French energy giant ENGIE, one of the world's largest power and natural gas providers, confirmed that attackers stole customer data after breaching a marketing platform used by business partners. ENGIE operates in renewable energy, infrastructure, and customer energy supply in 30 countries, employs over 90,000 people, and reported €71.9 billion in revenue last year. An ENGIE spokesperson told BleepingComputer that it cut off the attackers' access to the compromised platform and that they didn't breach the company's internal systems. "ENGIE's internal IT systems were not compromised. ENGIE recently identified unusual data access activity within a tool used by partners as part of their customer prospecting activities and the marketing of energy offers," the spokesperson said. The ENGIE spokesperson didn't say how many customers were affected, but told BleepingComputer the incident is limited to customers in France.
The University of Copenhagen in Denmark confirmed that hackers accessed one of its test environments containing personal data belonging to 525,000 people. The educational organization detected the breach last Tuesday and disclosed it on Friday. In an update yesterday, the university added another 20,000 staff and students whose PIN codes were exposed. “The University of Copenhagen has confirmed a cyber attack in which hackers gained access to one of the university’s test environments,” the university says. Founded in 1479, the University of Copenhagen is Denmark’s oldest university and one of its leading research institutions. It has approximately 36,800 students and 10,700 employees, with six faculties and more than 200 research centers. The University of Copenhagen is still investigating to determine the extent of the incident, but warns that the following information may have been exposed:
South Korean police identified seven suspects linked to a cybercrime operation that breached more than 90 organizations in the country, with ARTEX AI pentesting framework used in most of the attacks. According to local media citing the Seoul Metropolitan Police, the gang leader has a background in penetration testing and worked at a cybersecurity company between 2019 and 2022. In 38 of the incidents, the threat actor demanded ransom payments of 360 million won ($270,000), promising in exchange not to leak stolen data. Authorities believe the threat actor stole 8.2 million records from compromised organizations, including educational institutes, hospitals, large corporations, and even golf courses. Yonhap News says that the gang leader is a self-taught 32 year-old hacker and started attacking organizations in September 2025.
OpenAI has launched GPT-6.1 Terra, a new model focused on computer use, visual reasoning, coding, and everyday work, while costing significantly less than its larger models. Terra is designed as a faster and cheaper option for tasks such as filling out forms, editing videos, interpreting technical drawings, and automating repetitive desktop work. "We’re introducing GPT-6.1 Terra, a fast, efficient model that combines detailed visual reasoning and precise computer use alongside clearer, more natural writing," OpenAI explained in a blog post. "A significant step up from GPT-5.6 Terra, it excels at the communication and computer-based tasks that fill the workday, from drafting proposals and interpreting technical drawings to filling out forms and editing videos." OpenAI says GPT-6.1 Terra's API pricing is 50% lower than GPT-5.6 Terra and GPT-6.1 Sol, at $1 per million input tokens and $5 per million output tokens.
Cybersecurity researchers are calling attention to what they say is a "recurring social engineering pattern" across hundreds of cases in which threat actors use Microsoft Teams' external chat creation feature to conduct impersonation scams or to deliver malware. "A consistent pattern of attacker behavior has emerged across these incidents: the use of the same throwaway tenants, the same 'IT
Dutch police arrest two men over AI-voiced bank fraud that allegedly used a fake app to steal card data from 170 victims, causing €380,000 in losses. Rotterdam police have arrested two men over a new type of bank fraud that used AI-generated phone calls, a fake banking app, and NFC technology to steal bank card data. In just three weeks, the scheme allegedly cost 170 victims around €380,000. “Rotterdam police arrested two suspects accused of a new form of bank-helpdesk fraud. The operation allegedly caused around €380,000 in losses for 170 victims in just three weeks.” NL Times reports. “The suspects allegedly used AI-generated phone calls and a fake banking app to copy victims’ bank cards remotely, allowing accomplices to withdraw thousands of euros. Victims came from across the Netherlands and ranged in age; dozens were in their twenties and thirties.” The suspects allegedly used AI-generated calls to trick victims into believing their bank accounts were at risk. They then persuaded them to install a fake banking app and scan their bank cards with their phones. The app used NFC to capture card data, which accomplices could use to withdraw money. Victims came from across the Netherlands and included people of all ages, with dozens in their twenties and thirties. A 23-year-old man from Vaassen, in Gelderland, is suspected of developing the technology and directing the group. A 25-year-old from Ede, also in Gelderland, is suspected of coordinating the operation. On Tuesday, a Rotterdam court ordered both men to remain in custody for at least another 90 days while the investigation continues. The case started in mid-September, when Dutch banks reported the new fraud through the Electronic Crimes Task Force (ECTF). That’s a partnership of banks, police and prosecutors that shares information and expertise to fight financial and digital crime. Within days of consulting the task force, Rotterdam’s