PaperCut has released a second emergency security update for two actively exploited vulnerabilities in its PaperCut NG and MF print management software after researchers discovered multiple ways to bypass the initial fixes. As BleepingComputer reported yesterday, PaperCut warned that hackers were exploiting a vulnerability in zero-day attacks against customer servers and released an initial emergency patch for PaperCut NG/MF versions 25 and 26. At the time, however, the company had not disclosed CVE identifiers or technical details about the vulnerabilities, saying it was withholding information while it investigated the attacks and gave customers time to apply emergency fixes. PaperCut has now shared technical details and CVE identifiers for the two vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2026-82078 and CVE-2026-81578. These vulnerabilities can be chained to bypass authentication and execute code on vulnerable servers.
Trump targets foreign-made power grid equipment, citing cyber, sabotage and supply-chain risks to U.S. national security. Executive Order 14420, signed on August 26, targets equipment and technologies that could expose the power grid to sabotage, unauthorized access, malicious remote activity or supply-chain disruption. The timing matters. The White House points to the rapid expansion of data centers, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing and defense production as reasons why the United States now depends even more heavily on reliable electricity. A disruption that might once have been treated primarily as an energy problem can now affect defense operations, critical infrastructure, emergency services and large parts of the economy. The order frames the problem in two ways. Foreign-made equipment can introduce a direct cybersecurity risk, including the possibility of hidden digital access mechanisms, while dependence on overseas suppliers can create a second vulnerability if geopolitical tensions or trade disruptions suddenly cut off critical components. The White House’s language is unusually broad when describing the scope of the concern. “NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that the situation with respect to the foreign supply of bulk-power system electric equipment constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency with respect to that threat.” reads the Executive Order 14420. “This threat exists both in the case of individual transactions and when transactions are considered as a class. To deal with this threat, additional steps are required to protect the security, integrity, and reliability of bulk-power system electric equipment used in the United States.” That definition matters because the order isn’t aimed only at a specific piece of hardware from a specific country. It creates a framework under which the Energy Secretary can determine whether particular foreign entities, suppliers, countries or equipment present an unacceptable risk and then restrict transactions involving them. The restrictions apply to the acquisition, importation, transfer or installation of foreign-produced bulk-power equipment when the relevant transaction involves a designated Covered Foreign Entity and meets one of the risk conditions set out in the order. Those conditions include the possibility of sabotage, subversion, unauthorized access, malicious remote action or disruption of the power system and its supply chain. The order also reaches beyond the physical equipment itself. Its scope includes critical components, software, firmware, digital services, maintenance services and remote-access capabilities associated with covered equipment. “the transaction involves bulk-power system electric equipment — or any critical component, software, firmware, digital service, maintenance service, or remote-access capability associated with such equipment — designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a Covered Foreign Entity; and” continues the order. In practical terms, the government isn’t treating a transformer, an industrial controller and the software that manages it as completely separate security questions. That is particularly relevant to industrial control systems. The definition of covered equipment includes remote terminal units, programmable logic controllers, intelligent electronic devices, distributed control systems and safety instrumented systems, alongside transformers, generators, inverters, battery storage systems, protective relays, metering equipment and high-voltage circuit breakers. The order also allows agencies to consider software, firmware, remote access, update mechanisms and other supply-chain dependencies when deciding whether equipment falls within its security concerns. The geographical scope is also worth noting. The order defines the bulk-power system around interconnected transmission infrastructure and generation resources needed for grid reliability, including transmission lines rated at 69 kV or higher. Local electricity distribution facilities fall outside that definition. This isn’t only about equipment that companies might buy tomorrow. The Energy Secretary can also impose conditions on foreign-manufactured or foreign-operated equipment already installed before the order took effect. Depending on the risk, those measures could require operators to identify, isolate, monitor, secure, disconnect, replace or remove equipment. The order specifically requires officials to consider reliability, safety, the availability