Cloud hosting provider Railway published an urgent warning to users after detecting suspicious activity on its systems that store customer environment variables earlier this week. The company says its investigation indicates that, in some cases, an unauthorized third party may have obtained decrypted variables and urges all users to proactively rotate secrets and credentials. “Our investigation to date indicates that an unauthorized third party may have accessed encrypted environment variables and, for some of them, obtained the decrypted contents,” Railway says. “Environment variables may contain secrets such as API keys or database and registry credentials,” the company clarifies. Railway is a cloud platform for developers to deploy and run applications, APIs, databases, and various backend services. It has around 4.8 million users and hosts more than 16 million services.
China-linked Storm-0940 used AI tool ARTEX to target 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants, exploiting stolen ConnectWise credentials at machine speed. Microsoft published a detailed technical report naming Storm-0940, a China state-aligned group, as the actor behind the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply chain compromise. The group used ARTEX, an open-source AI-driven penetration testing framework, to run attacks at machine speed against hundreds of organizations across aerospace, defense, energy, financial services, government, manufacturing, and more. “Several of these Storm-0940 ARTEX-driven attacks have resulted in the actor obtaining privileged access to an organization’s cloud infrastructure – including multiple instances where the time from initial targeting to privileged access was less than 3 hours.” reads the report. “Microsoft assesses that Storm-0940 was responsible for the recently disclosed ConnectWise supply chain compromise of a multi-tenant application.” Storm-0940 has been active since 2021 and has historically relied on password spraying and OAuth application abuse to get into Microsoft 365 environments. Adding ARTEX changed the scale of what they could do. In some attacks, the time between initial targeting and achieving privileged cloud access was under three hours. Before obtaining the ConnectWise credentials, Storm-0940 launched a password spraying attack between October 10 and 14. The attack came from the IP address 144.172.64[.]99. Microsoft recorded more than 151,000 failed login attempts against 327 accounts at eight organizations. Activity peaked on October 11, with 2,900 failed attempts per minute. Forty-eight accounts each received more than 1,000 failed attempts. None of these attempts succeeded. The situation changed on October 15, one day after the ConnectWise breach became public. The AI agents stopped trying passwords and switched to a different attack method. By then, Storm-0940 had obtained the credentials of several ConnectWise cloud application accounts. The agents used these credentials to log directly into customer Microsoft 365 environments. “Storm-0940’s use of ARTEX accelerated the speed of compromised application abuse to authenticate to Microsoft 365 customer environments through applications that had already been granted access.” Microsoft continues. “This allowed the threat actor to operate without requiring an interactive user sign-in. “ The agents used applications that already had permission to access their targets. This allowed the attackers to enter customer environments without requiring users to sign in interactively. In a subset of environments where authentication succeeded, the agents didn’t stop there. They moved into Microsoft Graph and ran directory reconnaissance, modified application credentials to establish persistence, and attempted changes to identities, groups, and privileged roles. Microsoft identified multiple customer environments with evidence of this follow-on activity. The persistence mechanism is the part defenders need to act on now, even if they’ve already disabled the ConnectWise connections. “These changes can remain active as a backdoor even after the original compromised application is mediated.” says the IT giant. An attacker who added their own credentials to a trusted application before you revoked access still has a working key. Reviewing all service principal credential additions since at least October 1 is the right starting point, not October 15 when the public breach was announced. ARTEX is not a tool used only by Storm-0940. Microsoft says threat actors in several regions have used the same framework. Originally open-source, ARTEX was written in Go and can use different AI models to plan and carry out tasks. Researchers at Zscaler and Recorded Future also found a Chinese-speaking group using it to target South Korean financial institutions. The setup used DeepSeek, GLM, and Grok as coordinated AI agents, with GLM checking DeepSeek’s work. After these attacks became public, the project went closed-source. However, anyone who already has a copy can still use it. The speed point is what Microsoft keeps coming back to in its report. Agents don’t take weekends, don’t sleep, and can run multiple attack paths simultaneously. “This activity demonstrates how threat actors are integrating agentic AI into existing offensive security workflows and allows them to scale their operations exponentially.” Microsoft concludes. “Agents are not constrained by factors affecting humans – they can work around the clock, on weekends, and on holidays and attempt multiple breach paths simultaneously enabling significantly reduced time from selecting a target to achieving objectives, increasing the speed and impact of complex attacks like supply chain compromises.” When Storm-0940 had valid application credentials, they didn’t have to iterate slowly. They hit 2,250 tenants with 2,900 sign-in attempts per minute, a pace at which manual detection and response simply can’t keep up. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, ARTEX)
Right now, there is probably an AI agent running on a laptop somewhere in your network. It stores API keys and database passwords, can access your internal systems, and works without anyone watching. Nobody reviewed its access. Nobody owns it. If an employee had that much reach with that little oversight, you would call it an insider risk. So why do we still call the agent a productivity tool?
Unit 42 explores modern OAuth threats and actionable steps organizations can take to protect their environments. The post The Current Landscape of OAuth Attacks appeared first on Unit 42.
Attackers can steal credentials and begin exfiltrating data within minutes, often before security teams can respond. Exaforce examines real-world attacks involving stolen GitHub tokens, malicious AI installers, and MFA phishing, explaining why faster detection and automated containment are critical.
