Infostealers can steal active Claude sessions, bypass 2FA and drain paid usage. Anthropic is revoking access and refunding unauthorized charges. Anthropic confirmed that several infostealer malware can hijack an active Claude login session and let attackers burn through your usage without ever touching your password. “Our investigation is ongoing. Our findings to date suggest that a computer you use with Claude is likely infected with infostealer malware, and may have been for some time. Phones and tablets do not appear to have been involved.” reads the notification sent to the impacted users. “We have no reason to believe that this malware is related to Claude, installed through Claude, or related to anything you did with Claude. It’s general-purpose malware that typically arrives with an unofficial download or a malicious app, and it quietly copies saved passwords, login cookies in browsers, and credentials for other apps running locally. Your Claude session was likely one of the many things it collected. It appears that a bad actor has now started picking the Claude sessions out of what it collected and using them.” Recently, Anthropic started signing some Claude users out and removing their saved payment cards. The reason? Infostealer malware on their computers stole active Claude sessions and gave attackers access to their accounts. “We recently signed you out of Claude and removed the payment method saved on your account, so you’ll need to log back in and re-add your card.” continues the report. “We’re sorry for the disruption. Here’s what happened and what we’ve done about it.” Anthropic detected the suspicious activity and identified multiple infostealer families affecting Windows and macOS. Infostealers bypass the login process by stealing authenticated browser sessions, allowing attackers to evade passwords, MFA and SSO and access paid Claude accounts. Revoking sessions or blocking fraudulent payments is not enough: if the malware remains on the device, it can capture the user’s next login and give attackers access again. Anthropic is also refunding users for any charges it identifies as unauthorized. BREAKING: Anthropic is signing Claude users out and deleting their saved card because infostealer malware on their machines handed a bad actor live Claude login sessions. Anthropic says its systems detected the activity, and the notification names six stealer families across… pic.twitter.com/0nX53PaeiH — International Cyber Digest (@IntCyberDigest) August 29, 2026 “”Our systems detected this activity on your account, and we’ve therefore removed your card on file and signed out the sessions involved to help block further unauthorized access.” continues the report. “If your usage limits looked like they refilled and then drained while you weren’t using Claude, this was likely the cause.”” Anthropic identified Vidar, LummaC2, StealC, RedLine and Acreed on Windows, plus Atomic Stealer on a small number of Macs. The company revoked affected Claude sessions, forcing users to log in again, and removed saved payment methods to prevent unauthorized charges. Existing plans will continue until the current billing period ends. After that, users will need to add their payment method again. Anthropic may also sign them out again if it detects suspicious activity. If you use Claude and haven’t checked your usage history recently, that’s worth doing today rather than next week. Anthropic’s advice is the standard but genuinely necessary response: run a full malware scan before logging back in, change your account password with two-factor authentication enabled, and treat any pirated download or unofficial app installer with the same suspicion you’d give a sketchy email attachment. An AI subscription being quietly drained isn’t the scariest thing an infostealer can do to you, but it’s a pretty reliable sign that something considerably worse, like your actual banking credentials, might already be sitting in the same haul. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Anthropic)
Extortion group FulcrumSec claims they stole 86GB of Manchester Airports Group data after finding API credentials exposed in client-side JavaScript. Manchester Airports Group (MAG) disclosed a data breach on August 27 affecting customers of Manchester, London Stansted, and East Midlands airports. Two days later, BleepingComputer reports the extortion group FulcrumSec claimed responsibility, saying it stole roughly 86GB of data, considerably more detailed than what MAG’s original disclosure suggested. MAG’s own statement describes a relatively limited set of exposed data. It says the breach affected car park, lounge, Fast Track bookings, and airport WiFi registrations, exposing email addresses, phone numbers, vehicle registrations, and postcodes. MAG disclosed that the data breach impacted 8.7 million customers, however, the company says most of those customers had only