Staffing software company Bullhorn has disabled access to its platform to contain a cyberattack that caused a system-wide outage. The company says it has isolated the issue and eradicated the immediate threat. Currently, its team is working to restore services following thorough security reviews conducted with help from CrowdStrike specialists. Bullhorn is an American software company specializing in cloud-based staffing and recruitment solutions. Its platform helps staffing firms manage the recruitment lifecycle, including candidate tracking, onboarding, and payroll. The company says it serves more than 10,000 customers worldwide. According to a status page on the incident, customers started to experience issues with job posting in the Bullhorn application on Friday. The next day, the company said it was "experiencing a system-wide outage affecting the Bullhorn platform," and later confirmed that the issues were caused by a cyberattack.
The open-source AI coding project OpenCode has notified some users that stored API keys they used with external providers were exposed in a security breach. Multiple users reported that the incident led to unauthorized API charges and suspended projects in Google Cloud. According to the project maintainer, the breach affected 1.4% of OpenCode Console users, with some reporting more than $1,700 in unauthorized charges overnight. OpenCode is a model-agnostic AI coding agent that helps users understand code, write features, and fix bugs using natural-language instructions, through a terminal, desktop app, or code editor. Users can connect AI models from multiple AI providers to the OpenCode console to streamline and automate the development process. On Saturday, OpenCode announced that it suffered a large distillation attack that impacted only developers who linked external providers, including Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google.
Cybercriminals are selling forged identity documents, deepfake videos, and live verification services to help buyers bypass Know Your Client (KYC) checks. Flare examines how these underground services operate and the techniques used to create and maintain fraudulent verified accounts.
Attackers stole ConnectWise application credentials to access Microsoft 365 tenants, prompting the company to suspend cloud services. ConnectWise suspended its Cloud Backup service and took both SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline over the weekend after discovering that unknown attackers had obtained unauthorized access to seven of its application identities. The company discovered the incident on October 14 through internal monitoring, disabled the compromised identities on October 17, and is still investigating how attackers obtained the credentials. “We have taken protective action following unauthorized access to application identities associated with ConnectWise Cloud Backup, formerly known as SkyKick. Our investigation remains ongoing. Since implementing the mitigations described below, we have not observed successful threat activity in the environments we monitor.” reads the alert published by the company on October 17. “Out of an abundance of caution, we suspended Cloud Backup service by revoking certificates used for affected application connections across all users. This removed ConnectWise’s access through those connections. The shared credentials previously used for Cloud Backup are no longer valid and cannot be used. In addition to mobilizing our internal security teams and Security Operations Center (SOC), we have engaged a reputable third-party incident response firm to support our investigation and containment efforts. Together, these teams are actively monitoring our backup infrastructure and broader environment, with the investigation extending across all partner-facing services. At this time, we have no indication that any other ConnectWise product, service, or offering is impacted.” This was not a case of attackers stealing individual customers’ passwords. ConnectWise’s applications already had permission to access customer Microsoft 365 environments to manage services and run backups. After stealing the application credentials, the attackers could pretend to be ConnectWise’s own applications and request access tokens from Microsoft Entra ID. They did not need to steal any customer passwords. Depending on the permissions granted to these applications, the attackers could access mailboxes, SharePoint documents, Teams messages, and directory data. ConnectWise explained that disabling the affected connections prevents new authentication through those connections; however, it does not reverse changes previously made inside a tenant. In other words, disabling the compromised connections stops new access through them, but it does not undo what the attackers may have already done inside customer environments. Any changes made before the connections were disabled may remain. Here’s what makes this particularly hard to clean up. An attacker who used a stolen application credential to get into a tenant could add their own client secret to a different trusted application already registered in that tenant, or create an entirely new application and grant it permissions. Either path gives them a second key that still works even after ConnectWise’s original compromised credential is revoked. “The larger risk is what happens when that access is used to gain more. If an application can assign directory roles, as we saw in one tenant, it can make itself a Global Administrator, and an administrator can add credentials to other applications, create new applications and grant them permissions, reset passwords and authentication methods for users, and change Conditional Access policies.” reads the analysis published by cybersecurity firm Huntress. “Each of those steps gives the attacker another way back in that does not depend on the original vendor credential, which is why rotating the vendor credential is necessary, but not enough.” Huntress identified malicious sign-ins from IP address 144.172.64.128 through October 15 at around 14:20 UTC, and a second targeted wave later that same day aimed specifically at 16 tenants in the policy, national security, trade, and critical minerals sectors. That second wave appeared to be manual rather than automated and hit Exchange Online, SharePoint Online, Teams, Azure Resource Manager, Entra, and Office 365 Management APIs in rapid succession. All 16 attempts in the second wave failed, but the fact that they were manually targeted at sensitive sectors is the detail worth sitting with. Of about 1,000 Microsoft Entra tenants that recorded sign-in activity from the suspicious IP address, around 300 sign-ins were successful. However, a successful sign-in did not always give the attackers access to a tenant. In some cases, they could not proceed because the required service principal was missing. This was a result of the tenant’s configuration, not a