your browser, without needing Microsoft Office installed on your computer. It is based on Collabora Online and LibreOffice technology. CVE-2026-110447 is a critical OS command injection flaw in Nextcloud’s proxy.php that affects Collabora Online Built-in CODE Server before 26.4.303. Unauthenticated attackers can execute commands when the built-in server is stopped. Standalone Collabora servers are not affected. Update immediately. In versions up to 26.4.302, proxy.php included request data in a Bash command without proper sanitization, allowing attackers to execute OS commands as the web server user. Exploitation is possible only when the local CODE server is stopped, such as during a restart, upgrade or crash. The script runs directly through the web server without loading Nextcloud’s code. Exploitation has been reported since September 2026, with attackers deploying PHP web shells and stealing configuration files containing credentials and application secrets. Three administrators reported the vulnerability on GitHub, while the first recorded attack dates back to September 10. The first attack was reported by a Nextcloud administrator whose servers had been compromised. Logs showed malicious requests on September 10 and 11, 2026, from the same IP, targeting proxy.php on version 26.4.302. The attackers deployed a PHP web shell and searched one server for credential stores and cryptocurrency wallets. Although reviewed logs showed no file exfiltration commands, data accessible to the web server account must be considered potentially exposed. Two other administrators reported similar incidents, but none found evidence of root access. After updating to 26.4.303, one administrator recorded another attempt on September 14, but no new shell appeared. Project maintainer mmeeks urged users to update and remove leftover shx*.php files. The CVE record confirms exploitation in September and October 2026, but the total number of compromised servers remains unknown. The flaw affects only the Development Edition’s Built-in CODE Server deployment. According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaw by October 26, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added a critical Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-114625 (CVSS score of 9.4), to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) is the central management system for VMware SD-WAN, a technology that helps companies securely connect offices, data centers, cloud services, and remote sites over wide-area networks. It is now associated with Arista Networks, which acquired VMware’s SD-WAN business. The orchestrator gives network administrators a central place to configure, monitor, and manage the network. The flaw is a SQL Injection issue that affects on-premises VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO). It allows an authenticated user to gain operator privileges and impersonate a local superuser operator account. This could give a remote attacker access to internal functions that should not be remotely available, potentially compromising the system and the data it manages. Hosted VCO versions, including Dedicated, were also affected but have already been patched. “VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact the VCO host. Successful exploitation may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the orchestrator and data managed by the orchestrator.” reads the advisory. “On an affected system, any authenticated user can gain operator privileges and masquerade as a local “superuser operator” user. This includes access to functionality that is intended for internal use only and which is not intended to be remotely accessible.” VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) is vulnerable by default. An attacker needs access to its web interface and a valid account. Even an account with the lowest permission level, Enterprise Read Only, is enough. No configuration change can prevent this exposure. Administrators should check web access logs for unusual requests, encoded text, attempts to access internal services, or an unusually high number of requests. They should also block these IP addresses linked to attacks: 74.82.197.86 38.54.50.151 If an attack is suspected, administrators should save web, application, system and database logs, along with relevant file timestamps, before starting recovery, if possible. According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaw by October 26, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
PHP warns of a new, unlikely code execution flaw, CVE-2026-115560, and advises disabling session upload progress until a fix is released. PHP has warned of a new code execution vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-115560, just two days after releasing emergency patches for the critical PHP2Shell flaws. The vulnerability affects only a specific PHP configuration that PHP says is unlikely to be used in practice. An application must meet several conditions: it must configure session.serialize_handler as php_binary or php_serialize, change it to php at runtime using ini_set(), and make this change before calling session_start(). Session upload progress must also remain enabled. In an advisory published on October 23, the project recommended disabling session upload progress until a fix becomes available in a regular release. The vulnerability is separate from PHP2Shell and is not fixed by the October 21 updates for PHP versions 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27 and 8.5.12. “The issue can only occur under an unusual combination of configuration and application code. An application must set session.serialize_handler to php_binary or php_serialize in its configuration and then switch it to php at runtime with ini_set() before calling session_start(). Session upload progress must also still be enabled.” reads the advisory. “Applications that never change the serialize handler at runtime can keep the feature enabled. Since this setup is unlikely in practice, we are handling it in the regular release cycle and will publish a full advisory for CVE-2026-115560 with the next release.” Applications that do not change the serialization handler while running are not exposed through this attack path, even if session upload progress is enabled. PHP recommends a simple temporary fix: set session.upload_progress.enabled=0 until the next routine bugfix release. This is the same mitigation already recommended in the October 21 advisory for CVE-2026-109619. Administrators who applied this setting and have kept it in place do not need to take further action for this issue. Session upload progress is enabled by default and allows applications to track the progress of file uploads. Disabling it reduces exposure to this specific vulnerability path. PHP will fix CVE-2026-115560 through its regular release cycle because the vulnerable setup is uncommon. It plans to publish a full advisory with the next release. PHP has not yet identified affected versions, confirmed when the fix will arrive, assigned a severity score, or explained whether the flaw shares a root cause with CVE-2026-109619. No attacks targeting this new issue have been reported. On October 21, PHP released emergency patches for two critical vulnerabilities tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 (CVSS score of 9.2), affecting every PHP version that handles web requests. The bug code dates back to PHP 5.4 from 2012, lives in the PHP engine itself rather than in any application, and allows unauthenticated remote code execution via crafted HTTP requests. Cloudflare researchers observed tens of thousands of exploit attempts within 45 minutes of public disclosure, hundreds of thousands within two hours, and millions by October 22. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, PHP)
The PHP security team has shared mitigation measures for a new remote code execution vulnerability that affects systems with non-default configurations and has no patch. PHP is an open-source web development language used by nearly 70% of all websites on the Internet. According to VirusTotal estimates, more than 5.1 million PHP hosts are exposed online, and roughly 3.8 million have at least one port open to attacks. According to a Friday advisory, this security flaw (tracked as CVE-2026-115560) can only be exploited when targeting systems "with an unusual combination of configuration and application code." "An application must set session.serialize_handler to php_binary or php_serialize in its configuration and then switch it to php at runtime with ini_set() before calling session_start(). Session upload progress must also still be enabled," the PHP team explained.
PHP has warned of another way an attacker could run code on a web server, two days after it shipped emergency fixes for the critical PHP2Shell flaws. The new issue, assigned CVE-2026-115560, affects only web applications configured in an unusual way, and PHP considers it an unlikely risk.The project is not issuing an emergency fix for it. Instead, it recommends turning off a feature called
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