their email addresses exposed. FulcrumSec tells a different story. The group shared samples with BleepingComputer that included a 21.5GB export of Manchester customer data, with personal identifiers, historical booking details, and marketing information. BleepingComputer checked one record against a real traveler’s purchase history and found matching Fast Track bookings, arrival times, terminal information, and payment amounts. The alleged way into the system is particularly concerning. FulcrumSec says it found airport-specific Iterable API credentials inside client-side JavaScript. That code runs in users’ browsers, so anyone inspecting the website with developer tools could potentially see those credentials. “The group claims it obtained access using airport-specific Iterable API credentials exposed in client-side JavaScript and that the stolen material includes nearly 200,000 records related to upcoming travel during the remainder of 2026.” states the report. These records allegedly contain dates, times and booking information linked to personally identifiable information. FulcrumSec says it intends to publish the stolen data and a technical account of the intrusion. If the claim is accurate, attackers did not need a highly sophisticated technique. They simply found sensitive API credentials exposed in code that the website sent directly to customers’ browsers.” The most concerning specific claim is nearly 200,000 records tied to upcoming travel through the rest of 2026, complete with dates, times, and booking details linked to identifiable individuals. BleepingComputer couldn’t independently verify that number or the full scope of what was actually taken, and MAG declined to directly address FulcrumSec’s specific claims when asked, instead pointing to its existing statement that affected customers with upcoming bookings had already been contacted. MAG is confident that we have taken effective measures to protect our customers and we have contacted all those affected, a spokesperson said, without engaging with the 86GB figure or the exposed-credentials claim directly. FulcrumSec plans to publish the stolen data but may redact upcoming travel records because of the risk of real-world harm. UK postcodes can identify very small groups of addresses, and combined with vehicle registrations, parking dates and booking details, the data could enable highly convincing phishing messages targeting people with upcoming trips. UK postcodes make this exposure sharper than the equivalent breach might be in the US. Unlike American ZIP codes covering broad delivery areas, a full UK postcode typically identifies a small cluster of neighboring addresses, sometimes a single property, according to the Office for National Statistics. Combined with vehicle registrations, parking dates, and specific booking references, that’s more than enough raw material for a phishing message referencing a real upcoming trip that would be very hard to distinguish from a genuine MAG communication. Security researchers commenting on the broader incident have flagged a supply-chain angle worth watching. Airport operations increasingly run through third-party platforms for booking, parking, and loyalty services rather than systems the airport itself directly controls, and Iterable, the marketing platform whose API credentials FulcrumSec claims to have abused, is exactly that kind of outsourced dependency. This also isn’t aviation’s first bad year: a September 2025 ransomware attack on Collins Aerospace‘s check-in software had already grounded systems at Heathrow, Brussels, and Berlin, meaning UK and European aviation infrastructure has now taken two significant hits inside twelve months. MAG says no payment card or banking data was exposed, however, travelers who recently booked parking, lounge access or Fast Track should assume more travel data may be exposed and treat messages citing real booking details with caution. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Manchester Airports Group (MAG))
The Manchester Airports Group data breach has been claimed by extortion group FulcrumSec, which told BleepingComputer that it stole approximately 86 GB of data. Samples reviewed by BleepingComputer contained information consistent with MAG's disclosure while indicating that the breach exposed considerably more detailed customer, booking, and travel information than initially revealed. Manchester Airports Group (MAG), the United Kingdom's largest airport operator, disclosed on August 27 that an unauthorized third party had stolen customer data related to Manchester, London Stansted, and East Midlands airports. The company said the affected information came from car park, lounge, and Fast Track bookings and in-airport Wi-Fi registrations. In emails to BleepingComputer, FulcrumSec claimed responsibility for the attack and shared samples of the allegedly stolen data as evidence.
