Microsoft and Health-ISAC, along with the Japan Cybercrime Control Center (JC3) and a coalition of private sector companies, such as Resecurity, Cloudflare, Oracle, Proofpoint, and TRM Labs, announced the disruption of three phishing kits, CoGUI (aka NX or FA), Haozi (aka Phoenix), and Iron Man System. "Since January 2026, the threat actors behind these kits have been responsible for
Microsoft has resolved a known issue that caused Always On VPN connection issues after installing the September 2026 Windows 11 security updates. The Always On VPN remote access solution replaced the legacy DirectAccess technology and works with domain-joined, non-domain-joined, and Microsoft Entra ID–joined Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server devices. Always On VPN runs in the background and automatically establishes a secure tunnel back to the corporate network whenever a device connects to the internet. As Microsoft first acknowledged in a service alert sent to IT administrators in late September, the bug triggered Always On VPN failures if the initial connection fails (e.g., when using automatic protocol selection with IKEv2 and SSTP) on up-to-date systems running Windows 11 24H2 and later.
AI-powered penetration testing can uncover complex attack paths, but safety restrictions and network limitations leave many assets and vulnerabilities untested. Picus Security explains how combining agentic pentesting with exposure validation and breach simulation can help close these gaps.
A massive cybercriminal ecosystem facilitating more than a billion malicious messages targeting over 75,000 organizations across 150 countries has been disrupted by law enforcement agencies and partners worldwide. Since the start of the year, more than 750 million malicious messages have been aimed at Microsoft customers via email and SMS texts. Following an investigation initiated by Microsoft and Japan’s National Police Agency (NPA) into a wave of fraudulent activity, "a sprawling Chinese-language cybercrime marketplace" was discovered, with tools and services for phishing campaigns. The investigators traced the malicious activity to YAM Store (Storm-3119), an underground infrastructure marketplace, then linked it to the CoGUI, Haozi, and Iron Man System phishing kits, collectively tracked as Storm-2990.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Tuesday urged organizations to take steps to immediately update their Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) appliances and deployments to the latest version following the disclosure of an actively exploited vulnerability. The security flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-104935 (CVSS score: 8.6), is a case of authentication bypass impacting ICS
Unit 42 dissects a cyberattack targeting a European bank's IT infrastructure, delivering concrete defense strategies to help organizations detect and counter comparable threats. The post The Noise Inside the Network: How an Unsophisticated Attack Exposed a Third-Party Risk appeared first on Unit 42.
A flaw in Docker Hub, the registry where container images are published and downloaded, let one user push, pull, or delete images as another user. Docker fixed the flaw on September 30 and says it found no evidence that anyone exploited it. The flaw was in the feature that converts a personal account into an organization, Docker said in a security advisory on October 12.
Docker has disclosed a critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-105445) in Docker Hub that let attackers access another user’s container repositories using a personal access token (PAT). Docker Hub is an online registry for storing, sharing, and downloading container images - templates that package everything needed for an application to run in an isolated environment. In Docker Hub, a PAT serves as a secret used to authenticate tools and workflows. It allows you to pull, push, or delete container images. According to a security bulletin from the Docker team, an attacker could create an account and PAT, then convert the account into an organization and name a target user as its owner. The CVE-2026-105445 flaw stems from Docker Hub reassigning a personal access token (PAT) to a designated organization owner without changing its secret or obtaining the target's consent. This allowed the attacker to use the token to authenticate as the target.
Three vulnerabilities in LG's webOS can be chained to give an attacker on the same local network root access to certain smart TVs without a PIN or any interaction from the owner. LG has issued a fix, according to an advisory published by SSD Secure Disclosure on October 12. The chain was tested on two TV models, the 32LQ636BPSA and the 27TQ600SW, running webOS 7.5.7-25 on firmware
Canonical suffered its second DDoS attack this year, disrupting public websites for over four hours while Launchpad and the Snap Store remained online. Ubuntu’s parent company Canonical spent part of last week fighting off a sustained distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, the second one to hit its infrastructure this year. The company revealed the attack on October 8 through a post on the Ubuntu Discourse forum. “Canonical’s websites are under a sustained distributed denial of service attack. Our team is working diligently to resolve the incident. Please refer to our status page for up-to-date information. Some services may be intermittently unavailable.” the company states. At this time, no cybercrime or hacktivist group has claimed responsibility The attack affected Canonical’s main public websites, including ubuntu.com, canonical.com, the Ubuntu blog, the developer portal, and the security advisory pages and API. Users may have been unable to access security advisories or read the blog during the attack. “It was recently revealed that Canonical’s web infrastructure and the Ubuntu ecosystem suffered a massive and sustained distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that caused its main portals and services to crash and be intermittent for more than four hours.” states the company blog. “Regarding the attack, it is mentioned that it directly affected the most visible institutional domains, including canonical.com and ubuntu.com, as well as the official blog, the developer portal, assets.ubuntu.com, academy.canonical.com and sites linked to enterprise technologies such as jaas.ai and maas.io.” However, Launchpad and the Snap Store remained online throughout the incident. These services allow developers and system administrators to manage and install software. Canonical acknowledged the outage on its status page and Ubuntu Discourse while engineers worked to limit the impact. The attack temporarily disrupted the Ubuntu Security API and Livepatch services, affecting tools used to check security advisories and apply kernel patches without restarting systems. However, Canonical’s distributed infrastructure helped contain the damage. Software repositories and mirror servers remained available, allowing users to install updates. Launchpad, the Snap Store, disk image servers and Ubuntu Single Sign-On also continued to work. As a result, users could continue downloading and installing packages even while Canonical’s public websites were disrupted. The overall outage lasted a little over four hours, causing real disruption. This attack differs from the April one, which caused greater disruption by taking down Launchpad and the Snap Store and preventing some users from installing Ubuntu updates. At the time, a hacktivist group called The Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq, also known as 313 Team, claimed responsibility. Canonical described the April incident as a sustained, cross-border attack, language that suggested distributed infrastructure spanning multiple countries. Whether this October attack is a continuation of the same campaign or a completely unrelated actor piling on is genuinely unclear. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, DDoS)
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