ToxicPanda 2.0 targets 349 financial apps and abuses Android Wireless Debugging to gain deeper device access and steal banking credentials. ToxicPanda used to be a Europe-focused nuisance targeting a manageable list of banks. That version is gone. Zimperium’s zLabs team just documented ToxicPanda 2.0, and the numbers alone tell the story: 349 targeted financial institutions across 16 countries, up from 16 apps in the previous version, plus a command set that ballooned to 167 remote instructions. The infection starts with a fairly standard trick dressed up in a new coat of paint. The malware poses as a dropper, requesting VPN permissions through a fake installation screen, then quietly uses that access to block communication from Google Play Protect while it decrypts and installs the real payload hiding inside the app’s own asset files. Once installed, it leans on Android’s Accessibility Service, the same feature legitimate screen readers and automation tools rely on, to see and interact with everything happening on the victim’s screen. ToxicPanda was once a malware mainly targeting a small number of European banks. That has changed. Zimperium’s zLabs team has documented ToxicPanda 2.0, which now targets 349 financial institutions in 16 countries, compared with just 16 apps before. It also has 167 different commands that attackers can send remotely. The attack starts with a common trick. The malware pretends to be a legitimate app and asks for VPN permissions through a fake installation screen. It then uses this access to block Google Play Protect while secretly installing the real malware hidden inside the app’s files. Once installed, ToxicPanda abuses Android’s Accessibility Service. This feature is normally used by legitimate tools such as screen readers, but the malware uses it to monitor the victim’s screen and interact with apps and data on the device. “By abusing the Android Accessibility Service, threat actors can steal every UI element on the screen, alongside an overlay-based credential theft mechanism targeting 349 financial institutions, compared to the previous version, which targeted only 16 banking applications, the latest iteration demonstrates a significant expansion in targeting scope and capabilities.” reads the report published by Zimperium’s zLabs. “Several commands previously identified as unimplemented in Cleafy’s analysis are now fully operational, expanding the malware’s remote control and fraud capabilities.” What sets this version apart isn’t just scale, it’s a genuinely new privilege escalation trick built around a feature most people have never touched: Android’s Wireless Debugging framework. The malware automates the entire process of turning it on, tapping the build number seven times to unlock developer options, toggling wireless debugging, and then scraping the six-digit pairing code straight off the screen using accessibility permissions. From there it performs the actual cryptographic pairing handshake itself, gaining shell-level access to the device without the victim ever realizing developer mode got switched on. ToxicPanda was once a malware mainly targeting a small number of European banks. That has changed. Zimperium’s zLabs team has documented ToxicPanda 2.0, which now targets 349 financial institutions in 16 countries, compared with just 16 apps before. It also has 167 different commands that attackers can send remotely. The attack starts with a common trick. The malware pretends to be a legitimate app and asks for VPN permissions through a fake installation screen. It then uses this access to block Google Play Protect while secretly installing the real malware hidden inside the app’s files. Once installed, ToxicPanda abuses Android’s Accessibility Service. This feature is normally used by legitimate tools such as screen readers, but the malware uses it to monitor the victim’s screen and interact with apps and data on the device. The real danger comes from its ability to use Android Debug Bridge (ADB). Once connected, ToxicPanda can run commands through ADB without showing the usual permission requests. This allows it to give itself more permissions, remove Android restrictions on background activity, enable important components without the user knowing, and maintain access to the device. “The malware also introduces an automated click-based mechanism to abuse Android Wireless Debugging (ADB), enabling privilege escalation and shell-level access on compromised devices. Additionally, it can steal lock screen credentials by placing overlays on top of the lock screen.” continues the report. The credential theft itself runs on two separate tracks. For banking and crypto apps specifically, the malware watches which app the victim opens, matches it against a list of 349 targets, and either overlays a fake login screen or deploys an invisible transparent layer to capture every touch and PIN entry directly. Separately, it can now overlay a convincing fake version of the phone’s own lock screen to steal the device PIN, pattern, or password outright, which hands attackers a way back in even after the initial infection window closes. Several capabilities that security firm Cleafy had previously flagged as unfinished in an earlier ToxicPanda variant are now fully working. The malware can automatically click through OEM-specific permission dialogs across Xiaomi, Samsung, Huawei, and other manufacturers’ customized Android builds, request Device Administrator privileges using a fake “system service” prompt, and even remotely force-reset a victim’s lock screen password using legitimate Android device management APIs. It can also load an attacker-controlled webpage