Security Affairs Malware newsletter includes a collection of the best articles and research on malware in the international landscape Malware Newsletter Operation QUICSILVER: China-Nexus Actor Targets Myanmar Diplomats via VHD-Delivered Go Backdoor FTP Banners: The New Dead Drop Resolver Delivering Novel RATs The State of AI-Enabled Malware August 2026: From Brand Abuse to Agentic Execution 19 Chrome and Edge Extensions Deliver a Wallet Drainer and Credential-Stealing Payloads SLEEPWALKER: A Passive Backdoor With Its Own Command Language Tortoiseshell: New Toolset and Operational Infrastructure Exposed Dark Caracal Reloaded: New Malware, Same Hunting Grounds Cambodia-focused cluster uses multistage infection chain with localized lures BlueDelta Targets Defense and Diplomacy with HOOKEDGE XAI-Guided Graph-Based Feature Engineering and Heterogeneous Ensemble Learning for Android Malware Detection BotScan: An adaptive active probing approach for identifying live IoT Botnet C2 servers at scale EGAMA-RC: Risk-Calibrated Evidence-Gated Adaptive Malware Analysis for Robust and Interpretable Memory-Forensic Triage Survival of~the~Stealthiest: Evolving Low-Entropy Ransomware via~Genetic Algorithms Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)
A researcher chained two Unitree G1 flaws to gain root access remotely and showed how a compromised robot could attack others nearby. Security researcher Olivier Laflamme spent about three months digging into the Unitree G1 humanoid robot and eventually found a way to fully compromise it without plugging in a single cable. In his technical write-up, he details two vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-76639 and CVE-2026-76640, that can be chained across Bluetooth, Unitree’s cloud infrastructure, the mobile app, and the robot’s firmware to gain unauthenticated root access to any G1 within Bluetooth range. The first bug lives entirely inside the robot itself, no wireless attack surface needed if you can reach it over Ethernet. The G1’s AI chatbot service accepts a “knowledge” upload with almost no validation on the filename it writes to disk, and a classic path traversal payload lets an attacker write an arbitrary file anywhere on the filesystem, including into a directory that a separate service called bashrunner treats as trusted. Restart bashrunner, tell it to run the newly planted file, and you’ve got root-level shell execution with five DDS messages and zero authentication. The second chain is the one that should worry anyone deploying these robots at scale. It starts with a Bluetooth characteristic that accepts writes without pairing, something The Hacker News also covered in its own report on the disclosure. An unpaired device can request the robot’s encrypted key bootstrap blob, and Unitree’s cloud API would decrypt that blob for any free, logged-in Unitree account without ever checking whether the account actually owned that specific robot. “The blob is RSA-encrypted & the corresponding RSA private key is held by Unitree’s cloud infrastructure. This, in theory, is safe.. This is the security boundary Unitree appears to have relied on. Nearby devices can request the bootstrap blob, but only Unitree owns the RSA private key capable of opening it.” reads Laflamme’s report. “However, the Unitree mobile app reassembles the BLE notification chunks and slingshots that shit via a POST to Unitree’s cloud API /device/bindExtData on global-robot-api.unitree.com and the app stores the response body as gcmKey.” That decryption oracle is the crux of the whole chain, and Laflamme doesn’t undersell how convenient it made everything. “This single AES-128 key unlocks both the BLE protocol and the WebRTC signaling channels.” continues the report. Once an attacker has obtained it, they can authenticate to the robot’s Bluetooth handshake and unlock WiFi configuration commands that were previously locked behind that same key. From there, an oversized WiFi password triggers a fallback code path in Unitree’s own configuration script that inserts attacker-controlled text directly into a config file without escaping it, letting the attacker force the robot to join a hotspot they control, no physical access needed at any point. Going from “the robot connects to my Wi-Fi” to a full root shell required a buffer overflow in the G1’s Bluetooth server, and this is where the research gets particularly impressive. The server used a 500-byte buffer without proper bounds checking, allowing Laflamme to overwrite nearby memory with a carefully crafted 1,050-byte payload. He used that payload to create a fake cleanup structure that the program later interpreted as a legitimate function pointer, causing it to execute an attacker-controlled command with root privileges. There was one more obstacle: randomized memory addresses. To make the exploit work reliably, Laflamme first needed to discover where the vulnerable program was loaded in memory. He solved that by turning the first vulnerability into an information leak and using the result to make the second exploit work. In other words, one bug effectively helped unlock the other. The wormability is what turns this from an interesting security flaw into a much more serious operational risk. Once an attacker compromises one G1, that robot can use the same attack against other G1 robots within Bluetooth range, without requiring additional discovery or configuration. Laflamme tested the