Google tracks three Russia-linked espionage clusters using phishing and legitimate authentication tools to target researchers, diplomats and defense staff. Google’s Threat Intelligence Group tracked three separate suspected Russia-linked cyber espionage clusters. All three focus on the same thing: abusing authentication features that are supposed to protect accounts to access them instead. Threat actors target researchers, academics, government officials, think-tank analysts, and defense sector personnel across Europe and the United States. The three clusters are tracked as UNC6293, UNC7005, and UNC5976, and while they operate differently and with different tools, Google published them together for a reason. “These clusters engage in persistent, adaptive phishing campaigns, using sophisticated social engineering tactics to compromise personal accounts across multiple platforms.” reads the report published by GTIG. “Because these operations abuse legitimate authentication flows which may not immediately seem like phishing attempts to users, GTIG is raising awareness about these social engineering campaigns targeting individuals so that targets can more readily recognize malicious outreach.” UNC6293 is the oldest of the three and the most precisely attributed. Google assesses with moderate confidence that it’s a sub-cluster of ICE RELIC, the group also tracked as APT29, responsible for initial access operations. Its operations are narrow by design: typically fewer than five targets at a time, with themes built around diplomatic events and upcoming conferences. Since it was first documented in June 2025, UNC6293 has consistently impersonated US State Department officials to run app password phishing. The technique is simple but effective. The attacker convinces a target to set a specific app password on their account, one that the attacker already knows, and then uses it to log in without triggering two-factor authentication. By October 2025, UNC6293 was still reusing screenshots from its June phishing lures, including the ms.state.gov reference, while only changing the surrounding text. By June 2026, the group had added OAuth phishing. After logging in to a legitimate service, victims were asked to share a URL or “verification code,” allowing attackers to obtain valid access tokens. The trick works because the login itself is legitimate, while the attackers hide the malicious step elsewhere. UNC7005, tracked by Microsoft as STORM-2945, is a related but separate cluster first identified in February 2026. Google assesses it’s also connected to ICE RELIC, but notes it operates with lower technical sophistication and worse operational security than UNC6293. It compensates with a wider toolkit. UNC7005 runs app password phishing, device code phishing against both Microsoft and WhatsApp, malware distribution, and OAuth phishing operations, sometimes in the same month. “UNC7005 also conducts device code phishing operations for both Microsoft and WhatsApp accounts.” continues the report. “The themes of these phishing waves often involve invitations for calls with individuals from notable organizations related to the target’s field or, most recently, invitations to diplomatic events and conferences. “ The GLOBSEC conference spoof is a useful illustration of how UNC7005 works. The actor built a landing page mimicking an invitation to the legitimate GLOBSEC forum in May 2026, collected detailed registration information from targets including, not for the first time in ICE RELIC-linked operations, a wine selection for a fictional dinner, and then presented a Microsoft device code for the target to enter. The registration form still contained a reference to “Embassy security policy” rather than GLOBSEC, a leftover from the previous lure template that the actor hadn’t cleaned up. When Google flagged the page quickly, UNC7005 revised the template within days, citing “technical difficulties” to explain the change to anyone still watching. UNC7005 also used WhatsApp phishing pages to trick victims into linking their accounts to an attacker-controlled device. The fake pages offered options such as joining a call, opening an encrypted chat or downloading a file. If victims chose the call option, malicious JavaScript asked for microphone and camera access, recorded them, and sent the footage to the attackers. In late May 2026, UNC7005 ran a broader phishing wave targeting US-based academics, diplomats, and Russia researchers. The lure was a fake “Summit Companion App” to read a document supporting Ukraine. “In May and June 2026, UNC7005 conducted social engineering operations spoofing WhatsApp. The phishing pages distributed by the attacker lure targets into linking their WhatsApp accounts with an attacker controlled device in order to join a secure WhatsApp call, chat, or document share.” states the report. “The attacker also attempts multiple other methods of compromise after the device is linked.” Windows