inside a full-screen overlay on command, a feature that simply didn’t exist in prior versions. Distribution has shifted too, with samples now getting served from Amazon AWS-hosted storage buckets rather than whatever ad-hoc infrastructure earlier campaigns used. “The updated campaign also reveals a shift in distribution methods, with ToxicPanda 2.0 samples being delivered through Amazon AWS-hosted buckets, indicating the attackers are leveraging cloud infrastructure for malware delivery.” states the report. Using major cloud providers for malware delivery isn’t new, but it does complicate blocking efforts, since flagging an entire AWS IP range as malicious tends to take down a lot of legitimate traffic along with it. None of this requires a sophisticated zero-day, which is honestly the more unsettling part. Every capability here abuses a feature Android ships intentionally, Accessibility Services, Wireless Debugging, Device Administrator APIs, all designed for legitimate accessibility and enterprise device management. “As mobile banking threats like ToxicPanda become increasingly sophisticated, conventional signature-based security layers are no longer sufficient to protect enterprise mobile endpoints.” concludes the report. If you’re responsible for securing mobile endpoints, this is less a “patch something” problem and more a “detect abnormal use of normal features” problem, and that’s a considerably harder thing to build detection around. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, ToxicPanda 2.0)
A supply-chain attack targeting Android-based car head units is using a legitimate device-update app to spread malware that enlists compromised devices in a proxy botnet or uses them for ad fraud. Kaspersky researchers analyzed the malware and attributed the operation to the MoYu group, a threat actor previously associated with the BadBox malware botnet. The researchers note that this is the first documented case of a malware infection chain specifically created for the targeted car head unit. MoYu's operation targets systems from DoFun, a Chinese automotive software and hardware provider owned by Shenzhen Driving Control Technology Co., Ltd. DoFun is an automotive software, cloud services, and hardware provider that sells generic Android-based head units, which act as the command center for a car's infotainment, navigation, and settings systems.
Windows named pipes provide fast interprocess communication, but weak access controls can expose privileged services to untrusted processes. ThreatLocker explains how endpoint verification, command authorization, strict input validation, and narrowly scoped privileges can help secure named-pipe communication.
A critical flaw (CVSS 9.4) in NASA/JPL’s AIT-GUI let anyone send unauthenticated commands to spacecraft instruments. Cycode researchers found that AIT-GUI, the browser-based operator console in NASA/JPL open-source AMMOS Instrument Toolkit, shipped with no authentication, no session checks, and no CSRF protection on any of its state-changing endpoints. “AIT-GUI, the web front end of NASA/JPL’s open-source AMMOS Instrument Toolkit, starts an HTTP server with no authentication, no authorization, and no CSRF protection on any of its state-changing endpoints.” reads the report published by Cycode. “Anyone who can reach the port, or any website an operator merely visits in a browser, can: Issue arbitrary commands via POST /cmd Run server-side scripts via POST /script/run Execute command sequences via POST /seq“ The vulnerability is tracked as GHSA-p9r8-2q67-fp86, rated Critical (CVSS score of 9.4), and fixed in AIT-GUI 2.5.2. AMMOS (Advanced Multi-Mission Operations System) is an open-source framework used by NASA/JPL and other missions to control spacecraft and instruments, send commands, and process the data they send back. AIT-GUI is the web interface operators use to do this in real time. Sending a command through this software is not like filling out a simple online form. The vulnerability isn’t one thing. It’s four ordinary web weaknesses that compose into something with unusual consequences. The first is that the server reads its configured host setting into a variable and then ignores it, binding instead to 0.0.0.0, which means all network interfaces. An operator who sets host: localhost to keep the console on the loopback gets a server exposed to the entire reachable network anyway. The second and third weaknesses follow from the first. There’s no login requirement, no session gate, no CSRF token, and no cross-origin restriction on any route. POST /cmd takes whatever arrives in the command field, parses it, and hands it directly to the command bus: no check, no validation, nothing between the network and the hardware. The fourth weakness lives on POST /seq and POST /script/run, which build filesystem paths by joining raw user input onto a root directory with no confinement. A seqfile value of ../../../../something resolves outside the intended sequence directory. The researchers note that the correct confinement check already exists in the same codebase, on a sibling route called /scripts/load; the safe pattern was already written, just not applied consistently. The CSRF risk is especially serious because a firewall does not stop it. Browsers can send certain form requests from another website without first checking with the target site. So, if an operator opens a malicious page in the same browser they use for the console, it could send commands such as POST /cmd, POST /seq, or POST /script/run. The attacker does not need direct access to the system or its network port—they only need the operator to open a malicious link. Cycode’s research