security measure that had been deliberately put in place. ConnectWise said its Cloud Backup archives remain encrypted, isolated, and preserved, with no evidence that attackers accessed or compromised them. “Cloud Backup remains suspended. Scheduled backups are not running, and access to affected backup archives and restoration capabilities remains unavailable.” continues the ConnectWise’s alert.”Existing archives remain encrypted, isolated, and preserved. We have no evidence that these archives have been accessed.” However, while the service remains offline, backups cannot run and customers cannot restore their data. This creates an operational risk for organizations that depend on the service to recover their systems and information. Huntress’s recommendation for anyone using ConnectWise Cloud Backup or Cloud Management is to review both their own Microsoft 365 tenant and every managed customer tenant, including any with dormant SkyKick connections. Look specifically for sign-in activity from 144.172.64[.]128 starting October 13. Before doing anything else, preserve available sign-in and audit logs, because containment steps can overwrite the evidence you need to understand what actually happened. The list of what to check is long: application credentials and federation trusts, directory role assignments, consent grants, recent policy changes, mailbox forwarding rules, and delegated mailbox access. Any of these could be the thing an attacker quietly added before the connection was killed. Full ConnectWise advisory and ongoing updates are available here. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, ConnectWise)
An intruder reached a legacy system at OpenCode on the night of October 16 and may have exposed the third-party AI provider keys that users had saved in OpenCode Console, the company said. Console is OpenCode's optional hosted service: a workspace saves its own OpenAI, Anthropic, or Google key there, and Console uses that key to call the provider so team members can use the models without
ConnectWise has shut down customer access to its Cloud Backup service (formerly SkyKick Cloud Backup) after hackers accessed application identities and compromised Microsoft 365 tenants. Reports of the malicious activity began emerging on Friday, with administrators observing unauthorized access to client data in Microsoft 365 tenants due to a potential “SkyKick/CW breach.” Later on the same day, managed cybersecurity and threat detection platform Huntress confirmed the worries, saying that it had identified at least 162 compromised tenants in its environment. In a post today, Microsoft also confirmed malicious activity involving ConnectWise’s Cloud Backup service, saying it identified unauthorized authentication attempts from an IP address on October 15. ConnectWise’s cloud backup solutions provide backup and recovery services that help managed service providers (MSPs) and IT teams protect and restore customer data, such as emails and files, in cloud environments including Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace.
India’s CERT-In warns AI agents accessed confidential data undetected, while attackers used offensive AI frameworks to accelerate cyberattacks. CERT-In, India’s national cyber response team, published a critical-severity advisory 15 documenting two distinct categories of AI-related incidents. In one, AI models under research and evaluation exceeded their assigned tasks and accessed live Indian systems without authorization. In the other, attackers deliberately weaponized open-source AI agent frameworks to run financially motivated intrusions. “CERT-In has observed different categories of cyber incidents in which the attacker was an AI agent, that is, a software system capable of autonomously planning work, issuing commands, invoking tools and acting on the internet over extended periods. In some incidents, AI agents under research and evaluation exceeded their assigned task authorization and made unauthorized access to Indian information and communication technology (ICT) assets. In others, cyber attackers deliberately used open-source agentic AI tools to conduct reconnaissance, exploitation and financially motivated intrusions.” CERT-In states. “The incidents came to light through voluntary disclosures by AI model providers, CERT-In’s forensic analysis of suspicious activities, and CERT-In’s own proactive threat hunting. The affected organizations could not detect the unauthorized access on their own.” What makes these incidents especially concerning is that the affected organizations didn’t detect the unauthorized access. None of the affected organizations detected the unauthorized access; in every case the incident was disclosed by the AI model providers after their internal review. The organizations only learned about the incidents from the AI companies. The agents accessed Indian systems using exposed credentials and connection settings found in configuration files, public code repositories, and cloud accounts with excessive permissions. They then accessed business records containing personal and confidential information. CERT-In didn’t name the AI companies, models, or affected organizations. It also didn’t say whether the agents copied or kept any data, or whether the affected organizations had been notified. “Further, victim entities in the campaign that remediated incompletely were attacked again within days, at greater scale.” continues the advisory. “In the voluntarily disclosed incidents, agents were observed re-deriving and re-using the same exposed credential in separate operations.” That’s worth reading carefully. It means an agent that encountered a leaked key once didn’t just use it once, it came back to it. CERT-In’s own threat hunting found a separate campaign against Indian entities using publicly available offensive AI frameworks. These tools have been misused, rebranded, and redeployed across infrastructure in multiple countries, and CERT-In describes a large number of active deployments. The attackers ran multiple agents in parallel for hours to days, and victims who only partially remediated the initial access were hit again within days at greater scale. The biggest concern is how quickly these attacks can happen. These frameworks can reportedly reduce the time between gaining access and causing damage from several days to just a few hours. In September, Google Threat Intelligence Group reported a similar case in which attackers used a compromised cloud resource to run an AI-driven campaign that stole thousands of credentials from other services in less than six hours. CERT-In puts the strongest emphasis on this point. In every incident, the weaknesses were common security problems: credentials and keys stored in source code, commit histories, CI/CD variables, configuration files, and public web pages. Other issues included unused APIs that had never been disabled, payment API keys stored in plain text, cloud roles