The FBI has disrupted infrastructure associated with a technical “quartermaster” that provided reconnaissance, proxy management, and operational routing capabilities for Chinese cyber espionage activities. Black Lotus Labs, the threat research arm of Lumen Technologies, has been tracking the infrastructure for the past year and discovered the components of the framework used in attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. According to the researchers, the provider offers a reusable service consisting of four distinct operational elements: The infrastructure was used to profile and steal data from U.S. military and defense organizations, government networks, universities and research institutions, aerospace and bioinformatics organizations, healthcare orgs, financial firms, critical infrastructure and energy companies, and enterprise software vendors.
Snowflake is ending password authentication for legacy service accounts, forcing organizations to migrate them to passwordless methods. Token Security explains why the harder challenge is identifying what uses each account, who owns it, and how much access it still needs.
Ubiquiti has released security patches for three new maximum-severity vulnerabilities that threat actors can exploit remotely without privileges. The first (tracked as CVE-2026-77537) lets unauthenticated attackers compromise unpatched devices by exploiting an improper input validation weakness in the UniFi Protect Application video surveillance management platform. Ubiquiti also addressed a CRLF injection flaw (CVE-2026-77550) that remote attackers without privileges can exploit to bypass authentication on UniFi OS devices or instances. "A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences vulnerability found in certain devices running CRLF Injection to bypass authentication to such UniFi OS devices or instances," it explained. The third maximum severity vulnerability patched today is a command injection security flaw (CVE-2026-77554) stemming from improper input validation in the UniFi Talk Application Voice over IP (VoIP) phone system.
Attackers are actively exploiting a critical-severity vulnerability in the Gitea self-hosted Git service, according to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Like cloud-hosted GitHub or GitLab SaaS (Software as a Service) platforms, Gitea provides a full suite of DevOps tools, but it is designed to be used as a self-hosted software development platform. Tracked as CVE-2026-60004 and reported by Salesforce security researcher Shai Rod, this code injection security flaw allows an authenticated user with repository write access to repositories hosted on vulnerable servers to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Gitea service account by submitting malicious patches via the diffpatch API endpoint. However, default-configured Gitea instances have self-registration enabled, allowing unauthenticated attackers to register an account, create a new repository, and trigger the vulnerability without prior credentials.
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds Gitea flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added an Oracle HTTP Server and Oracle Weblogic Server Proxy Plug-in flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-60004 (CVSS score of 9,8), to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Gitea is an open-source platform for hosting and managing Git repositories. Think of it as a self-hosted alternative to GitHub or GitLab. CVE-2026-60004 is a critical remote code execution flaw that allows an attacker with write access to a repository to execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea service user. The flaw affects Gitea versions from 1.17 and was fixed in 1.27.1. The vulnerable diffpatch API can be abused to plant and execute a malicious Git hook. Because Gitea enables open registration by default, an unauthenticated attacker can create an account, create a repository, and exploit the flaw without existing credentials. A reported attack used the vulnerability to deploy a cryptocurrency-miner-like payload after an exposed Gitea instance allowed open registration and anonymous access to its web interface. According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaw by August 28, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
88 ID-verification breaches exposed billions of records, highlighting the growing risks of collecting sensitive identity and biometric data. A new report from Mysterium VPN compiles 88 documented incidents since 2011 where data collected specifically to verify someone’s identity or age got breached, exposed, or sold. The confirmed and researcher-verified total sits at 2.15 billion records, with attacker and seller claims piling another 4.54 billion on top of that. The most uncomfortable number in the whole dataset isn’t the total record count, it’s how much of it can’t be fixed after the fact. In 41 of the 88 incidents, what actually leaked included the source documents themselves: ID scans, verification selfies, fingerprints, full biometric templates. A password gets reset in thirty seconds. A face doesn’t. The timing makes the report especially concerning. Of the 88 incidents, 37, or 42%, happened between January 2024 and August 2026, when mandatory identity and age checks were spreading quickly around the world. The message is simple: the systems that collect your ID can be breached just like any other online service. “The pattern of this era is specific: the wall you are forced to hand your ID to is exactly as breachable as everything else on the internet.” reads the report. Some recent cases are particularly worrying. The Tea app, created as a women-only safety platform, exposed verification selfies through an open storage bucket, and the images later appeared on 4chan. Discord users who challenged age-verification decisions also had around 70,000 government IDs exposed through a third-party support provider, even as Discord continued expanding age checks. What makes this particularly damning is who’s actually running the verification layer for the internet’s biggest platforms. AU10TIX, which verifies identity for TikTok, Uber, and X, left admin credentials exposed for over a year. Sumsub disclosed a support-system intrusion that went undetected for 18 months. Persona, which handles age verification for Discord and Roblox, exposed its own frontend configuration. “In 41 of the 88 incidents, what leaked included the actual documents: ID scans, verification selfies, fingerprints, biometric templates. Unlike a password, none