users who downloaded it received VIDAR, an off-the-shelf infostealer sold as a service that pulls saved credentials, cookies, and payment data from browsers. Mac users received ATOMIC, also known as AtomicStealer, a macOS infostealer operating the same business model. Neither is custom tooling. The actor’s email address in this operation was nearly identical to one used by UNC6293 a year earlier. The hospitality captive portal campaign, previously reported by Reliaquest and Microsoft and attributed to Midnight Blizzard, connects directly to UNC7005. Google traces the infrastructure back to April 2026: domains spoofing Microsoft authentication resources, which Google added to Safe Browsing blocklists as they appeared. By mid-July 2026, those same domains were receiving redirects from captive portals at hotels and conference centers. The IP resolution trail links the captive portal infrastructure to the GLOBSEC device code phishing operation and to ENGINELIGHT, a Go-based malware used in a separate limited UNC7005 operation in May 2026. CHERRYPIE, also known as ChocoShell, is a PowerShell infostealer that adds another interesting detail. Google found comments and code references that appear consistent with AI-generated code, suggesting the attackers may be using an LLM to develop malware. The data it targets overlaps with the commercial infostealers already used by UNC7005, leading Google to suspect that CHERRYPIE could be a customized version of a malware-as-a-service tool. UNC5976 is the third cluster and the most distinct. It focuses on military, aerospace, defense industrial base, and NGO targets, concentrating geographically on Ukraine and Armenia. Instead of residential proxies for post-compromise access, as UNC6293 and UNC7005 use, it runs dedicated infrastructure. Its OAuth phishing is more automated: the actor registers file-sharing-themed domains, creates Google Cloud projects behind them, and uses cloud-hosted scripts to collect authentication tokens from targets who log in through what looks like a Google sign-in prompt on a fake file-sharing page. Within three months of Google disrupting this infrastructure, UNC5976 had built at least twelve new domains and was already migrating toward non-Google hosting providers. In April 2026, UNC5976 also distributed HEADRUSH, a malicious Excel plugin, through a domain impersonating a Ukrainian research institute, potentially targeting a Ukrainian aerospace and imaging company. HEADRUSH eventually leads to an HTA downloader, though Google wasn’t able to recover the full infection chain. The defender challenge that runs through all three clusters is the same one Google names directly. ” The accounts these groups target are often personal, rather than corporate domain-joined accounts, creating a visibility gap for monitoring compromise from an organizational perspective. The likely use of encrypted messenger applications instead of email for initial outreach also presents a challenge to defenders hoping to track and remediate abuse.” concludes the report. “The combination of these tactics not only enables the attacker to conduct quick-turnaround exfiltration operations, but also presents opportunities for the attacker to further phish targets of interest from compromised, legitimate accounts. “ Security teams watching corporate email and endpoint telemetry won’t see the initial contact. By the time a compromised personal account starts being used to phish the target’s contacts, the original access event is already cold. Google’s practical guidance for individuals: don’t set app passwords for anyone who asks, revoke existing ones you don’t recognize, check WhatsApp’s linked devices list, and treat any OAuth authorization prompt from an unsolicited message as suspicious regardless of how polished the surrounding page looks. High-risk individuals should consider Google’s Advanced Protection Program, which blocks app password creation entirely. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Russia)
Microsoft has patched a maximum-severity vulnerability in the Entra ID identity and access management (IAM) platform that has been exploited in attacks.
Threat actors are abusing FTP banners to hide commands that deliver two previously undocumented remote access trojans named E4del and PINHOLE. MalwareHunterTeam observed this unusual technique in July in an attack that used shortcut files (.LNK) and FTP server banners as dead-drop resolvers (DDR) to retrieve commands. FTP banners are text strings the server uses as a greeting message for connecting hosts before they log in. By embedding commands in the initial response sent when a compromised system connects to an FTP server, a malware stager can receive instructions from a remote server. After discovering FTP banners being used to deliver malicious commands during an investigation, researchers at threat intelligence platform SOCRadar expanded their hunt and found that the technique remains in use.
