Manic Android malware combines banking fraud and spyware, using a Bluetooth relay to steal data even when devices are offline. ThreatFabric’s Mobile Threat Intelligence team has identified a new Android malware, dubbed Manic, which has been active in the wild since at least February 2026. The researchers state that the malware is still under development as of July. “Manic sits at the intersection of Android banking malware and mobile spyware, combining financial-fraud capabilities with broader surveillance and device-control features.” reads the report published by the ThreatFabric’s Mobile Threat Intelligence team. “Its targeting is strongly focused on Ukraine, covering Ukrainian banks, government and identity services, and messaging applications, while also extending to Russian and European financial institutions, global fintech and cryptocurrency services, and military-focused communications.” The malware monitors 169 different Android apps, including banking and payment apps across several European countries, government and eID services, crypto exchanges and wallets, 2FA tools, messaging apps, browsers and email clients. This wide coverage appears deliberate. By targeting both financial and communication apps, the attackers can track a victim’s money, messages, location and files from the same device. ThreatFabric traces the first infrastructure registrations back to February 2026, with development and production services appearing in late March and April. By July, an updated build had added stronger anti-analysis checks, in-memory DEX loading, and a technique the researchers call lock-secret phishing, which extracts the device PIN or pattern by presenting a fake prompt before the victim reaches the real lock screen. Once installed, Manic requests Accessibility and notification access, then uses the Accessibility service as a UI keylogger. It classifies everything it captures before logging it: lock-screen input, recovery phrase candidates, four-to-six-digit SMS codes, passwords, long messages, email logins, and ordinary text. “Manic uses its Accessibility service as a UI keylogger. It classifies captured text before recording it, distinguishing lock-screen input, recovery-phrase candidates, four- to six-digit SMS codes, passwords, long messages, email logins, and ordinary text.” continues the report. “Each key log record includes the app and package, captured text, timestamp, whether the input came from Autofill or manual entry, and whether the app is on Manic’s target list “ Each log record includes the app name and package, the captured text, a timestamp, whether input came from autofill or manual entry, and whether the app is on Manic’s target list. The PIN theft technique works differently from a typical banking overlay. When Manic detects a numeric keypad in a targeted app, it places an invisible layer over the keys and records each tap. It then briefly passes the tap to the real keypad using Android’s Accessibility features, so the banking app works normally while Manic captures the PIN. Another function, called autoEnterPin, can try to enter a stored PIN or pattern on the Android lock screen. This gives attackers two options: capture a PIN during a banking session and later use it to unlock the device without the victim being present. According to the researchers, Manic stands out for its offline relay. “Manic uses a store-and-forward relay mechanism to exfiltrate data even when the infected device cannot reach the C2 server directly.” continues the report. “Collected files and command results are encrypted with AES-GCM and placed in a local queue, allowing the source device to remain offline while the malware searches for another infected device that can provide a route to the C2 infrastructure.” Manic searches for nearby infected devices over Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth RFCOMM, or BLE GATT, and supports chains of up to four relay hops. Cutting an infected phone off from the Internet doesn’t cut it off from exfiltration, as long as another infected device is within radio range. It’s a store-and-forward mesh built out of other people’s compromised phones. Manic gives attackers remote control of the device through WebRTC, allowing them to view the screen and interact with it using Android’s Accessibility features. It can hide its activity with black screens, fake screens or fake update messages, while also covering permission requests. The July version goes a step further by removing itself from the device’s app launcher. This keeps it out of the normal app list and lets attackers activate it through its wrapper or a deep link. For defenders, the combination here is complete in an uncomfortable way: credential theft, live screen monitoring, authentication interception, device takeover, and an exfiltration path that doesn’t require the infected device to have Internet access at all. Monitoring for unusual Accessibility service grants and unexpected Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Direct connections from phones that aren’t actively transferring files are the most practical detection starting points. “Manic is an evolving Android fraud platform designed for Device Takeover (DTO), combining credential and authentication theft with live screen monitoring and remote control. Its targeting spans banks, payment and cryptocurrency services, eID applications, and messengers, with a strong focus on Ukraine.” concludes the report. “A particularly distinctive capability is its offline mesh relay, which allows collected data to move through nearby infected devices over Wi-Fi Direct or Bluetooth when direct C2 access is unavailable. “ Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Android Malware)
Hackers compromised the maintainer account behind the widely used Rust crate arrayref to introduce malware that executed on developers’ systems during compilation. Within a 23-minute window, the attacker also poisoned two other crates, append-only-vec and internment, in the same supply-chain attack. The arrayref crate is a popular Rust library with more than 53 million downloads over the past 90 days that is used by cryptography, graphics, and blockchain tools. A report from application security company StepSecurity notes that the malicious Rust crate releases were arrayref 0.3.10, append-only-vec 0.1.9, and internment 0.8.7, all maintained by the same account. The hacker injected a dependency on a package called proc-macro1, a typosquat impersonating the popular proc-macro2 crate, while retaining the rest of the upstream source code completely unchanged.