team used a combination of AI-assisted code analysis and human validation to find and confirm the issues. The AI handled the initial codebase review, flagging recognizable patterns: state-changing routes with no auth anywhere in their call path, user input flowing from a request parameter into a subprocess call without sanitization, and a configuration value that was read and then silently discarded. The human researcher then confirmed each pattern was exploitable and reduced each to a working proof-of-concept, including a self-contained CSRF demonstration that drove a real headless browser and recorded zero network preflights. That second step matters. A pattern match points to a candidate; a reproduced exploit confirms the finding is real. Cycode says explicitly it only reports the second kind. “More broadly: operational and ground-system software inherits the same web weaknesses as everything else, but with a far higher cost of failure. Auth, CSRF defense, and input confinement are not optional extras on a panel that commands hardware.” concludes the report. The fix is in AIT-GUI 2.5.2. Operators should upgrade immediately and verify the console port is not reachable from untrusted networks. Anyone who ran an exposed instance before the patch should treat it as a reason to audit command and sequence history, since an unauthenticated POST leaves no user-level trace by design. Maintainers hardening deployments should add authentication and CSRF protection to the command, script, and sequence routes; bind the server to the configured host instead of 0.0.0.0; and apply the existing path-confinement logic from /scripts/load to /seq and /script/run. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, NASA/JPL)
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) flaw CVE-2026-73570 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. CERT Polska, Poland’s national computer emergency response team, confirmed this week that threat actors are actively exploiting the critical vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite. The flaw allows unauthenticated remote code execution and was patched less than a month ago. “The CERT Polska team informs about an actively exploited OS Command Injection vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite.” reads the advisory published by CERT Polska. “The vulnerability, identified as CVE-2026-73570 , allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the zimbra user . The vulnerability affects instances that have the SNMP trap service enabled via the snmp_notify parameter and the swatchdog service running (enabled by default).” The vulnerability affects systems with SNMP trap notifications enabled and the swatchdog service running, which is enabled by default. The technical root cause is a sanitization failure in the SNMP monitoring component. Zimbra released version 10.1.20 on 20 July 2026 to address the issue. The fix came 28 days before active exploitation was confirmed, which is not a wide window, but apparently wide enough. The attack surface only exists when the optional zimbra-snmp package is installed and SNMP notifications are active, but swatchdog, the service that processes those notifications, is running by default on most installations. Below are recommendations by CERT Polska: “Due to the ongoing campaign exploiting this vulnerability, we recommend: verifying Zimbra logs /var/log/zimbra.log for the following entries: Service status change: <szkodliwy ładunek> changed from stopped to running Service status change: <szkodliwy ładunek> changed from running to stopped verification of files created by user zimbra in the last 30 days in the following directories: /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/ /opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps/ /tmp/ If you discover any signs of potential exploitation of this vulnerability, please contact our team immediately.” According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaw by August 24, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
Attackers are targeting CI/CD pipelines and developer tools instead of application code, requiring total SDLC visibility and strict security controls The post Connecting the Dots: Securing the Overlooked Corners of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) Supply Chain appeared first on Unit 42.
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a set of trojanized npm packages that masquerade as working calendar and streak utilities but are engineered to stealthily deliver an artificial intelligence (AI)-powered Linux implant dubbed RedC2 4.0. "When the module loads, it locates the bundled binary, marks it executable, and launches it as a detached background process," TrendAI, Trend Micro's
Microsoft says ongoing issues causing games to crash or fail to launch after installing the August 2026 Windows updates may be caused by peripherals with RGB lighting. As Microsoft explained when it confirmed it's investigating on Wednesday, this known issue affects games like ARC Raiders, MARVEL Tōkon: Fighting Souls, and The Finals on systems running Windows 11 24H2 and 25H2. "Following the release of Windows updates on August 11, 2026 (KB5121003) and later, Microsoft received reports of issues involving inability to run games as expected," Microsoft said on the Windows release health dashboard. On impacted PCs, users are also experiencing gaming freezes, "EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION" errors, and even unexpected system restarts. In a Thursday update, Microsoft said the gaming issues may be caused by drivers or components installed by RGB devices on affected Windows systems.
