CISA red teams fully compromised two critical infrastructure orgs. One SOC isolated hosts in minutes; the other never detected the breach. CISA published an advisory (AA26-237A) documenting two simultaneous red team assessments at critical infrastructure organizations. Both organizations lost full domain control and had their cloud environments compromised. One of them didn’t know until CISA told them afterward. “The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) conducted simultaneous red team assessments at two organizations and observed different defensive outcomes. In both environments, the red team achieved full domain compromise and accessed sensitive business systems (SBSs) and cloud resources.” states CISA. “Organization A failed to detect or contain the activity, but Organization B rapidly identified initial compromise attempts, isolated affected systems, and forced the red team into an assume breach model.” Organization A is a Government Services and Facilities Sector entity. Organization B operates in the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector. The red team used comparable techniques against both. The difference in outcome was entirely about detection and response, not the sophistication of the attack. At Organization A, the red team found a web application that still used default credentials. They used it to send phishing emails from a trusted internal address and gained access to four workstations. From there, they exploited a misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Services template with the ESC1 flaw. This allowed a low-privileged user to request certificates for other users, including administrators. They then reached all the targeted sensitive business systems without anyone noticing. After moving into the cloud, they even read SOC staff emails to see if the attack had been detected. It hadn’t. “Without well-defined baselines and alert filtering, false positives and routine alerts overwhelm defenders, obscuring real threats.” CISA continues. “Organizations that tune alerts to highlight anomalies and filter out normal business activity enable defenders to focus on genuine incidents and respond rapidly.” Organization A’s SOC was receiving thousands of false positive alerts, many at higher severity than the actual intrusion alerts the red team was generating. Staff eventually reviewed SCCM-related alerts from real red team activity, couldn’t identify the system’s owner or function, and marked it a false positive. The red team confirmed the miss by reading SOC email. Then they used keyloggers and screenshot capture on SOC workstations to make sure nothing was coming. Nothing was. The organization had multiple separate SOCs with different EDR solutions and no cross-team visibility, which meant that even if one team noticed something, there was no mechanism to act on it across the relevant systems. “Detection tools are only as effective as the people, processes, and procedures supporting them. SOC staff should not operate in silos and should have clear authority unhindered by bureaucracy to effectively contain and resolve incidents.” add CISA. At Organization A, SOC analysts were managing systems they didn’t fully understand and had no written escalation procedures, so their default response to ambiguity was to wait. At Organization B, staff triaged, investigated, coordinated with engineering, and reimaged machines before handing them back to users. At Organization B, the red team still found important security gaps. They discovered a password stored in plain text inside an XML file on an SCCM distribution point. They used the related service account to gain powerful rights over a domain controller and then performed a DCSync attack, obtaining the krbtgt hash. This allowed them to create Golden Tickets and impersonate users across the domain. They also found a path into the OT network through RDP files pointing to a bastion host. Using FTP credentials found on a jump server, they connected to the bastion through SSH. The bastion had no outbound internet access, so their payload could not run, and the SOC quarantined the host. Still, the access path was there. Both organizations also had the same cloud security problem: neither had enabled Conditional Access for workload identities. This Microsoft feature applies access controls to applications and service accounts, not just human users. Without it, applications with broad Microsoft Graph permissions can bypass normal Conditional Access rules. CISA’s red team used this gap in both organizations to access emails across the companies. In Organization A, the team also found AWS IAM credentials stored in users’ home directories with no expiration date. Those credentials could remain valid indefinitely, creating another long-term risk. In Organization B’s cloud environment, the red team abused Seamless SSO by using Kerberos tickets obtained via DCSync to authenticate to Azure without needing any user’s cleartext password. They found a disabled AD-synced account that owned an application with permission to read, write, and send emails for every user in the tenant. They re-enabled the account, DCSynced its credentials, added a client secret to the application, and could then access the full mailbox of every employee from the public internet. Organization B’s detections flagged the AzureHound tool by user agent and caught anomalous Microsoft Graph API request volumes, but those controls arrived after the initial cloud access was already established. CISA recommends several practical steps to improve security. These include hardening ADCS by disabling CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT on templates and limiting who can enroll, setting the Machine Account Quota to zero when there is no operational need, and removing cleartext credentials from workstations and network shares. Organizations should also enable Conditional Access for workload identities, create procedures to revoke tokens, and treat SCCM and similar endpoint management platforms as Tier 0 assets, giving them the same level of protection as domain controllers. The full advisory also maps each red team technique to its MITRE ATT&CK identifier and compares how well the two organizations detected the different stages of the attacks. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
Attackers are actively exploiting a critical-severity vulnerability in the Gitea self-hosted Git service, according to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Like cloud-hosted GitHub or GitLab SaaS (Software as a Service) platforms, Gitea provides a full suite of DevOps tools, but it is designed to be used as a self-hosted software development platform. Tracked as CVE-2026-60004 and reported by Salesforce security researcher Shai Rod, this code injection security flaw allows an authenticated user with repository write access to repositories hosted on vulnerable servers to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Gitea service account by submitting malicious patches via the diffpatch API endpoint. However, default-configured Gitea instances have self-registration enabled, allowing unauthenticated attackers to register an account, create a new repository, and trigger the vulnerability without prior credentials.