NSA, CISA, FBI, DOE, and EPA warn of active AI-assisted attacks against Siemens S7 PLCs across US critical infrastructure sectors. Five U.S. federal agencies issued a joint advisory this week warning of an active hacking campaign against Siemens S7 Series programmable logic controllers. The advisory, CISA AA26-231A, is co-signed by NSA, FBI, DOE, and EPA and covers every S7 generation, from the S7-200 to the S7-1500 F-series safety controllers. The advisory is direct about one thing from the first paragraph: this is not a theoretical risk. “The threat actors are conducting reconnaissance and capability development against U.S.-based Siemens PLC installations using AI-generated exploitation scripts disguised as legitimate monitoring tools. The actors leverage Internet scanning services to find Internet-exposed PLCs running outdated software or that are otherwise poorly protected.” reads the advisory. “The U.S. critical infrastructure sectors most targeted by this threat activity include Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Water and Wastewater, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Commercial Facilities. This is not a theoretical risk—it is an active threat. “ The key detail is how the attackers try to hide their activity. They make their scripts look like legitimate OT monitoring software, making it harder for security teams to notice them while they map the target environment. The tools themselves are not custom malware. The attackers use the open-source snap7.dll and python-snap7 libraries, which are legitimate industrial automation tools. These libraries can communicate directly with Siemens PLCs over S7comm on TCP port 102, allowing access to PLC memory, configuration data and ladder logic programs. “Using AI to generate exploitation scripts represents an evolution in threat actor capabilities, dramatically reducing the technical expertise and time required to develop working ICS exploitation scripts and malicious tools. In addition, AI enables adversaries to rapidly leverage additional attack vectors and adapt to defensive measures.” continues the advisory. “Threat actors can easily collect public information about vulnerabilities and weaknesses, find exposed and exploitable PLCs, and use AI-generated scripts to act on that information. If PLCs are exposed to the Internet, they are at high risk for exploitation.” Researchers warn that a defender who patches a vulnerability may now find the attacker’s tooling already adapted before the change window closes. The observed activity breaks into two phases. Actors use scanning services like Censys and ZoomEye to locate Internet-exposed PLCs, then run read operations to understand the target environment before any writes happen. The authoring agencies assess this as pre-positioning: the actors are building a map and testing their techniques against specific CPU models, refining as they go, before they’re ready to cause disruption. The target list covers Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Water and Wastewater, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Commercial Facilities. The Defense Industrial Base is also named, given its use of S7-series hardware. If these actors move from read to write, the potential consequences include process disruption, equipment damage, and safety incidents through manipulation of interlocks or emergency shutdown systems, and cascading effects across interconnected supply chains. The advisory flags third-party exposure as a specific problem. Asset owners who rely on system integrators or managed service providers for remote PLC access may not know their controllers are reachable from the Internet. If an external support partner holds credentials for your S7 devices and you haven’t recently verified that those connections are segmented and monitored, this advisory is a good prompt to check. There are several clear signs defenders can monitor. They should look for S7comm connections from devices that are not normally used for engineering, PLC read or write activity outside scheduled maintenance, and scans of multiple IP addresses on TCP port 102. It is also worth checking for Python processes loading snap7.dll on systems where it should not be present. Connections from unexpected countries or locations should also raise an alert. On the mitigation side, the agencies prioritize inventory first, then patching with Internet-facing controllers at the top of the queue. Block TCP port 102 at the perimeter firewall, require password protection on all controllers, configure protection levels to limit what an unauthenticated or low-privilege session can read or write, and deploy ICS-aware monitoring capable of baselining legitimate S7comm behavior. Disabling the PLC web server where it’s not needed and limiting simultaneous S7comm sessions also appear in the guidance, alongside TIA Portal’s know-how protection and complete restart protection features. The advisory closes by recommending direct engagement with Siemens ProductCERT for model-specific hardening and patch compatibility verification, which matters in OT environments where a firmware update can interact badly with third-party integrations and can’t simply be rolled back. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
AI is making phishing attacks more personalized, convincing, and difficult for traditional email filters to detect. Kaseya explains how MSPs can monitor identity, email, and endpoint activity to detect and contain attacks that make it past the inbox.
