Microsoft tracked over 30 MacSync Stealer domains by focusing on behavioral patterns, revealing a campaign targeting passwords, keys, wallets and other data. Domain blocking is a losing game when the thing you’re blocking can register a new domain faster than you can add it to a list. That’s the exact problem Microsoft Defender Experts ran into while tracking MacSync Stealer, a macOS-focused information stealer that RST Cloud first flagged for swapping out its command-and-control infrastructure almost immediately after getting publicly outed. Microsoft detailed how its experts stopped chasing individual domains and started tracking the behaviors that stayed constant underneath them. Instead of tracking individual domains, Microsoft looked at recurring request patterns, HTTP headers and other behaviors. This allowed its researchers to link more than 30 domains to the same campaign and determine that the infrastructure was doing more than just sending commands to infected Macs. It was also being used to collect, stage and exfiltrate stolen data. “MacSync Stealer is a macOS-focused information stealer that relies on changing infrastructure to deliver payloads, communicate with compromised devices, and exfiltrate data. Earlier reporting by RST Cloud identified the threat through a limited set of domains and documented rapid command-and-control (C2) replacement after public disclosure.” reads the report published by Microsoft. “Microsoft Defender Experts expanded that view by correlating recurring endpoints and network behaviors across the activity. This behavior-led approach connected more than 30 domains and showed that the infrastructure supported more than C2 communication, extending into active collection, staging, and exfiltration.” The infection chain starts with a trick rather than an exploit. Victims get social-engineered through a technique known as ClickFix, tricked into pasting or running commands directly in macOS Terminal, and once that shell session fires, curl pulls down attacker-controlled payload content from a path formatted as /curl/[token]. Then, native macOS tools decode and unpack the payload, and an AppleScript-driven layer takes over, blending Unix commands like sh, cp, rm, and killall with osascript calls that make the whole chain look more like ordinary system scripting than malware. Once active, the stealer focuses on valuable data. The malicious code looks for macOS Keychain data, saved browser passwords and cookies, SSH keys, AWS credentials, Kubernetes configurations and files in common user folders. It also searches for Ledger and Trezor wallet data, showing that the malware targets users with valuable credentials and assets rather than simply collecting random browser history. What actually confirms exfiltration, rather than just suspicious traffic, is the upload mechanism itself. Collected data gets staged under temporary paths, compressed into an archive, split into chunks, and pushed out through HTTP PUT requests carrying parameters like upload_id, chunk_index, and total_chunks. “The staged archive was uploaded through rotating infrastructure using curl and HTTP PUT requests. Observed requests included –data-binary, API-key headers, macOS User-Agent string, upload_id values, chunk_index values, and total_chunks parameters.” states Microsoft. “These upload traits confirmed active data exfiltration and provided durable hunting pivots even when domains rotated. “ The researchers pointed out that the exfiltration method stays recognizable even when the destination keeps changing. RST Cloud’s follow-up work backs up how consistent this infrastructure actually is under the surface. Using the same recurring URI patterns, RST Cloud surfaced eleven additional candidate domains and found a static API-key value shared across four confirmed command-and-control domains, even while the build token attached to each deployment kept rotating. A shared static key sitting inside otherwise rotating infrastructure is exactly the kind of detail that makes automated evasion look less impressive up close. The attack wraps up with cleanup, deleting temporary archives, staging folders, and lock files after the upload completes. Microsoft notes this reduces what’s left sitting on disk, but it doesn’t erase the behavioral sequence itself. “After exfiltration, the malware removed temporary archives, staging folders, lock files, and other artifacts. Although this cleanup reduced on-disk evidence, the sequence of archive creation, chunked upload, and deletion can still provide a useful behavioral correlation for defenders.” concludes Microsoft. For anyone defending Mac fleets, the practical takeaway here isn’t a list of domains to block, since that list will be stale within days. It’s building detection around the recurring shape of the attack itself: shell sessions spawning curl with those specific flag patterns, osascript chaining rapidly into network activity, and archives appearing under /tmp/sync* right before outbound PUT traffic starts. Chase the pattern, not the address, because the address was never going to sit still long enough to matter. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, malware)
Most email defenses still do the job they did a decade ago. Scan the message, look for something malicious, block it. That worked when the danger sat in the payload, a bad link or an attachment. It stopped working when the danger moved into the message's intent, and it is failing now that the sender is no longer a person. From Bad Content to Bad Intent to AI on Both Sides Phishing 1.0 was bad
Two critical vulnerabilities impacting MLflow, an open-source artificial intelligence (AI) platform, and FUXA, an open-source, web-based SCADA / HMI software built for operational technology (OT) and industrial automation, are witnessing malicious scanning and exploitation efforts. According to independent reports from watchTowr and VulnCheck, the vulnerabilities in question are as follows -