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds Gitea flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added an Oracle HTTP Server and Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-60004 (CVSS score of 9,8), to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Gitea is an open-source platform for hosting and managing Git repositories. Think of it as a self-hosted alternative to GitHub or GitLab. CVE-2026-60004 is a critical remote code execution flaw that allows an attacker with write access to a repository to execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea service user. The flaw affects Gitea versions from 1.17 and was fixed in 1.27.1. The vulnerable diffpatch API can be abused to plant and execute a malicious Git hook. Because Gitea enables open registration by default, an unauthenticated attacker can create an account, create a repository, and exploit the flaw without existing credentials. A reported attack used the vulnerability to deploy a cryptocurrency-miner-like payload after an exposed Gitea instance allowed open registration and anonymous access to its web interface. According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaw by August 28, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
WhatsApp says 1 billion users now use passkeys, while stronger two-step verification and caller context add new layers of account protection. WhatsApp has reached a significant security milestone: more than one billion people now use passkeys to protect access to their accounts. At the same time, Meta is adding stronger two-step verification and more information about calls from people who aren’t in a user’s contacts. Passkeys let users sign back into WhatsApp with a fingerprint, Face ID or their device’s screen-lock code instead of relying on passwords, PINs or one-time codes. WhatsApp now also allows people who use both Android and iOS devices to add more than one passkey to the same account, which removes one of the practical limitations of the earlier implementation. “More than 1 billion people now use a passkey: A passkey lets you log back into WhatsApp with your fingerprint, face ID, or screen lock code. It’s the fastest and most secure way to verify it’s really you, with no codes or PINs.” reads the announcement published by WhatsApp. “More than a billion people have already set one up, and you can now add more than one passkey to your account if you use both Android and iOS devices. To get started, go to Settings > Account > Passkeys.” For people who move between platforms, the ability to register multiple passkeys should make account recovery less dependent on a single device. It is important to highlight that WhatsApp is moving account protection away from secrets that users have to remember or type. Passkeys rely on credentials stored on the device and protected by its existing biometric or screen-lock mechanism, which also makes phishing them much harder than a traditional password or verification code. WhatsApp is also changing its two-step verification system. Until now, the additional protection relied on a six-digit PIN. The company has now upgraded it to a full password that can be longer, use letters and numbers, and include special characters. “Two-step verification is an extra protection layer that helps prevent someone from taking over your account, even if they get hold of your one-time passcode.” continues the announcement. “Until now it was a six-digit PIN, we’ve now upgraded it to a full password: longer, alphanumeric, and even with special ch@racters to make it harder to guess. If you’ve been using “123456,” this is your sign to upgrade.” That’s a small interface change with a meaningful security consequence. A short numeric PIN has a limited number of possible combinations and encourages users to choose predictable values, while a longer password gives account owners a much stronger second factor. WhatsApp makes the point in unusually direct terms, even calling out the classic 123456 choice. If that’s still protecting an account, the app has just provided a fairly unambiguous hint. The change also addresses a specific account-takeover scenario. If an attacker manages to obtain a user’s one-time registration code, the additional password can still prevent the takeover from succeeding. The third change targets a different problem: social engineering. On Android, WhatsApp will now provide additional context when someone outside the user’s contacts calls. The information can include whether the number comes from another country and whether the caller shares any groups with the recipient. That gives users a little more information before they decide whether to answer. “When you get a call from someone not saved in your contacts, a little context can help you decide whether to pick up. On Android, you’ll now see more information about a non-contact caller, like whether the number is from a different country and if