Cloud hosting provider Railway published an urgent warning to users after detecting suspicious activity on its systems that store customer environment variables earlier this week. The company says its investigation indicates that, in some cases, an unauthorized third party may have obtained decrypted variables and urges all users to proactively rotate secrets and credentials. “Our investigation to date indicates that an unauthorized third party may have accessed encrypted environment variables and, for some of them, obtained the decrypted contents,” Railway says. “Environment variables may contain secrets such as API keys or database and registry credentials,” the company clarifies. Railway is a cloud platform for developers to deploy and run applications, APIs, databases, and various backend services. It has around 4.8 million users and hosts more than 16 million services.
Hackers compromised the LiteLLM project’s PyPI package and published malicious Docker images with a payload that steals credentials, secrets, and environment variables. The supply-chain attack affected all PyPI wheels (.whl installation packages) for LiteLLM version 1.107.0, impacting Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. LiteLLM is an open-source Python SDK and AI gateway that enables applications to access AI models from different providers through a common API. It is a massively popular project with 61,800 GitHub stars, 92 million monthly downloads on PyPI, and is used by high-profile companies like NVIDIA, Netflix, AT&T, and Okta. The project says that the release pipeline was compromised on October 21 and a threat actor pushed version 1.107.0 to the Docker registry and PyPI. "This version contained compiled malware which steals credentials and loads remote-code execution tools," the maintainer says, adding that customers running the private enterprise were not impacted.
Right now, there is probably an AI agent running on a laptop somewhere in your network. It stores API keys and database passwords, can access your internal systems, and works without anyone watching. Nobody reviewed its access. Nobody owns it. If an employee had that much reach with that little oversight, you would call it an insider risk. So why do we still call the agent a productivity tool?
Attackers are exploiting a zero-day SQL injection flaw in Arista's VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO), the central management system for VeloCloud SD-WAN networks, the company said in an advisory on October 22. The flaw lets anyone who can log in to the orchestrator, even with a read-only customer account, gain operator privileges, the top level of control over it. For
A critical Signal flaw could keep calls active after hang-up, exposing microphone or camera. Update to a fixed version immediately. A critical vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-113380 (CVSS score 9.3 of 10), in Signal ’s calling library could allow a malicious caller to interfere with call termination, potentially leaving the victim’s microphone and camera active after they believe the conversation has ended. The flaw affects versions before 2.72.0 of the library RingRTC, which the messaging app uses to provide voice and video calling. It highlights a security problem that deserves attention beyond a single messaging application: ending a call should be an immediate control action, not something that can be delayed by traffic coming from the other participant. According to the technical report published on GitHub, the vulnerability stems from how RingRTC handles events in the finite-state machine (FSM) that manages a call. The application places events in a queue for processing, but a malicious peer can flood that queue with events and prevent the local hang-up operation from being handled in a timely manner. “A local hang-up is not a kill switch: it is just one more event placed at the back of the call’s finite-state-machine event queue. The remote peer is trusted with that queue — there is no rate limit on peer-originated events and no priority lane for hang-up.” reads the technical report published on GitHub, “Flood the queue with junk and the hang-up waits behind attacker noise forever, so the call (microphone, possibly camera) is never torn down.” People expect that pressing the hang-up button ends the call and turns off the microphone and camera. But if the system is too busy processing other events, it may delay the command to end the call, leaving the audio or video active longer than expected. The report explains that someone taking part in a call could exploit this weakness by sending enough events to overload the system’s queue. This could stop the other person from ending the call properly, potentially keeping the microphone active and possibly the camera too. The underlying problem is not that Signal’s end-to-end encryption has been broken. Rather, it concerns the handling of call state and the reliable termination of a session. Encryption cannot protect users from every flaw in the software that controls when a communication session begins or ends. The vulnerability concerns RingRTC versions earlier than 2.72.0 and can affect Signal clients that embed a vulnerable build of the library. According to the CSIRT Toscana advisory, the affected application versions are Signal for Android before 8.27.0, Signal for iOS before 8.30.0, and Signal Desktop before 8.29.0. The official RingRTC fix and the comparison between versions 2.71.0 and 2.72.0 document the software changes. Users should install the latest available Signal release for their device rather than relying on the library version alone. The technical report also includes a conceptual Python proof of concept. It models the difference between a queue in which a flood can bury a hang-up event and one in which critical events receive priority. The demonstration is synthetic and offline, with no network activity or real calls, so it illustrates the underlying logic rather than providing a working exploit. This is an important distinction. The fact that the vulnerability has been made public does not mean attackers are already exploiting it. However, because it could expose private conversations, updating Signal promptly is a sensible precaution, especially for people who use it to discuss sensitive matters. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, mobile)
eMudhra, an Indian certificate authority (CA), will withdraw from its global SSL/TLS certificate business, its board decided on Thursday. The decision came five days after a researcher reported recovering the private keys of eight of its intermediate CA certificates. eMudhra said it will replace affected customers' certificates with free ones from partners, though its
This week has already been rough for cybersecurity. Critical PHP and GitLab RCE flaws, serious Linux security bugs, compromised eMudhra certificates, a Node.js RCE flaw, a hacked LiteLLM release, and hundreds of hijacked Tor relays. That's a lot to deal with in just a few days. And the week isn't even over yet. But those big headlines are only half the story. Stolen passwords, exposed
Arista Networks released security updates to patch an actively exploited zero-day vulnerability affecting VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) On-Prem deployments. VCO is a web-based management portal that helps administrators configure, monitor, and manage VeloCloud SD-WANs (Software-Defined Wide Area Networks) and associated edge devices. Tracked as CVE-2026-114625, this critical-severity flaw can allow attackers with basic privileges, access to the VCO web interface, and a valid authenticated session to escalate privileges through low-complexity SQL injection attacks that don't require user interaction. "VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact the VCO host. Successful exploitation may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the orchestrator and data managed by the orchestrator," Arista said.
Eight compromised eMudhra intermediate CA private keys risk unauthorized TLS signing and MitM interception. Read our analysis and containment guide. The post EMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates Compromised appeared first on Unit 42.
Linux servers running KSMBD, the kernel's built-in SMB server, are exposed to two publicly reported remote code execution flaws rated 9.0 by Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative, with no fix yet in the mainline kernel. One of them, ZDI-CAN-33774, can be triggered before any network authentication. The other, ZDI-CAN-33549, requires the SMB Direct transport and an RDMA-capable network
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