State Bank of India has identified 3,897 customer records containing personal information in a set of about 375,000 records available on the dark web, and it does not yet know where the data came from. The state-owned bank, India's largest, said in a stock-exchange filing dated October 21 that it "has experienced an incident involving the loss of certain data." The count is
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is ordering federal civilian agencies to stop using DeepSeek products and remove them from government systems. The order also covers products from the Chinese AI company's affiliates and third-party products and services built using DeepSeek technology. DeepSeek (Hangzhou DeepSeek Artificial Intelligence Co., Ltd) develops large language models and offers a chatbot, API services, and models suitable for coding and reasoning tasks. Its AI tools became extremely popular early on, but were but were soon followed by reports of security risks [1, 2, 3, 4] and concerns about the potential for Chinese authorities to access users’ conversations. The DHS is now taking regulatory action to limit the use of DeepSeek and derivatives on critical systems in the United States, and has issued a notice of order for agencies to:
CJIS v6.1 requires agencies to maintain strong authentication, account security, and audit controls while demonstrating ongoing compliance. Specops outlines five practical priorities covering MFA, account management, passwords, logging, and audit readiness.
A Nigerian national was sentenced to eight years in prison for his involvement in a series of spearphishing attacks targeting US tax preparation businesses since 2019. 40-year-old Chukwuemeka Victor Amachukwu (also known as Chukwuemeka Victor Eletuo and So Kwan Leung) has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit computer intrusions and wire fraud after being extradited from France to the United States in August 2025. "Chukwuemeka Amachukwu believed he was operating safely offshore when he targeted his victims, but he has now been held to account and now faces a serious sentence for his crimes," said US Attorney Jamie McDonald in a Monday press release. "Amachukwu took part in sophisticated schemes to hack into US businesses, steal and use stolen identity information of victims, and commit fraud. These crimes imposed significant harm on the victims and the public, and so it is only appropriate that the crimes also come with a significant sentence for the defendant."
A data breach exposed AfD emails, while an anonymous site published AI summaries of 421,000 messages, raising questions about authenticity and privacy. Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) confirmed on October 19 that its hosting provider was hacked in September and that mailboxes were copied. By the time the confirmation reached Bild, a website called hexane.cc had already been online for hours offering an index of what it claims are 421,179 internal party emails. “In September 2026 there was a hacking attack on a hosting provider used by our party.” By then the website hexane.cc had been online for several hours with an index of what it says are 421,179 of the party’s emails. In place of the emails, the site shows summaries written by software, sorted into categories that include racism and antisemitism and graded from Low to Critical. International Cyber Digest (ICD), a cybersecurity news account on X, examined it on 19 October and reported that the index includes Gauland’s mailbox and that the newest message is dated 12 September 2026. According to the summaries ICD relayed, Gauland, the party’s 85-year-old honorary chairman and former co-leader, forwarded a 2018 email about a “Hitler pilgrimage” by a former judge on the party’s internal court in Thuringia.” AfD told told Bild. “A district board member sent a Christmas card with a swastika and the words “Heil Hitler”. Staff at the party’s Berlin headquarters discussed luring a photographer to an event and throwing him out by force, in a thread signed off “hail and victory”. The AfD’s statement gave a limited account of the incident. The party said the attackers copied parts of a few mailboxes, most of which had not been used for years, and did not access the leadership’s current accounts. However, the online index includes messages dated as recently as September 12, 2026, raising questions about the party’s account. The website hexane.cc does not publish the emails themselves. Instead, it provides AI-generated summaries grouped into categories such as racism and antisemitism, with severity ratings from Low to Critical. The site operators have not identified the AI software used to create them. When users try to open a record, the site displays the message “source text not published for this record.” So far, none of the summaries has been linked to an original email that can be verified. That’s an important detail that’s getting lost in the coverage. The summaries describe swastikas, Nazi greetings, Christmas cards bearing Heil Hitler, and a thread at the federal party headquarters signed off with “hail and victory.” If authenticated, some of this material would matter significantly in ongoing court proceedings about whether the party can be banned. But right now all of it is filtered through an anonymous operator’s software, and the original texts remain unpublished. Bild is the only German news outlet confirmed to have examined files from the archive directly, although it reviewed only a very small sample. The files appeared to be genuine party records, including identity documents, invoices, bank statements, membership applications, and regional member lists. They also included the identity card of Markus Frohnmaier, deputy leader of the AfD’s parliamentary group in the Bundestag. Berlin-based security researcher Lilith Wittmann, who exposed a flaw in the CDU’s campaign app in 2021, wrote on X that she believed the leak was genuine and the reported attack method was plausible. The hacker reportedly told the International Cyber Digest account on X that they gained access through “a single unpatched party website” and then reached the mail servers. The AfD has confirmed that its hosting provider was targeted, but the reported entry method has not been independently verified. The archive’s own file names offer another clue: one server is labeled “afd_exfil.” The term “exfil” is commonly used for a system that stages stolen data before attackers transfer it out of a network. The AfD is currently contesting in court its classification as a confirmed right-wing extremist organization by Germany’s domestic intelligence agency. Lawmakers in the Bundestag and Thuringia are separately debating whether to seek a formal party ban, which under German law can only come from the Federal Constitutional Court. The leak appeared on October 19, while the Cologne Administrative Court is actively weighing whether the intelligence agency may publicly apply the extremist designation, and two months before the AfD plans to seek the election of one of its leaders as state premier in Saxony-Anhalt. Within two hours of the first posts about the archive on X, some accounts were using it to argue that the AfD should be banned. If authenticated, the most legally relevant emails would be those showing how the party’s national headquarters operates and handles internal disciplinary cases. This is because a ban case focuses on the party as an organization, not on individual members. So far, none of the summaries has been linked to an original email. The website describes itself as an independent archive published in the public interest and claims to have minimized personal data. However, Bild found that the files it reviewed included membership applications and member lists containing full names and home addresses of people whose only apparent connection to the story was their party membership. By the afternoon of October 19, the site’s About, Method, and Support pages were returning server errors, leaving visitors unable to access its own explanations of how the archive was created and managed. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, AfD)
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