of secure replacements and continuity of essential services before demanding isolation or replacement. That last point is important because securing a power grid isn’t as simple as unplugging a suspicious device. Removing a component without a suitable replacement can itself create an operational problem. The order therefore leaves room for phased compliance and negotiated mitigation measures rather than assuming that every risky component can disappear overnight. The government also wants to avoid turning security screening into a permanent procurement bottleneck. The Energy Secretary can establish criteria for pre-qualified equipment and vendors, creating a list of products and suppliers that can receive exemptions from the baseline restrictions. At the same time, the order makes clear that pre-qualification doesn’t prevent the government from scrutinizing or restricting a transaction later if circumstances warrant it. The order doesn’t name a specific country as the target. Instead, it defines a Covered Foreign Entity broadly enough to include governments under certain U.S. arms embargoes or sanctions regimes, as well as entities that the relevant U.S. authorities determine are engaged in conduct detrimental to national security or foreign policy. SecurityWeek also noted that the structure resembles earlier Trump-era restrictions on foreign bulk-power equipment, including measures that previously focused on entities associated with China. The order does not mention any country by name. However, its structure is very similar to a 2020 Trump-era order on the U.S. power grid, which later led the Department of Energy to ban companies linked to China. The next phase will be regulatory rather than rhetorical. Within 120 days, the Energy Secretary is expected to issue rules or regulations needed to implement the order, including procedures for identifying covered entities, equipment and countries and for licensing transactions that would otherwise be prohibited. The administration also wants recommendations for changes to federal procurement rules that would give greater weight to national security risks and favor U.S.-manufactured energy infrastructure. Those procurement changes have their own timetable. The Energy Secretary has 180 days to develop recommendations for revisions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, while the FAR Council would then have 90 days to consider proposing corresponding amendments for public comment. The policy fits into a wider push by the administration to reduce dependence on foreign supply chains for strategically important infrastructure. The Department of Energy said earlier this month that it is working to increase domestic production and availability of critical grid components, pointing to rapid growth in electricity demand and the need to strengthen the grid supply chain. For cybersecurity professionals, however, the most interesting part of the order isn’t the preference for domestic manufacturing. It’s the decision to treat supply-chain exposure, remote access and embedded technology as part of the attack surface of the power grid. That changes the question organizations need to ask about critical equipment. It’s no longer enough to know whether a device has a vulnerability today; operators also need to understand who made it, who controls the supplier, where critical software and firmware come from, who can remotely access the equipment, how updates reach it and what happens if that supply chain suddenly becomes unavailable. The uncomfortable reality is that a power grid compromise doesn’t necessarily begin with someone breaking through the perimeter of a utility network. It can begin much earlier, when an organization buys a component it can’t fully inspect, relies on a remote maintenance channel it doesn’t control, or becomes dependent on a supplier it can’t replace quickly. That’s the security problem Executive Order 14420 is trying to address. The White House has effectively moved part of the grid’s cyber defense line back into procurement, manufacturing and supply-chain decisions. And for critical infrastructure operators, that’s a much harder problem to solve than simply finding another firewall. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, power grid)
A 68-year-old has been sentenced in the U.K. to more than six years in prison for operating an illegal IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) service that generated £980,812 ($1.3 million) over three years. An investigation by the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU) at the City of London Police found that Milan Ibrahim ran a "sophisticated operation" that provided illegal IPTV services to users in the UK and abroad. According to PIPCU, Ibrahim sold illegal broadcasts from major rights holders such as the BBC, ITV, Sky, the Premier League and the Motion Picture Association. The police seized and shut down all servers they found during the operation, disrupting the illegal streams that users of the IPTV service received. “The investigation revealed that the business operated on 80 servers from premises in Chorley and generated £980,812 over a three-year period,” announced the City of London Police.
AI is accelerating vulnerability discovery, putting pressure on systems built to enrich, prioritize, and remediate flaws at a slower pace. Action1 explains why defenders increasingly need to correlate multiple intelligence sources and turn vulnerability data into faster remediation.