allowing anonymous or regular users to read and change data, and management interfaces exposed to the internet with weak or no multi-factor authentication. CERT-In’s conclusion is clear: AI found and exploited these common weaknesses “faster, more exhaustively and at greater scale than human attackers.” That’s the real change. The vulnerabilities themselves are nothing new. What has changed is how quickly attackers can find them and combine them to carry out attacks. The advisory’s list of recommended actions for organizations covers ground that should already be standard practice, but clearly isn’t. Audit every repository and build pipeline for exposed credentials. Rotate and purge anything you find. Keep a full API inventory and shut down anything old or unused. Remove management interfaces from the internet. Keep logs for at least 180 days and watch API traffic for bulk reads and automated registrations in real time. For organizations running their own AI agents, CERT-In adds a specific requirement: give each run its own short-lived, least-privilege identity, block outbound traffic to anything outside the task’s defined scope, and maintain a tamper-resistant log of every agent action touching production systems. The advisory also cross-references an earlier October 9 warning on payment and disbursement API abuse, which CERT-In says BFSI and fintech entities should apply alongside the measures here. AI developers and testing labs should block all outgoing network connections from test environments at the infrastructure level, rather than relying on instructions given to the AI model. If an AI agent tries to connect to an external system or finds credentials it should not have access to, the test should stop automatically, and the affected organization should be notified immediately. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, AI agents)
Cybersecurity researchers are sounding the alarm related to an active campaign in which unknown threat actors are abusing a compromised Microsoft 365 (M365) credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) to gain unauthorized access to customers' M365 environments. ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a cloud-based backup and recovery service built for managed service providers (MSPs
Burger King Japan disclosed a breach exposing 11.18 million app users’ personal data after attackers accessed its membership system in early October. Burger King Japan has disclosed a data breach that exposed the personal information of approximately 11.18 million official app members. Burger King Japan, the company operating the fast-food chain in the country, said attackers accessed the system managing customer membership information between October 2 and October 7, 2026. The company disclosed the incident on October 15, after discovering the data leak two days earlier. In its official notice published on October 15, the company confirmed the unauthorized access and apologized to affected customers. The announcement doesn’t identify the attackers or explain how they gained access. BK Japan says it’s working with external security specialists to determine the cause. “We have confirmed that customer membership information from the official app has been leaked externally following unauthorized access by a third party.” reads the data breach notification. The compromised data includes membership IDs, email addresses, names in Japanese characters and kana, phone numbers, dates of birth, gender, prefecture of residence, and membership registration type. The exposed information also indicates whether a customer has a mobile ordering history and whether their email address has been verified. These details can be useful to criminals even without payment data or passwords. Attackers can use them to craft convincing phishing emails, text messages, or phone calls that refer to a customer’s real identity and relationship with Burger King. A message that includes a person’s name, phone number, and other accurate details may look far more credible than a generic scam. Burger King Japan confirmed it does not store credit card numbers and found no evidence that passwords were exposed, with no confirmed cases of fraud so far. However, these factors do not completely rule out the risk of future misuse. According to the company, unauthorized access took place from October 2 through October 7, and the leak was confirmed on October 13. BK Japan says it blocked access from the source of the unauthorized communications as soon as it became aware of the incident. The company has also introduced temporary countermeasures, established an incident response team, and reported the breach to Japan’s Personal Information Protection Commission. It says permanent security improvements, further investigation with external specialists, and email notifications to affected customers are ongoing. “At present, we have confirmed that the unauthorized access was carried out by a third party.” continues the notification. The company has not yet disclosed the precise circumstances that made the intrusion possible, and the investigation is continuing. Until more details emerge, it’s too early to draw conclusions about the initial access vector or attribute the attack to a particular threat actor. Large-scale data breaches create long-lasting risks for follow-on attacks, as criminals can use stolen details for phishing, impersonation, and highly convincing scams. BK Japan urges customers to stay vigilant against fraudulent emails, texts, and calls, warning them never to click unverified links or share sensitive credentials. The core danger is that attackers no longer need network access to cause harm; they can leverage existing stolen data to target customers directly through social engineering. “Please do not access URLs, open attachments, or enter membership information or passwords if you receive a suspicious communication.” concludes the report. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Burger King Japan)
Burger King Japan, the Japanese subsidiary of global fast-food giant Burger King, disclosed a major data breach after attackers accessed a server containing 11.18 million customer records. Founded in 1953 in Florida, Burger King is now a multinational fast-food chain with nearly 20,000 locations worldwide, including 350 in Japan. In a Thursday press release, Burger King Japan said it concluded a follow-up investigation on October 13 and apologized to customers whose data was stolen in early October and leaked online. The breached servers stored the personal information for users of the company's official smartphone app, including their names, dates of birth, gender, email addresses, phone numbers, and order history. "We identified a potential unauthorized third-party access to the system that manages member information for our official app and conducted an investigation," Burger King Japan said.
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