Toronto's Hospital for Sick Children (SickKids) says a cybersecurity incident exposed the personal information of some current and former employees and job applicants, stemming from a flaw in third-party software. Clinical systems and patient records were not affected. (264)
CERT Polska confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-73570, a critical unauthenticated RCE in Zimbra Collaboration Suite patched on July 20. CERT Polska, Poland’s national computer emergency response team, confirmed this week that threat actors are actively exploiting a critical vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite tracked as CVE-2026-73570. The flaw allows unauthenticated remote code execution and was patched less than a month ago. “The CERT Polska team informs about an actively exploited OS Command Injection vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite.” reads the advisory published by CERT Polska. “The vulnerability, identified as CVE-2026-73570 , allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the zimbra user . The vulnerability affects instances that have the SNMP trap service enabled via the snmp_notify parameter and the swatchdog service running (enabled by default).” The vulnerability affects systems with SNMP trap notifications enabled and the swatchdog service running, which is enabled by default. The technical root cause is a sanitization failure in the SNMP monitoring component. Zimbra released version 10.1.20 on 20 July 2026 to address the issue. The fix came 28 days before active exploitation was confirmed, which is not a wide window, but apparently wide enough. The attack surface only exists when the optional zimbra-snmp package is installed and SNMP notifications are active, but swatchdog, the service that processes those notifications, is running by default on most installations. Below are recommendations by CERT Polska: “Due to the ongoing campaign exploiting this vulnerability, we recommend: verifying Zimbra logs /var/log/zimbra.log for the following entries: Service status change: <szkodliwy ładunek> changed from stopped to running Service status change: <szkodliwy ładunek> changed from running to stopped verification of files created by user zimbra in the last 30 days in the following directories: /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/ /opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps/ /tmp/ If you discover any signs of potential exploitation of this vulnerability, please contact our team immediately.” The exposure numbers aren’t reassuring. Shadowserver currently tracks over 12,100 Zimbra servers reachable from the Internet, split roughly between Europe (4,382) and Asia (4,492). That figure doesn’t distinguish between patched and unpatched instances, or between production servers and honeypots, so the real attack surface is smaller, but nobody knows by how much. CERT Polska published indicators of compromise alongside the advisory and gave administrators specific places to look. The team recommends checking /var/log/zimbra.log for service status change entries where the payload transitions from stopped to running and back, which is the signature of a malicious command being executed as a service. Admins should also check whether any files were created in /opt/zimbra/jetty/webapps/, /opt/zimbra/jetty_base/webapps/, or /tmp/ by the zimbra user in the last 30 days. Web shells dropped into those directories would give persistent access after the initial command injection. CVE-2026-73570 isn’t yet in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, which currently lists 18 Zimbra Collaboration Suite entries, four of them added this year. The absence doesn’t mean the threat is lower; it means the catalog hasn’t caught up yet. Zimbra solutions have been targeted by nation-state actors for years. Russian espionage group Winter Vivern exploited a reflected XSS flaw in February 2023 to steal emails from NATO-aligned organizations through Zimbra webmail portals. In October 2024, US and UK agencies warned that APT29, linked to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, was targeting vulnerable Zimbra servers via a credential-stealing flaw. Most recently, in March 2026, Seqrite Labs researchers documented APT28, tied to Russian military intelligence, exploiting a stored XSS vulnerability against Ukrainian government Zimbra deployments. Organizations in sectors targeted by Russian or Chinese state-backed groups should treat unpatched Zimbra servers as a high priority. CVE-2026-73570 is especially risky because attackers can exploit it without authentication, the vulnerable service is enabled by default, and many Zimbra servers are exposed online. These conditions make the flaw an attractive target for rapid exploitation. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Zimbra Collaboration Suite)