of that can be changed.” states the report. “Every major identity-verification vendor from the current era — AU10TIX, IDMerit, Sumsub, Persona, inVOID — has appeared in this timeline. The companies the internet now relies on to hold everyone’s identity documents safely haven’t demonstrated they can do it.” Governments haven’t fared any better with their own centralized registries. Argentina’s national identity system leaked 45 million records including ID scans and selfies. France’s ANTS, the agency that literally issues French identity documents, confirmed 11.7 million people affected in a 2026 breach. India’s Aadhaar system, Thailand’s visitor database, the Philippines’ voter rolls, Brazil’s tax registry, the pattern repeats at country scale roughly as often as it does at startup scale. The report isn’t blaming one company or one mistake. Its main point is that the growing use of ID and age checks is creating more opportunities for sensitive data to be exposed. Every new law that requires ID checks, every platform that adds age verification, and every company that stores identity data creates another valuable target. Putting permanent and highly sensitive information into systems with different levels of security creates a risk that’s hard to ignore. This doesn’t mean ID and age verification have no value. They can serve legitimate purposes. But companies deciding whether to build or outsource these systems should study this history carefully. Relying on a “reputable” third-party provider clearly isn’t enough. “The timeline makes something visible that individual breach reports obscure: this isn’t a series of unrelated failures. It’s one failure mode, repeated across 88 incidents, fifteen years, and every type of organization that has ever decided to collect this category of data.” concludes the report. “What varies is the victim. Sometimes, it’s a startup with inadequate security. Sometimes, it’s a national government that built a country-scale identity registry and watched it walk out the door. Sometimes, it’s a verification vendor that became the single point of failure for a dozen companies that outsourced their compliance obligations to them. “ Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, ID Verification Breaches)
WhatsApp says 1 billion users now use passkeys, while stronger two-step verification and caller context add new layers of account protection. WhatsApp has reached a significant security milestone: more than one billion people now use passkeys to protect access to their accounts. At the same time, Meta is adding stronger two-step verification and more information about calls from people who aren’t in a user’s contacts. Passkeys let users sign back into WhatsApp with a fingerprint, Face ID or their device’s screen-lock code instead of relying on passwords, PINs or one-time codes. WhatsApp now also allows people who use both Android and iOS devices to add more than one passkey to the same account, which removes one of the practical limitations of the earlier implementation. “More than 1 billion people now use a passkey: A passkey lets you log back into WhatsApp with your fingerprint, face ID, or screen lock code. It’s the fastest and most secure way to verify it’s really you, with no codes or PINs.” reads the announcement published by WhatsApp. “More than a billion people have already set one up, and you can now add more than one passkey to your account if you use both Android and iOS devices. To get started, go to Settings > Account > Passkeys.” For people who move between platforms, the ability to register multiple passkeys should make account recovery less dependent on a single device. It is important to highlight that WhatsApp is moving account protection away from secrets that users have to remember or type. Passkeys rely on credentials stored on the device and protected by its existing biometric or screen-lock mechanism, which also makes phishing them much harder than a traditional password or verification code. WhatsApp is also changing its two-step verification system. Until now, the additional protection relied on a six-digit PIN. The company has now upgraded it to a full password that can be longer, use letters and numbers, and include special characters. “Two-step verification is an extra protection layer that helps prevent someone from taking over your account, even if they get hold of your one-time passcode.” continues the announcement. “Until now it was a six-digit PIN, we’ve now upgraded it to a full password: longer, alphanumeric, and even with special ch@racters to make it harder to guess. If you’ve been using “123456,” this is your sign to upgrade.” That’s a small interface change with a meaningful security consequence. A short numeric PIN has a limited number of possible combinations and encourages users to choose predictable values, while a longer password gives account owners a much stronger second factor. WhatsApp makes the point in unusually direct terms, even calling out the classic 123456 choice. If that’s still protecting an account, the app has just provided a fairly unambiguous hint. The change also addresses a specific account-takeover scenario. If an attacker manages to obtain a user’s one-time registration code, the additional password can still prevent the takeover from succeeding. The third change targets a different problem: social engineering. On Android, WhatsApp will now provide additional context when someone outside the user’s contacts calls. The information can include whether the number comes from another country and whether the caller shares any groups with the recipient. That gives users a little more information before they decide whether to answer. “When you get a call from someone not saved in your contacts, a little context can help you decide whether to pick up. On Android, you’ll now see more information about a non-contact caller, like whether the number is from a different country and if you have any groups in common.” concludes the announcement. “Scammers rely on urgency – now you can take a beat with some more info before answering.” It’s a simple addition, but it addresses a common weakness in fraud attempts: pressure. An unexpected call creates a sense of urgency, and attackers often use that moment to persuade someone to disclose information, click a link or continue the conversation on their terms. Giving the recipient more context doesn’t stop a scammer from calling. It gives the user a reason to pause before answering. Taken together, the three changes target different parts of the same account-security problem. Passkeys make authentication harder to steal, stronger two-step verification provides another barrier when a one-time code is compromised, and caller context gives users more information before a potentially suspicious interaction begins. The billion-user passkey figure is also worth watching beyond WhatsApp. It suggests that phishing-resistant authentication is no longer an experimental security feature limited to security-conscious users. At this scale, the challenge shifts from convincing people that passkeys are safer to making sure they understand when and how to use them. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, WhatsApp)