The SANDCLOCK LiteLLM supply-chain attack exposed credentials across 2,038 repositories, affecting technology, finance, healthcare, retail and more. Resecurity (USA) estimated the most affected sectors by the “SANDCLOCK” backdoor, which was planted as a result of the code repository compromise. According to cybersecurity experts, LiteLLM / TeamPCP Supply-Chain Attack will have long-lasting consequences. By compromising a well-known component in AI applications, adversaries will multiply the blast radius—some of the victim organizations are still unaware of the backdoor and its impact. LiteLLM is a popular open-soure AI gateway and utility library that unifies API calls for over 100 large language model providers, such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, and local Ollama models. Such incidents involve substantial MTTD (Mean Time to Detect) and MTTR (Mean Time to Respond). The threat actor group “TeamPCP” compromised maintainer credentials for LiteLLM and published malicious package versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 to PyPI around March 2026 – creating a window of exposure lasting at least a few months. Over 2,500+ organizations and hundreds of thousands of CI/CD environments suffered full-credential exposure, compromising cloud infrastructure keys, repository access tokens, SSH credentials, Kubernetes secrets, and AI provider API keys (such as OpenAI and Anthropic). Resecurity has acquired the 150GB archive attributed to the LiteLLM supply-chain attack conducted by TeamPCP using the “SANDCLOCK” credential-stealer. Per published incident reporting — accompanying victim manifests enumerate 898 compromised GitHub owners (organisations/accounts) across 2,038 repositories. The affected owners include major global enterprises — among them Microsoft, Azure, IBM, NVIDIA, PayPal (Zettle), Deloitte, Bosch, S&P Global, Elevance Health, 84.51° (Kroger), Adeo (Leroy Merlin), Kärcher, Dräger, ID.me and 1inch. Top 10 the most impacted sectors (by victim organization profile): Technology / Software Banking / Finance / Insurance Healthcare / Pharma / Medtech Retail / E-Commerce Media / Gaming / Adtech Manufacturing / Industrial Professional Services Cybersecurity Crypto Government Resecurity enumerated 2,146 records by key name (values never inspected beyond structural masking). The composition is overwhelmingly GitHub CI-CD identity material, with a long tail of high-value cloud and registry credentials. Victim manifests (owners.txt, repos.txt) enumerate 898 distinct compromised GitHub owners across 2,038 repositories. The distribution is long-tailed: 631 owners have a single affected repo, while the most-affected owner (Cencosud-Cencommerce) has 64. Critically, the owner list includes major global enterprises and regulated organisations. Every organization affected by the LiteLLM incident should revoke or rotate GitHub App private keys, PATs, AWS/GCP/Firebase credentials, ECR/JFrog tokens, SSH keys, and signing passwords, and invalidate sessions. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)
A maximum-severity security vulnerability impacting SAP Commerce Cloud is witnessing active exploitation efforts. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-58231, is rated 10.0 on the CVSS scoring system. It relates to an instance of insufficient authorization checks and input validation. "SAP Commerce Cloud allows an unauthenticated attacker to abuse a default authentication client and submit
Google Workspace attacks do not always begin with phishing. Stolen OAuth tokens can provide another path into Gmail, Drive, and connected systems. Material Security explains why organizations need defenses that cover the entire Workspace attack chain.
A former data analyst contractor for Brightly Software has been sentenced to two years in prison for targeting his employer in a $2.5 million extortion scheme. Brightly is a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) company formerly known as SchoolDude, which was acquired by Siemens in August 2022. Brightly employs over 700 people and provides asset management and maintenance software to more than 12,000 clients worldwide. 27-year-old North Carolina man Cameron Curry (also known as "Loot") was found guilty in March of orchestrating an "extensive cyber extortion scheme" targeting his employer. According to court documents, Curry stole sensitive documents after gaining access to the company's payroll information and corporate data, which he later used to extort Brightly after learning that his six-month contract wouldn't be extended.
An ongoing data theft campaign uses custom tools to steal data exposed to anonymous users through Salesforce Experience Cloud and ServiceNow customer portals. The data-theft campaign, dubbed City-Forum by SaaS security firm Reco, has been traced to a single server that has targeted multiple organizations worldwide. These organizations include telecommunications companies, banks and financial services firms, enterprise software vendors, security and data privacy companies, and public-sector portals. Reco says the attacks are ongoing, with activity continuing to increase. Reco says all of the attacks originate from the IP address 158.220.87.79, hosted by German VPS provider Contabo, and almost always use the default Go-http-client/1.1 user agent when downloading data. This IP address is associated with the city-forum.com domain, which has resolved to the server since at least March 2025, indicating that the infrastructure has remained in place for more than a year.
A new Android NFC relay malware called WindRelay is being used alongside the SpyNote remote administration tool (RAT) to steal card data and send it to attackers in real time. In an incident investigated by the cybersecurity company Group-IB, a fraudster impersonated a bank employee and called the victim under the pretense of a problem with their payment card. During the call, the threat actor instructed the victim to sideload the SpyNote RAT disguised as a legitimate app and grant it Accessibility Service permissions, giving the attacker remote access to the Android device. To add credibility, the attacker personalized the malicious app label with the victim's name. After gaining remote access to the device through SpyNote, the attacker installed WindRelay without further interaction with the victim and used the banking app to take out a loan in the victim’s name.
Google says Chrome's anti-abuse systems reduced unwanted notifications on Android by more than 7 billion per day during the first quarter of 2026. In a new blog post, Google argues that notification abuse has increasingly been used to distribute scams, malware, phishing attempts, and fraudulent payment requests. To reduce the abuse, Google developed a "Swiss cheese" defense model, where several overlapping systems try to stop abuse at different stages. "Our goal is to ensure that if abuse slips through one layer, another is there to catch it," Google explained. "This approach allows us to halt abuse at the source, preventing deceptive content from reaching users while maintaining a healthy balance between utility and security." Chrome already removes notification permissions from inactive websites, as well as sites that repeatedly trigger suspicious-notification warnings.
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