While monitoring Android threats in June 2026, we discovered a new piece of Android malware. What struck us as unusual was that it installed like an ordinary user app yet made no attempt to disguise itself as legitimate software: it had no user interface at all. This led us to suspect the app might be reaching users’ devices without their knowledge. Further investigation confirmed that hypothesis and allowed us to reconstruct the entire infection chain. Key findings: We identified new Android malware: a multi-stage downloader whose ultimate purpose is ad fraud and creation of a proxy botnet. The malware spread through the built-in updaters of Android-based automotive head unit firmware. This is the first documented case of malware found on a car head unit with an infection chain specific to that type of device. We attribute this activity, with high confidence, to the MoYu Group, an actor linked to the BADBOX botnet. Kaspersky solutions detect the threats described below under the following detection names: HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent.vu HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Agent.ov HEUR:Trojan-Proxy.AndroidOS.Zhima.* HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.Vo1d.* Head unit firmware overview A head unit is a system that combines multimedia functions with partial control over certain vehicle functions. Head units may come as part of a car’s factory equipment or as an aftermarket upgrade. The main attack vectors for these systems are compromise via physical access and vulnerabilities in the head unit’s OS or components, both of which we’ve covered previously. In some cases, head units run on Android, primarily because it’s convenient for manufacturers: Android’s source code already accounts for use cases within automotive head units. Android also allows manufacturers to add their own system applications during the build process, which they can use for a range of purposes: customizing the UI, adding system components tailored to the vendor’s needs, and more. Most apps developed for Android devices can also run on an Android-based head unit, and that is true for malware as well. That said, it’s hard to imagine certain categories of smartphone-targeted malware being used to attack a head unit. Banking Trojans are a good example: since mobile banking is used almost exclusively on smartphones, infecting a head unit with a banking Trojan would be a waste of the attacker’s resources. It’s worth noting that head units often include SIM card slots and can connect to the internet, enabling features like navigation and software updates. Since a head unit typically holds nothing of value to an attacker, one of the more likely attack scenarios using “classic” Android malware is infecting the device to recruit it into a botnet – similar to attacks on IoT devices. During our research, we found exactly that kind of malware. The design of firmware for DoFun head units enabled attackers to distribute malware. We notified the vendor about the distribution scheme, and they subsequently reported fixing the security issues. Below is the entire infection chain: Head unit infection scheme Let’s look at exactly how these head units became infected. The TWCore app TWCore is a legitimate system application responsible for collecting analytics data and updating the head unit software. Let’s take a closer look at how the update function works. The process is fairly simple. An MQTT message broker hosted on the subdomain cardoor[.]cn sends a message containing information about the APK files that need to be downloaded and installed on the head unit. Notably, the object describing this message includes an installNotExists field, a Boolean flag that can be set to true or false. This flag allows TWCore to install apps that weren’t originally present on the device. TWCore only checks whether an app is already installed on the device when installNotExists = false The APK file is downloaded to <TWCore external cache dir>/push/apk/ for installation. The path TWCore uses to download APK files Our telemetry revealed previously unknown malware at these file paths. On top of that, our data indicates that in every observed case, the malware was installed by an app with the package name com.tw.core, which matches the TWCore package name. Next, we’ll break down the malware installed by TWCore: the JarService dropper. Stage 1: the JarService dropper As mentioned earlier, JarService is a small dropper app with no UI of any kind. It decrypts data stored as encrypted blocks within the Trojan’s code. Each block is XOR-encrypted with a single-byte key that shifts linearly from block to block. The decrypted data contains serialized information about the payload version and entry point, along with the malware’s own code for further loading. Decrypting and deserializing information about the stage 2 payload In the version of JarService we analyzed, the entry point for the next-stage payload was the wa method of the com.c.j.qbh class. Stage 2: the loader This stage’s payload is a malicious loader. Its code contains encrypted strings that are later used as class names to execute the stage 3 payload using the reflection mechanism. The loader sends implant information to one of the attackers’ servers via a POST request. Example of a request to the C2 server: { "userId": "REDACTED", "dexVersion": "1.7", "dexType": 1, "channelId": "2039", "packageName": "com.tw.jar1", "appVersion": 12, "appName": "JarService" }In response to the POST request, the C2 server returns a link for downloading the stage 3 payload. An example of a C2 response is shown below. { "code": 200, "data": { "dexUrl": "hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/dex3.68.png", "dexVersion": 3.680, "status": 0 } }The Trojan uses the link in the dexUrl field