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds ownCloud, Linux Kernel, and JFrog Artifactory flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the following vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog: CVE-2023-49105 ownCloud Improper Authentication Vulnerability CVE-2026-53362 Linux Kernel Unspecified Vulnerability CVE-2026-66384 JFrog Artifactory Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory Vulnerability CVE-2023-49105 (CVSS score of 9.8) is an improper-authentication flaw in ownCloud Server’s WebDAV functionality. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim’s username can read, alter, or delete that user’s files when no signing key is configured, because the application can accept pre-signed URLs without properly validating that condition. The issue affects ownCloud core versions 10.6.0 through 10.13.0, before version 10.13.1. Organisations running affected ownCloud instances should treat remediation as urgent, review exposed WebDAV services, and investigate unusual file access, deletion, modification, or downloads. CVE-2026-53362 (CVSS score of 7.8) is an out-of-bounds memory-write vulnerability in the Linux kernel’s IPv6 networking subsystem. A local attacker who can create UDP sockets could exploit an incorrect parameter-length calculation during fragmented IPv6 packet handling to overwrite kernel memory, potentially causing a system crash, corrupting data, or escalating privileges.access. Shortly after the Hugging Face incident became public, OpenAI said its models had identified and exploited a zero-day vulnerability in JFrog’s Artifactory package registry manager. The report also describes a separate incident on July 19. In that case, some AI agents exploited the Linux kernel vulnerability, CVE-2026-53362, to gain higher privileges inside an OpenAI environment. The agents detected that the Linux kernel on their machine was vulnerable, found a public exploit, modified it to work in their environment, and used it to gain root access to the underlying worker node. This allowed them to escape the Artifactory container and move laterally to other parts of the connected environment. CVE-2026-66384 (CVSS score of 5.3) is a path-traversal vulnerability in JFrog Artifactory’s Docker cache handling. Under specific remote-repository conditions, an authenticated user can manipulate a file path and write data outside the intended cache directory, potentially affecting other locations on the Artifactory host. According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaw CVE-2026-66384 by September 10, while the remaining must be addressed by August, 30, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
Over 8,300 Internet-exposed Gitea instances are still unpatched against a critical security flaw exploited in ongoing remote code execution attacks, according to cybersecurity watchdog Shadowserver. The code injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-60004) targeted in these attacks was reported by Salesforce security researcher Shai Rod, and it allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Gitea service account by submitting malicious patches via the diffpatch API endpoint. While successful exploitation requires repository write access to repositories hosted on vulnerable servers, Gitea comes with self-registration enabled by default, allowing unauthenticated attackers to register an account, create a new repository, and trigger the vulnerability without prior credentials.
Hasbro, one of the world's largest toy and game companies, has disclosed that attackers have accessed the personal and financial information of an undisclosed number of employees. Founded in 1923, Hasbro is a publicly traded American multinational entertainment conglomerate on the NASDAQ and owns many brands, including Monopoly, Clue, Nerf, Transformers, Play-Doh, Peppa Pig, Scrabble, Magic: The Gathering, Dungeons & Dragons, and many others. The company has filed data breach notification letters with the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, but didn't disclose the total number of affected individuals or when the incident was detected. "The information involved varied by individual but may have included your name and one or more additional personal information elements such as email, address, phone number, national ID number, or financial information," Hasbro said.
Microsoft released the KB5120998 preview cumulative update for Windows 11 versions 25H2 and 24H2, which comes with 35 changes, including improvements to the Start menu, taskbar, and Windows search. KB5120998 is a preview update that lets IT administrators test Windows bug fixes, improvements, and new features before they roll out to all users during next month's Patch Tuesday release. However, unlike cumulative updates, monthly optional updates do not include security fixes and provide only quality improvements. After installing the August 2026 preview update, users can move the taskbar to the bottom, top, left, or right side of their screen in Settings > Personalization > Taskbar > Taskbar behaviors > Taskbar position, with most customization settings, like never combining taskbar icons, working in every position.