Microsoft has started rolling out a Classic Outlook theme for users of Outlook on the web and the New Outlook for Windows. This new Outlook theme is rolling out as part of a targeted release beginning mid-August and expected to complete by the end of September. The theme will become generally available worldwide between late September and late October. "When enabled, the setting applies coordinated changes across the Outlook experience, including visual styling, layout, typography, icons, and selected interactions," Microsoft said in a Microsoft 365 Message Center update. Once rolled out, the feature will not override any existing administrator configurations and will not automatically migrate users from classic Outlook to the new Outlook. Microsoft also added that the new user interface style will be enabled by default for some users, but they can toggle it off to switch to the standard theme from Settings > General > Appearance.
Cisco patched nine critical flaws, including six rated CVSS 10.0, found during internal testing. None are known to be exploited. Cisco released another batch of security fixes for its Crosswork platforms and Secure Workload software, part of what it’s calling an ongoing internal security review, and the CVSS scores in this round are unusually severe. “As part of Cisco’s ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco Crosswork engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in a software hardening release that addresses multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities.” reads the advisory. “These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and are not known to be actively exploited. To assist customers in patching and to streamline the disclosure process, Cisco has grouped these issues by their underlying vulnerability class – Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) – and assigned a single Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Identifier (CVE ID) to each CWE grouping.” Four vulnerabilities affect Crosswork Data Gateway, Crosswork Network Controller, and Crosswork Planning, all impacting these products regardless of how they’re configured: CVE-2026-20030 (CVSS score: 10.0) – an SQL injection vulnerability that lets an attacker manipulate database queries directly. CVE-2026-20357 (CVSS score: 10.0) – a missing authentication for critical function vulnerability, meaning a sensitive operation can be triggered without ever proving who you are. CVE-2026-20358 (CVSS score: 10.0) – an external control of file system vulnerability, letting an outside actor influence which files the system reads or writes. CVE-2026-20359 (CVSS score: 9.9) – an insufficiently protected credentials vulnerability, where stored login material isn’t locked down the way it should be. Seeing three CVSS 10.0 vulnerabilities in a single Cisco advisory is unusual. The four flaws affect Crosswork 7.2.1 and earlier, and Cisco fixed them in version 7.2.1-SP. Five more vulnerabilities got patched in Cisco Secure Workload, spanning both its cloud SaaS and on-premises deployments: CVE-2026-20231 (CVSS score: 9.9) – a set of improper neutralization of special elements vulnerabilities covering command, operating system, and argument injection, essentially several different ways to smuggle unintended commands into the system. CVE-2026-20315 (CVSS score: 10.0) – a set of improper access control vulnerabilities spanning authorization, authentication, privileges, and bypasses, a broad category that generally means the system doesn’t reliably enforce who’s allowed to do what. CVE-2026-20317 (CVSS score: 10.0) – a set of improper authentication vulnerabilities covering missing authentication, authentication bypass, and reliance on untrusted inputs, another maximum-severity cluster centered on identity verification failing outright. CVE-2026-20318 (CVSS score: 9.6) – a set of improper input validation vulnerabilities spanning input validation, path traversal, and external path control, the kind of flaw that lets crafted input reach files or directories it was never meant to touch. CVE-2026-20319 (CVSS score: 7.5) – a set of improper restriction of operations within the bounds of a memory buffer vulnerabilities spanning buffer overflows and out-of-bounds writes, lower severity than the rest but still a genuine memory-safety problem. The networking giant addressed five vulnerabilities in Secure Workload Release 3.10.9.1 for the 3.10 branch and earlier, and 4.0.4.16 for the 4.0 branch. The company found these vulnerabilities during internal testing; it is not aware of attacks in the wild exploiting this issue. “The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities that are described in this advisory.” conctinues the advisory. “Cisco says it found the vulnerabilities through internal security testing that also used advanced AI models.” Nobody’s reported active attacks against any of these nine flaws yet, and Cisco’s own review process caught them before an outside researcher or attacker did. If your organization runs Crosswork or Secure Workload in any configuration, this isn’t a patch to schedule for next month’s maintenance window. Perfect CVSS scores tend to attract attention fast once a vulnerability’s technical details start circulating, and Cisco’s internal discovery only buys you a head start if you actually use it. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Cisco)
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