INTERPOL’s Operation Jackal IV made 58 arrests and exposed global networks laundering money from scams, fraud and sextortion. INTERPOL announced that Operation Jackal IV, running from November 2025 to June 2026, led to 58 arrests and identified 263 suspects tied to West African organized crime networks, groups like Black Axe that are responsible for a huge share of the world’s romance scams, crypto fraud, and business email compromise (BEC) schemes. “Operation Jackal IV (November 2025 – June 2026) aimed to disrupt money laundering, identify high-value targets, seize assets, and support arrests and prosecution.” Interpol announced. “The operation, which brought together 22 countries from six continents, is a response to the escalating global threat posed by West African criminal networks – such as the Black Axe and other similar groups. These groups are responsible for a significant share of the world’s cyber-enabled financial fraud, typically through romance scams, cryptocurrency and investment scams or business email compromise fraud, as well as other serious and violent crimes.” The goal wasn’t to chase individual scammers. Investigators followed the money behind the scams: shell companies, mule accounts and criminal services that help move and hide stolen funds. Tomonobu Kaya of INTERPOL’s Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Centre explained the approach: By following illicit financial flows across borders, we are attacking the very lifeblood of organized crime. Argentina turned up one of the operation’s biggest finds. Investigators identified 196 individuals connected to a crime-as-a-service network suspected of supplying website domains and laundering support specifically for West African criminal groups, resulting in 17 arrests. INTERPOL sent an Operational Support Team to help analyze seized data and map out the wider network of suspects, the kind of cross-border analytical work that individual national police forces usually can’t pull off on their own. South African authorities raided seven locations in Johannesburg linked to a group running romance and investment scams against retirees in English-speaking countries. The syndicate assigned members to specific roles, such as “conversion” and “retention” agents. The operation led to 39 arrests, $2.67 million seized and 257 bank accounts frozen, the largest number of arrests in the operation. Italy’s case shows how much damage a single laundering account can absorb. One individual was tied to a pan-European laundering network moving money through shell companies and remittance services, and investigators traced €845,000 laundered through a single account across 560 separate transactions using 20 different financial instruments. That’s not a careless operator; that’s someone who understood exactly how to fragment a large sum into a pattern designed to look unremarkable at every individual step. Romania’s case was the biggest by dollar value, and arguably the most brutal in its simplicity. A call center ran a fake investment scheme promising big returns on stocks and crypto, funneling victims’ money into wallets the operators controlled, and by the time authorities dismantled it, the estimated theft and laundering total had climbed to around €143 million globally. Eleven arrests and roughly €379,000 in cash and crypto seized, plus six properties and several luxury watches, is a real result, but it’s a fraction of what actually got stolen. “Beyond individual cases, Operation Jackal IV also enabled the analysis of critical and emerging trends, including a rise in West African organized crime groups using sextortion to target minors, with victims as young as 14. Offenders typically contact minors via social media, build trust and coerce them into sharing explicit images or videos.” concludes INTERPOL. “They then threaten to distribute this material to the victim’s contacts unless a ransom is paid.” The report’s darkest finding sits outside any single country’s arrest count. INTERPOL flagged a rising trend of these same criminal networks using sextortion against minors as young as 14, building trust through social media before coercing victims into sharing explicit images and then threatening to distribute that material unless a ransom gets paid. Some of these groups were even observed buying crime-as-a-service support through the dark web specifically to outsource pieces of that operation, treating exploitation infrastructure as just another service line alongside laundering and fraud. That’s the uncomfortable throughline connecting every case here: these aren’t scattered opportunists, they’re networks running organized business models with specialized roles, outsourced services, and financial engineering sophisticated enough to move hundreds of millions across borders. Twenty-two countries coordinating for eight months produced real numbers, real arrests, real frozen accounts. It also produced a fairly clear picture of how much more organized this side of cybercrime has become, and how much further there is to go. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Operation Jackal)
An eight-month INTERPOL operation targeting West African organized crime groups has led to arrests of 58 people and the identification of 263 suspects. "The operation, which brought together 22 countries from six continents, is a response to the escalating global threat posed by West African criminal networks – such as the Black Axe and other similar groups," INTERPOL said. "These groups are
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform built to strip Apple's Activation Lock from stolen devices, using rented AI voice agents that call theft victims posing as Apple Support and ask for their device passcode. SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) said the platform, which it tracks as AnonyMousKIT, is credit-metered and drives lures across
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