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds Red Hat, Linux Kernel, Ajax.NET Professional, Microsoft SQL Server, and Citrix NetScaler flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the following vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog: CVE-2015-3246 Red Hat Libuser Race Condition Vulnerability CVE-2015-5287 Red Hat Automatic Bug Reporting Tool Privilege Escalation Vulnerability CVE-2019-1068 Microsoft SQL Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-23758 Ajax.NET Professional Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability CVE-2022-0995 Linux Kernel Out-of-Bounds Write Vulnerability CVE-2026-8452 Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer Vulnerability CVE-2015-3246 is a race condition in Red Hat libuser that could let an authenticated local user corrupt /etc/passwd to cause denial of service or escalate privileges. CVE-2015-5287 is a privilege escalation bug in Red Hat Automatic Bug Reporting Tool that could allow local users with certain permissions to gain higher privileges via a symlink attack on a predictable file. CVE-2019-1068 is a remote code execution flaw in Microsoft SQL Server that could allow an attacker to execute code in the context of the SQL Server Database Engine service account. CVE-2021-23758 (CVSS score not specified in the KEV notice) is a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in Ajax.NET Professional that could allow for remote code execution via arbitrary .NET classes. CVE-2022-0995 (CVSS score not specified in the KEV notice) is an out-of-bounds memory write vulnerability in Linux Kernel that could allow a local user to gain privileged access or cause a denial of service on the system. CVE-2026-8452 (CVSS score not specified in the KEV notice) is an improper restriction of operations within the bounds of a memory buffer vulnerability in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway that could lead to denial-of-service and has been observed under active exploitation in the wild. According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaws CVE-2019-1068 and CVE-2026-8452 by August 29, 2026, while the remaining must be addressed by September 9, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
A cyberattack on Manchester Airports Group exposed data of 8.7 million customers across Manchester, Stansted, and East Midlands airports. Manchester Airports Group disclosed that an unauthorised third party accessed customer data belonging to approximately 8.7 million people across three of England’s busiest airports: Manchester, London Stansted, and East Midlands. “Manchester, London Stansted and East Midlands airports have been hit by a cyber-attack in which hackers accessed the data of about 8.7 million customers.” reads the report published by The Guardian. “The incident involved data related to “car park, lounge and fast-track bookings and in-airport wifi sign-ups”, and the hackers obtained email addresses, phone numbers, vehicle registration numbers and postcodes, said Manchester Airports Group (MAG), which operates the three hubs.” MAG says it learned about the incident on Tuesday, August 25, after attackers breached the system over the weekend. The affected data included car park bookings, lounge and fast-track security reservations, and airport Wi-Fi sign-ups. Attackers accessed email addresses, phone numbers, vehicle registration numbers, and postcodes. The system did not store bank or payment details. According to MAG, most of the 8.7 million affected customers only lost their email addresses, while the impact varies depending on which services they used. The attack did not disrupt airport operations or flights. As a precaution, MAG temporarily suspended its Manage My Booking service, but all existing reservations remain valid. Customers who need to change a booking within the next 72 hours can use a dedicated phone line. “We would urge you to be particularly cautious of unexpected emails, calls or text messages claiming to be from us. We will never contact you unexpectedly to ask for payment or banking information. We apologise for any inconvenience or concern this may cause.” reads the email sent by Stansted to affected customers. That warning is relevant because the combination of an email address, a phone number, and the knowledge that someone recently made a parking or lounge booking gives a convincing starting point for a targeted phishing message. Attackers don’t need payment data if they can impersonate the airport convincingly enough to obtain it themselves. The timing adds pressure. The attack landed during the peak summer travel season, with millions of families flying back into the UK before the school year begins. The three airports combined handled around 54 million passengers last year, and MAG recently reported a record 66 million passengers across its network. The scale of the data exposure reflects the sheer volume of ancillary services these airports sell, and how much personal data those services routinely collect. The wifi registration system is the detail worth noting: signing into airport wifi typically requires a name, email, and phone number at minimum, and that information now belongs to whoever executed this breach. MAG says it quickly contained the incident, brought in external cybersecurity experts and notified the relevant authorities. No group has claimed responsibility, and investigators have not publicly linked the attack to any specific actor. The incident adds to a growing list of cyberattacks against UK infrastructure. Earlier in August, Iran-linked hackers took a British power plant offline for four days, marking the first confirmed case of Iranian actors shutting down a UK generator. Last year, attacks disrupted production at Jaguar Land Rover and targeted Marks & Spencer, Harrods and the Co-op. Heathrow also faced flight delays and cancellations after attackers disrupted check-in and boarding systems used by several European airports. MAG’s breach adds further pressure on UK infrastructure operators to strengthen their cyber defenses. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, UK Airport Operator MAG)
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