of the data object to download serialized data for loading the next stage. This data begins with a single-byte integer, a key used to decrypt the strings in the loader’s code. Immediately following this number is a four-byte floating-point value used to XOR-decrypt the stage 3 payload, which itself is located after these keys. Decrypting the stage 3 payload In the decrypted payload, the entry point is the init method of the com.ast.sdk.BillingMain class, shown in the screenshot below. Entry point of the stage 3 payload While analyzing this stage, we noticed that the download link for the next-stage payload includes a version number. We decided to try other version numbers to retrieve different payload versions, and ultimately obtained seven distinct variants, which we list under “Indicators of Compromise” at the end of this report. The earliest version, numbered 3.57, uses a different decoding algorithm than the one described above. This may indicate that an earlier version of the infection chain used a different loader between JarService and the stage 3 payload. Stage 3: clicker / reverse proxy loader In this stage, the malware sends a POST request to /cpc/api/task every 90 minutes by default, containing information about the infected device (display resolution, device model, the SSID of the connected Wi-Fi network, MAC address, and so on) along with the Trojan’s configuration version. If the configuration is outdated, the C2 server returns an updated configuration containing new C2 addresses and new paths for sending HTTP requests. An example of a response is shown below. Note that at the time of our research, the most up-to-date configuration version was 3.82. { "code": 100, "data": { "configVersion": 3.820, "hosts": ["hxxp://t2.kshahnd[.]sbs", "hxxp://t2.mdsjhd[.]sbs", "hxxp://t2.nmnsny[.]sbs", "hxxps://t2.nmnsny[.]sbs"], "interval": 5500000, "reportApi": "/cpc/api/report", "tagName": "config", "taskApi": "/cpc/api/task", "updates": ["hxxp://a2.kshahnd[.]sbs", "hxxp://a2.mdsjhd[.]sbs", "hxxp://a2.nmnsny[.]sbs", "hxxps://a2.nmnsny[.]sbs"], "vn": 1.010 } }If the configuration version doesn’t need updating, the C2 server instead returns integer command identifiers, which the attackers refer to as productId. The Trojan maps each identifier to command information, which it stores as a serialized JSON object using the SharedPreferences API. Each identifier also has its own version, expressed as a UNIX timestamp. If the C2 response includes an unknown productId or one whose version is outdated, the malware sends a GET request to the attackers’ server at /cpc/api/xml to retrieve the command contents for all such identifiers. The C2 server responds with command information for each unknown identifier. An example of a response is shown below. { "code": 200, "data": [{ "productId": 979, "script": "{\n \"loadType\": 1,\n \"reload\": true,\n \"method\": \"start\",\n \"url2\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n \"md52\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\",\n \"name\": \"zhima\",\n \"className\": \"com.miyc.transfer.Client\",\n \"thread\": true,\n \"tagName\": \"loadlib2\",\n \"params\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"Context\"\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"String\",\n \"value\": \"107.151.248[.]132\"\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"String\",\n \"value\": \"1002\"\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"int\",\n \"value\": 1337\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"int\",\n \"value\": 7777\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"int\",\n \"value\": 8888\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"int\",\n \"value\": 15000\n }\n ],\n \"url\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n \"md5\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\"\n}", "version": 1778650942 }, { "productId": 1019, "script": "{\n \"loadType\": 1,\n \"reload\": true,\n \"method\": \"start\",\n \"url2\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n \"md52\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\",\n \"name\": \"zhima\",\n \"className\": \"com.miyc.transfer.Client\",\n \"thread\": true,\n \"tagName\": \"loadlib2\",\n \"params\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"Context\"\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"String\",\n \"value\": \"128.14.210[.]58\"\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"String\",\n \"value\": \"1002\"\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"int\",\n \"value\": 9999\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"int\",\n \"value\": 7777\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"int\",\n \"value\": 8888\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"int\",\n \"value\": 15000\n }\n ],\n \"url\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n \"md5\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\"\n}", "version": 1766001509 }, { "productId": 3505, "script": "{\n\"tagName\":\"http\",\n\"url\":\"hxxps://api.kookjar[.]com/sayhi?channel=daihai&uuid={get_uuid_10}\"\n}", "version": 1776656317 }], "msg": "" }The command information includes a tagName field, which is the command name. The code maps each name to the corresponding class responsible for executing it. List of executable commands At the time