Citrix has warned customers to immediately secure their systems against two vulnerabilities affecting NetScaler Gateway secure remote access solutions and NetScaler ADC networking appliances. The most severe of the two, tracked as CVE-2026-19490, can allow remote attackers without privileges to bypass authentication when the appliance is configured as an AAA virtual server or as a Gateway (SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy), depending on the NetScaler firmware version and whether SAML Action is configured. Admins can check if an appliance is vulnerable to attacks targeting CVE-2026-19490 by inspecting their NetScaler configuration for SAML action configuration (add authentication samlAction .*) string and Auth or VPN vserver ('add authentication vserver .*' and 'add vpn vserver .*') strings.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned federal agencies that threat actors are now exploiting a critical MLflow vulnerability. MLflow is an open-source AI engineering platform for large language models (LLMs) and agents backed by the Linux Foundation, with over 30 million monthly downloads, used by thousands of organizations to debug, evaluate, optimize, and monitor AI applications. Tracked as CVE-2026-64849, this critical DNS-rebinding server-side request forgery (SSRF) bypass in MLflow's outbound webhook delivery was patched in version 3.15.0 and can be used by attackers without privileges to remotely access internal services or cloud metadata configurations on unpatched instances. "The default MLflow Tracking Server (mlflow server, no authentication, default SQLite backend) exposes the model-registry webhooks API unauthenticated, including a synchronous POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/{id}/test endpoint that returns the upstream response status and body to the caller," MLflow's security team says in a security advisory issued three weeks ago.
A new Android malware named Manic targeting users in multiple European countries has a fallback mechanism for exfiltrating data through nearby infected devices. The malware has been active since at least February and combines spyware, banking fraud, and remote control capabilities. It targets at least 169 banking, government/eID, payment, crypto wallet, messaging, and authenticator/2FA apps, with users in Ukraine being the primary focus. Mobile security company ThreatFabric analyzed the Manic malware and found that it uses transparent overlays on the numeric keypads of legitimate applications to capture victims' taps and reproduce them through Android Accessibility, allowing the legitimate applications to continue functioning normally. After obtaining Accessibility and notification access permissions, the malware can capture the lock PIN/password, intercept notifications and SMS messages, collect files and location data, monitor the screen, and provide remote control to operators via WebRTC sessions.
Unit 42 details how attackers exploit enterprise collaboration tools for identity phishing and credential theft. Discover key defense strategies. The post Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels appeared first on Unit 42.
CERT Polska, the Polish Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), warned that attackers have begun exploiting a critical vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS). ZCS is a popular email and collaboration software suite used by hundreds of millions of people and organizations worldwide, including thousands of businesses and hundreds of government agencies. The Zimbra security team released version 10.1.20 on July 20 to patch the vulnerability (tracked as CVE-2026-73570), which allows unauthenticated attackers to gain remote code execution by exploiting a command injection weakness in the SNMP monitoring component when SNMP notifications are enabled. "Due to improper sanitization of untrusted input during SNMP notification processing, an unauthenticated attacker can send specially crafted SMTP requests that may result in execution of arbitrary operating system commands as the Zimbra user," it explained.
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds an MLflow vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added a Progress LoadMaster vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-64849 (CVSS score of 9.3), to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. CVE-2026-64849 is a critical server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in MLflow, a platform for managing machine-learning workflows. The issue affects MLflow versions before 3.15.0 and a remote attacker can exploit the issue without authentication. The vulnerability allows attackers to make requests from an exposed MLflow server to internal services, including cloud metadata endpoints, potentially exposing temporary cloud credentials. Attackers are actively exploiting CVE-2026-64849 to access cloud metadata services and steal credentials and secrets. Cybersecurity firm watchTowr also observed widespread scanning for exposed MLflow instances just hours after the CVE was assigned on August 17, 2026. “watchTowr Intel is observing in-the-wild exploitation of a critical unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in MLflow (CVE-2026-64849), the open-source platform for managing the machine learning and AI development lifecycle, with over 60 million monthly downloads.” watchTowr said in a post on LinkedIn. “Attackers are exploiting the vulnerability to reach cloud metadata services directly, and exfiltrating cloud credentials and secrets. Within hours of the CVE being assigned, Attacker Eye, our global honeypot network, detected attackers indiscriminately scanning for exposed MLflow systems online, capturing attempts against cloud-hosted instances.” Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
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