technique on just two robots in the same room, so the real-world reach of a chain reaction remains unclear. In a warehouse, laboratory, or campus where dozens of these robots operate close to each other, however, the possibility of one compromised machine spreading the attack to others is difficult to ignore. Unitree’s response gets genuine credit in the writeup, and it’s worth noting given how often vendor disclosure stories go badly. The company patched the cloud ownership-check flaw within about two months of the report, paid out a combined $5,000 bounty across both chains, and worked through verification quickly enough that Laflamme calls the collaboration close to ideal. “July 1-6 August, 2026 — Unitree implemented an account-to-robot cloud binding ownership check before returning the AES-128 key. Patching the “cloud-oracle” vulnerability discovered back in May. “August 6, 2026 — a $5,000 USD bounty was paid out, $4,000 for the BLE RCE and $1,000 for the chat_go RCE.” The BLE pairing and buffer overflow issues themselves, notably, sit deeper in the firmware and represent a harder, slower fix than a simple cloud-side ownership check. None of this required exotic tools or some cutting-edge attack technique. That is probably the detail that should get the most attention from anyone who still sees robot security as a niche problem. This was a $20,000 humanoid robot, the kind increasingly used in research labs and universities and likely to appear in more workplaces, compromised with a decompiled Android app, a firmware encryption scheme that researchers had already broken years ago, and a familiar class of buffer overflow that predates humanoid robots by decades. If your organization has a G1 sitting in a lab, lobby, or workspace, checking its patch status should be a priority. A 90-pound robot losing its collision-detection capabilities is not the kind of security incident you want to discover the hard way. “You could use the G1 to spy on people through audio and video, make it say obscene shit in public, swap out or backdoor the ResNet onboard AI models, tamper with perception and movement logic, disable collision detection and other safety checks (it weighs ~90lbs having that run into a kid, a wall, or even step on your toe will do some serious damage).” concludes the researcher. “They also cost a lot! I’d be pissed off if someone hacked into my G1, took control of it, and walked it off my factory/campus.” Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Robot)
Berlin ‘s government faces a Rhysida ransomware attack weeks before elections, with officials refusing to pay despite a claimed 5.79 TB data theft. Berlin’s state government confirmed this week it’s dealing with an extortion attempt following an August cyberattack on the city-state’s administrative network, and officials have already refused the requested ransom. The ransomware group Rhysida claimed responsibility on its leak site August 28, posting an entry titled simply “Berlin, Germany” and claiming 5.79 terabytes of data across roughly 1.44 million files, with personal information on 12,076 individuals allegedly included. Rhysida claims it stole 5.79 TB of data, covering around 1.44 million files. The alleged dataset includes: Personal data: 12,076 individuals, 16,389 email addresses, 11,963 phone numbers and 148 IBANs. Sensitive records: more than 5,000 personnel files, more than 5,000 administrative-offence files, payroll data and leadership information. Credentials: plaintext passwords and credentials for systems including GebäudAtlas, the ePayment PAYONE database and Z_ADMIN accounts. Government and legal material: disciplinary proceedings, court cases, supervisory documents, NDA records and Bundesrat committee protocols. Classified information: data related to classified-material handling and documents allegedly containing state secrets. Critical infrastructure: vulnerability analyses concerning Berlin’s water supply. Identity documents: passports and ID cards from personnel records. Other material: contracts, financial documents, HR records, infrastructure files, health data, password stores and SQL/PST archives. The group also claims that the material could involve violations of GDPR, German classified-information rules, criminal law and KRITIS/BSIG requirements. These are Rhysida’s claims and have not been independently verified. The timing makes this attack especially sensitive. Berlin will elect its state parliament on September 20, less than a month after the breach, so an attack on government systems just before the vote was bound to raise questions. Interior Senator Iris Spranger said the election remains secure and that, so far, the attackers haven’t taken any election-related data. Security officials support that assessment. Broadcaster RBB first reported on Thursday that Berlin had received ransom demands. “The state of Berlin will not submit to extortion,” Berlin Mayor Kai Wegner and Berlin’s interior senator, Iris Spranger, said in a joint statement on Friday, before the ransomware group claimed the attack on their Tor data leak site. That position follows long-standing advice from US federal agencies, which warn that paying a ransom doesn’t guarantee data recovery and can encourage more attacks. Saying no to the ransom is one thing; dealing with the consequences if the attackers publish the stolen data is another. Berlin first disclosed the compromise on August 