of our research, the attackers had implemented nine commands. The table below lists command names, brief descriptions, and arguments. The functionality of these commands suggests that the malware can be used to display ads, commit ad fraud (serving as a clicker), and download additional malicious code. Command name Description Arguments return Return a value from SharedPreferences. key: the key whose value should be returned copy Set the contents of the clipboard. text: the key whose value from SharedPreferences is returned as the clipboard contents url: a link for downloading gzip-compressed data (optional); this data is then concatenated with the value of the text key, with (5 spaces) used as a separator http Make a POST/GET HTTP request to a specified resource and, if instructed, save the response in SharedPreferences under a specified key. url: the resource address method: the HTTP method name (optional) startLabel: a marker for the start of the data to save from the resource (optional) endLabel: a marker for the end of the data to save from the resource (optional) valueLabel: the key under which to save the value (optional) header: a dictionary of headers for the HTTP request (optional) content: the content of the POST request (optional) web Open a link in the WebView and execute arbitrary JavaScript code within it. url: the link to open in the WebView js: base64-encoded JavaScript code to execute in the WebView; used when the url parameter is empty or absent corejs: JavaScript code to execute when the resource loads in the WebView (optional) param: a string dictionary of parameters for launching the WebView client: if this key is present, WebViewClient is used to handle redirects manually time: task timeout loadlib Not fully implemented at the time of publishing this report. – loadlib2 Download and execute arbitrary code. url: the address to download the payload from name: the name of the module being downloaded md5: the MD5 hash of the payload clear: a comma-separated list of payload names to delete (optional) params: an array of parameters to launch the payload with className: the class name of the payload entry point method: the name of the virtual method at the payload entry point cmethod: the name of the static method used to instantiate the entry-point class (optional) thread: a flag; the payload runs in a separate thread if this flag is not set reload: a flag that, when set, restarts already loaded modules loadlib3 Not fully implemented at the time of publishing this report. – deeplink Open a resource in the browser. url: a link to the resource traceroute Check resource availability via an ICMP ping. host: comma-separated list of resources to check However, attackers use only a relatively small subset of these commands in real-world attacks. As shown in the example C2 response above, at the time of publishing this report the attackers were using the loadlib2 and http commands. The payload downloaded via the loadlib2 command is a reverse proxy module named “zhima”, which researchers from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team independently discovered in TV set-top boxes around the same time as we did and also described in their report. This confirms that the attackers’ ultimate goal is building a proxy botnet. While investigating this stage of the attack chain, we noticed that the zhima download link also included a version number. As with the previous stage, we tried other possible version numbers and found eight variants of the zhima module, the earliest of which was version 57. The complete list of identified zhima modules is provided under “Indicators of Compromise” below. Attribution While analyzing the complete infection chain, we noticed that the stage 2 loader created a thread with the meaningful name mosdk-host-loader. We decided to investigate what mosdk referred to in that name. This led us to a malicious app installed on various TV set-top boxes with the package name com.abc.nexus (3AD4BF5A86D26FFBF09CAE42AF330A98). It consists of several components (including a dropper similar to JarService), each used by the attackers to covertly monetize the device’s computing power. Each malicious component in the app corresponds to its own service, and the service containing the launch code for the JarService-like dropper is named AdmoyuService. In light of this and the name of the malicious thread found in the payload code, we concluded that moyu in the service name referred to MoYu Group, one of the actors linked to the BADBOX malware platform, which had been described by researchers at HUMAN. This assessment is further supported by extensive overlap between the malware’s network infrastructure and that of MoYu Group, which was independently identified by researchers from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team around the same time as our own research. Based on these similar naming patterns and prominent infrastructure overlap between the activity of MoYu Group and the attacks described in this report, we attribute it to the same actor with high confidence. While investigating the malware downloaded by TWCore, we noticed that the domain admin.uipoxy[.]com resolved to the IP address 128.14.210[.]58, one of the C2 servers for the zhima reverse proxy module. It appears that the URL hxxp://admin.uipoxy[.]com/proxy/u/login hosts the zhima admin panel. Interestingly, this panel allows anyone to register as long as they have a valid invite code. The malware operator registration page During registration, users are prompted to review the terms of use and privacy policy. Both documents are hosted on links under the pxyedge[.]com domain, which belongs to PXYEDGE, a vendor specializing in the sale of residential proxies. On the registration page hosted at admin.uipoxy[.]com, we also found the string copyright © 2020 proxyforu[.]com all rights reserved, which linked to hxxps://proxyforu[.]com, the website of ProxyForU, another vendor of residential proxy services. We found several similarities in the authentication APIs across all of these sites: The sign-in page was hosted on an admin.