you have any groups in common.” concludes the announcement. “Scammers rely on urgency – now you can take a beat with some more info before answering.” It’s a simple addition, but it addresses a common weakness in fraud attempts: pressure. An unexpected call creates a sense of urgency, and attackers often use that moment to persuade someone to disclose information, click a link or continue the conversation on their terms. Giving the recipient more context doesn’t stop a scammer from calling. It gives the user a reason to pause before answering. Taken together, the three changes target different parts of the same account-security problem. Passkeys make authentication harder to steal, stronger two-step verification provides another barrier when a one-time code is compromised, and caller context gives users more information before a potentially suspicious interaction begins. The billion-user passkey figure is also worth watching beyond WhatsApp. It suggests that phishing-resistant authentication is no longer an experimental security feature limited to security-conscious users. At this scale, the challenge shifts from convincing people that passkeys are safer to making sure they understand when and how to use them. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, WhatsApp)
A newly uncovered phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform called AnonyMousKIT automates the retrieval of codes used to unlock stolen Apple devices and disable the Activation Lock feature. The illegal service has been active since early 2024 and is powering a structured ecosystem that sells stolen iPhones, harvests Apple IDs, accesses iCloud backups, and Keychain credentials. Researchers at threat intelligence platform SOCRadar took advantage of the platform operator's use of bare relative paths to gather information on how the service works, its operators, and infrastructure. SOCRadar found that AnonyMousKIT is connected to 506 domains and is fueling a sprawling business with 168 storefront brands acting as resellers. The researchers recovered records of 200 calls made to victims between August 2025 and May 2026, using 55 distinct interaction transcripts handled by a voice AI agent operating under five personas.
Healthcare and services provider Nutex is investigating a data breach incident where an unauthorized third party exfiltrated information from company servers. The organization has disclosed the cyberattack in a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), noting that the stolen data includes details that may be private or confidential. “Based on preliminary findings from the Company’s ongoing investigation, the Company believes that certain information maintained on the Company’s servers was accessed and exfiltrated by an unauthorized third party, including some information that may be private and/or confidential,” Nutex says. Nutex Health is a for-profit healthcare company that operates 28 facilities across 12 states, including the Bayou City ER & Hospital in Texas and Green Bay ER & Hospital in Wisconsin.
WhatsApp has started rolling out several new account security features, including support for multiple passkeys and stronger two-step verification. While the instant messaging service already allowed users to add passkeys for secure logins via fingerprint, Face ID, or screen lock code, it now lets them create separate ones for each platform. "More than a billion people have already set one up, and you can now add more than one passkey to your account if you use both Android and iOS devices. To get started, go to Settings > Account > Passkeys," it said. WhatsApp has also updated its two-step verification security feature to allow alphanumeric passwords instead of six-digit PINs. "Until now it was a six-digit PIN, we've now upgraded it to a full password: longer, alphanumeric, and even with special ch@racters to make it harder to guess. If you've been using '123456,' this is your sign to upgrade," WhatsApp added.
Explore Unit 42 research on AI-enabled malware. Learn how existing behavioral detection and endpoint analytics stop AI-authored code before execution. The post The State of AI-Enabled Malware August 2026: From Brand Abuse to Agentic Execution appeared first on Unit 42.
Meta on Tuesday announced a set of WhatsApp account security features, including support for multiple passkeys to a single account to help users with both iOS and Android devices sign into their accounts using the phishing-resistant method. The tech giant said more than 1 billion people use a passkey to log into WhatsApp. Support for passkeys was first introduced in Android in October 2023,
A breach at South Korea's government-backed startup platform exposed encrypted personal data after an encryption key was included in an API. Penta Security explains why encryption keys must be securely managed and kept separate from the data they protect.
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