17, isolating the Senate Department for Mobility, Transport, Climate Protection and Environment along with a second department from the network. Forensic investigators later found the actual data exfiltration happened earlier than the public disclosure, sometime between August 7 and August 12, with the affected department having flagged an initial outflow internally on August 7, a full week before the network got cut off. That gap between first internal detection and actual network isolation is the kind of detail that tends to get scrutinized hardest once the immediate crisis passes. Rhysida isn’t a new name to anyone tracking ransomware against government targets. The group has claimed roughly 280 victims since emerging in 2023, according to tracking services cited by Reuters, including nine in Germany alone and headline targets like the British Library and Chile’s army. Roughly half its victims sit in the US, with the UK, Canada, and Italy rounding out the next tier, a spread that suggests Rhysida isn’t picking targets based on geography so much as opportunity. A joint advisory from CISA, the FBI, and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center, first published in November 2023, lays out exactly how Rhysida typically gets in: compromised VPN credentials at organizations without multi-factor authentication, exploitation of the Zerologon vulnerability that Microsoft patched back in 2020, and old-fashioned phishing. None of those entry points are exotic or new, which is precisely the point; Rhysida doesn’t need novel techniques when so many organizations still haven’t closed gaps that have been publicly known for years. Berlin reconnected all Senate departments to the network on August 23, but forensic teams are still checking the systems. The state’s data protection commissioner and Germany’s federal cybersecurity agency, the BSI, are following the investigation. As of publication, neither Berlin’s data protection office nor the Senate Chancellery had given specific advice to the roughly 12,000 people whose data Rhysida claims to have stolen. If you’re among them and haven’t received any official message yet, don’t assume that means you’re safe. Investigators are still working to establish exactly what the attackers accessed and took. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Rhysida Ransomware)
Multiple critical security flaws have been disclosed in WordPress plugins and themes, including WPMU DEV Dashboard, Avada, TranslatePress, Pods, and GiveWP, that could lead to authentication bypass, account takeover, and arbitrary code execution. The vulnerabilities, according to Wordfence and Patchstack, are listed below - CVE-2026-76581 (CVSS score: 9.8) - An authentication bypass flaw in
A 68-year-old has been sentenced in the U.K. to more than six years in prison for operating an illegal IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) service that generated £980,812 ($1.3 million) over three years. An investigation by the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU) at the City of London Police found that Milan Ibrahim ran a "sophisticated operation" that provided illegal IPTV services to users in the UK and abroad. According to PIPCU, Ibrahim sold illegal broadcasts from major rights holders such as the BBC, ITV, Sky, the Premier League and the Motion Picture Association. The police seized and shut down all servers they found during the operation, disrupting the illegal streams that users of the IPTV service received. “The investigation revealed that the business operated on 80 servers from premises in Chorley and generated £980,812 over a three-year period,” announced the City of London Police.
Over 8,300 Internet-exposed Gitea instances are still unpatched against a critical security flaw exploited in ongoing remote code execution attacks, according to cybersecurity watchdog Shadowserver. The code injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-60004) targeted in these attacks was reported by Salesforce security researcher Shai Rod, and it allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Gitea service account by submitting malicious patches via the diffpatch API endpoint. While successful exploitation requires repository write access to repositories hosted on vulnerable servers, Gitea comes with self-registration enabled by default, allowing unauthenticated attackers to register an account, create a new repository, and trigger the vulnerability without prior credentials.
Hasbro, one of the world's largest toy and game companies, has disclosed that attackers have accessed the personal and financial information of an undisclosed number of employees. Founded in 1923, Hasbro is a publicly traded American multinational entertainment conglomerate on the NASDAQ and owns many brands, including Monopoly, Clue, Nerf, Transformers, Play-Doh, Peppa Pig, Scrabble, Magic: The Gathering, Dungeons & Dragons, and many others. The company has filed data breach notification letters with the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, but didn't disclose the total number of affected individuals or when the incident was detected. "The information involved varied by individual but may have included your name and one or more additional personal information elements such as email, address, phone number, national ID number, or financial information," Hasbro said.
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