* subdomain. The sign-in page was located at /proxy/u/login. The signup page was located at /proxy/register?channelKey=<invitation code>. Based on this, we believe these services are connected to MoYu Group. Conclusion Despite efforts by cybersecurity professionals and law enforcement to shut down the BADBOX botnet, individual actors linked to it continue their malicious activity, infecting devices worldwide. Delivery methods for this kind of malware vary widely, from downloads via pre-installed backdoors to infected builds of IPTV apps. The case examined here demonstrates an even more sophisticated delivery method: distribution through the legitimate update functionality of a system application. Attackers are also actively expanding into new platforms. This malware is the first known malicious app targeting head units, which means these platforms now require protection against malware as well. Indicators of compromise Stage 1: JarService ba27951b4ee1c341f4415d033369ecd3 d63bacd6d6709dd68a10ef9d374c7835 6c2e34b30da42085240ede53ab6107d4 8b5e513144a6138a966ea59e68bf9da2 e119845877089d6f4b0a70dc7388f316 Stage 2: loader e9f3a0dab6949ce2cddab9e0aa80ae1a Stage 3: loader/clicker 0fbaa7092204f4b1494e0b840b014774 1dcf031c40ce456b6a36a00b0acf3d11 44b6b213a6a3f299eaf88e078de95ecb 67dc78e544ebce16b85dc7c195dfbc58 9642ae619b3165d23c6349002d1abe24 b067d5b0dbecbd6498bcdfba45dba77e f0e3f7eba2cde91e2dedb921bab47422 zhima module 412e9243f2981bbea3894254d105b3b8 71ab5517f71866279d0d87d37f2ae320 89ef78f716a75964539f2db6520be362 a4223ce4288a230d1e6c3ff2c7639045 bd4d81cd27125ad3d9a114922d468499 c6bfb1643ac7474ed8a7b4f96a187fdb de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c f8cf8c23ff597700d471fb7767df8bac Domains and IP addresses xmsae[.]sbs ishano456[.]sbs xshaon123[.]sbs kshahnd[.]sbs mdsjhd[.]sbs nmnsny[.]sbs kookjar[.]com ty54fgd435[.]my ue886578433[.]online ty4523[.]space 144.217.243[.]201 107.151.248[.]132 128.14.210[.]58 Addresses used to download JarService hxxp://ovcloudcontrol.cdn.cardoor[.]cn/upgrade/2026-06-08/bd80bd3c3d0e4bf6b5b4a825650d01f5.apk hxxp://ovcloudcontrol.cdn.cardoor[.]cn/upgrade/2025-06-10/fe71af9ecf174de48d2b2ccc2c15fb04.apk hxxp://ovcloudcontrol.cdn.cardoor[.]cn/upgrade/2024-11-07/fa831c3c23824b99871163387bcda7ad.apk Hashes of TWCore (the legitimate software used to distribute JarService) 2a64c3efc11bf224aa54f24e876446c9 7a4d3ba2dacccfdda55859a5dfee2671 ea24487996eb70c1780922fb3063bcc5
A newly disclosed security flaw in GitLab has come under active exploitation within days of public disclosure, according to watchTowr. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-19478 (CVSS score: 9.4), a case of code injection that allows an unauthenticated attacker to modify or delete publicly accessible GitLab projects and rewrite their data under certain conditions without requiring
Microsoft on Thursday warned of a maximum-severity security flaw in Entra ID that it said has been exploited in the wild, but noted that no customer action is required. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-69836 (CVSS score: 10.0), is a case of remote code execution impacting the tech giant's cloud-based identity and access management service. It was previously called Azure Active Directory
Manic Android malware combines banking fraud and spyware, using a Bluetooth relay to steal data even when devices are offline. ThreatFabric’s Mobile Threat Intelligence team has identified a new Android malware, dubbed Manic, which has been active in the wild since at least February 2026. The researchers state that the malware is still under development as of July. “Manic sits at the intersection of Android banking malware and mobile spyware, combining financial-fraud capabilities with broader surveillance and device-control features.” reads the report published by the ThreatFabric’s Mobile Threat Intelligence team. “Its targeting is strongly focused on Ukraine, covering Ukrainian banks, government and identity services, and messaging applications, while also extending to Russian and European financial institutions, global fintech and cryptocurrency services, and military-focused communications.” The malware monitors 169 different Android apps, including banking and payment apps across several European countries, government and eID services, crypto exchanges and wallets, 2FA tools, messaging apps, browsers and email clients. This wide coverage appears deliberate. By targeting both financial and communication apps, the attackers can track a victim’s money, messages, location and files from the same device. ThreatFabric traces the first infrastructure registrations back to February 2026, with development and production services appearing in late March and April. By July, an updated build had added stronger anti-analysis checks, in-memory DEX loading, and a technique the researchers call lock-secret phishing, which extracts the device PIN or pattern by presenting a fake prompt before the victim reaches the real lock screen. Once installed, Manic requests Accessibility and notification access, then uses the Accessibility service as a UI keylogger. It classifies everything it captures before logging it: lock-screen input, recovery phrase candidates, four-to-six-digit SMS codes, passwords, long messages, email logins, and ordinary text. “Manic uses its Accessibility service as a UI keylogger. It classifies captured text before recording it, distinguishing lock-screen input, recovery-phrase candidates, four- to six-digit SMS codes, passwords, long messages, email logins, and ordinary text.” continues the report. “Each key log record includes the app and package, captured text, timestamp, whether the input came from Autofill or manual entry, and whether the app is on Manic’s target list “ Each log record includes the app name and package, the captured text, a timestamp, whether input came from autofill or manual entry, and whether the app is on Manic’s target list. The PIN theft technique works differently from a typical banking overlay. When Manic detects a numeric keypad in a targeted app, it places an invisible layer over the keys and records each tap. It then briefly passes the tap to the real keypad using Android’s Accessibility features, so the banking app works normally while Manic captures the PIN. Another function, called autoEnterPin, can try to enter a stored PIN or pattern on the Android lock screen. This gives attackers two options: capture a PIN during a banking session and later use it to unlock the device without the victim being present. According to the researchers, Manic stands out for its offline relay. “Manic uses a store-and-forward relay mechanism to exfiltrate data even when the infected device cannot reach the C2 server directly.” continues the report. “Collected files and command results are encrypted with AES-GCM and placed in a local queue, allowing the source device to remain offline while the malware searches for another infected device that can provide a route to the C2 infrastructure.” Manic searches for nearby infected devices over Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth RFCOMM, or BLE GATT, and supports chains of up to four relay hops. Cutting an infected phone off from the Internet doesn’t cut it off from exfiltration, as long as another infected device is within radio range. It’s a store-and-forward mesh built out of other people’s compromised phones. Manic gives attackers remote control of the device through WebRTC, allowing them to view the screen and interact with it using Android’s Accessibility features. It can hide its activity with black screens, fake screens or fake update messages, while also covering permission requests. The July version goes a step further by removing itself from the device’s app launcher. This keeps it out of the normal app list and lets attackers activate it through its wrapper or a deep link. For defenders, the combination here is complete in an uncomfortable way: credential theft, live screen monitoring, authentication interception, device takeover, and an exfiltration path that doesn’t require the infected device to have Internet access at all. Monitoring for unusual Accessibility service grants and unexpected Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Direct connections from phones that aren’t actively transferring files are the most practical detection starting points. “Manic is an evolving Android fraud platform designed for Device Takeover (DTO), combining credential and authentication theft with live screen monitoring and remote control. Its targeting spans banks, payment and cryptocurrency services, eID applications, and messengers, with a strong focus on Ukraine.” concludes the report. “A particularly distinctive capability is its offline mesh relay, which allows collected data to move through nearby infected devices over Wi-Fi Direct or Bluetooth when direct C2 access is unavailable. “ Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Android Malware)
Hackers compromised the maintainer account behind the widely used Rust crate arrayref to introduce malware that executed on developers’ systems during compilation. Within a 23-minute window, the attacker also poisoned two other crates, append-only-vec and internment, in the same supply-chain attack. The arrayref crate is a popular Rust library with more than 53 million downloads over the past 90 days that is used by cryptography, graphics, and blockchain tools. A report from application security company StepSecurity notes that the malicious Rust crate releases were arrayref 0.3.10, append-only-vec 0.1.9, and internment 0.8.7, all maintained by the same account. The hacker injected a dependency on a package called proc-macro1, a typosquat impersonating the popular proc-macro2 crate, while retaining the rest of the upstream source code completely unchanged.
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