cybercrime team had identified the digital infrastructure used by the group. Investigators monitored the servers to understand how the operation worked. They traced the people behind the technology, the phone calls made to victims, and the cash withdrawals. The scam started with a recorded message warning victims about suspicious activity on their bank accounts. “The callers used artificial intelligence (AI) to produce dozens of recordings featuring different voices, banks, companies, and scenarios. Victims were asked to press 1 if they did not recognize the alleged activity.” states the report. “They were then connected to someone posing as a bank employee.” The message asked people to press 1 if they did not recognize the activity. They were then connected to someone pretending to be a bank employee. Following a prepared script, the caller pressured them to act quickly and take steps to block their bank cards. The fake employee told victims to download an app and hold their bank card against the phone to scan it. The criminals presented this as a way to secure the accounts. If a caller ever asks you to scan your card with an app, hang up and phone your bank on the number printed on the card. According to police, the app sent data from the card’s near-field communication (NFC) chip, the technology behind contactless payments, to an app run by an accomplice. That person waited at a cash machine or payment terminal and could withdraw thousands of euros without the victim realizing what was happening. “Police described this technical method as one they had not encountered before.” the report concludes. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, NFC)
uCreater is Android spyware disguised as trusted apps, stealing credentials, messages and wallet data through a rentable platform. uCreater is a rentable Android spyware platform that hides inside repackaged legitimate apps, targeting messaging services and mobile wallets. Its YingGai framework can intercept one-time passwords, steal account and chat data, collect contacts, manipulate sessions and spoof camera feeds to bypass identity checks. Victims may install modified versions of Telegram, WeChat or GCash through sideloading or social engineering. Researcher Ovi found stolen data on a control server, but the number of victims and links between operators and customers remain unconfirmed. “The repackaged APK can be relatively thin: target-specific instrumentation is retrieved after installation from the operator’s Alibaba OSS and MinIO infrastructure, including buckets and paths named Huuk_<target> and fengzhuang-app (literally, “packaging”). Distribution hosts include telegram-apk.uzyzx.com.” researcher Ovi states. “I could reconstruct much of the post-installation execution chain from the recovered code, but I could not directly establish the initial delivery mechanism for every victim.” Ovi rebuilt most of the chain from recovered code but couldn’t establish how every victim got the first install. The product is older than the samples. The package com.ucreater.autotool dates to about 2014, Windows tools tied to ucreater.com were signed between 2016 and 2019, and the YingGai mobile line shows up in records from September 2021. The samples Ovi studied run from 2024 to 2026: uip.exe builds from February to December 2024, Telegram repacks from July and November 2024, the WeChat host and Telegram framework from December 2024, and the Onion Box client from March 2026. The control server’s ICP filing, 湘ICP备2024061212号, dates to 2024. The infrastructure hints at scale, though not at victim numbers. Ovi counts about 20 target apps with confirmed code support, six operator domains with dozens of subdomains, three Redis buses, two MQTT buses, and a cloud-phone cluster in Changsha spread across several ISPs. A Censys search for the operator’s Tengine gateway fingerprint returned roughly 48 hosts. It looks like a multi-year product sold to many downstream operators, but he can’t say how many customers used it or how many devices fell. Attributing the platform to a specific legal entity is more difficult. Hunan Youchuang Technology is linked to the ucreater.com brand and a self-signed certificate on videoflow.cn. Changsha Sukai Network holds the ICP filing for the control server’s main domain, qianxuncc.cn, while Changsha Zhuoqing E-commerce appears as the signing identity on uip.exe, using a DigiCert certificate. A common owner is plausible but unproven. Another lead involves hunanzhijing.com, a domain belonging to the Hunan Intelligent Police Public Safety Technology Research Institute. It shares the same gateway fingerprint, and an official Hunan document connects the institute to an intelligent-policing research project. However, shared cloud infrastructure establishes only co-tenancy, not ownership or operational involvement. There is no evidence that the police developed or operated uCreater. Other infrastructure links also require caution. A Thailand-based relay used by the Telegram component, hosted on Huawei Cloud, also served gambling websites, an advertising-account service and an SMS service. The cloud-phone web client displayed a certificate for another vendor, while the gateway served a Vue application titled 舆情交易, meaning “public-opinion trading”. These observations are leads for further investigation, not proof of common ownership. uCreater relies on app virtualization, a technique already identified by Zimperium as a growing mobile threat. VirtualApp runs another application inside a container, LSPatch merges code hooks into repackaged apps without requiring root access, and Pine hooks Android’s runtime. Together, these components allow malicious code to operate inside a legitimate app while it is signed in and has access to decrypted data. “uCreater is notable because it turns these techniques into a reusable, remotely managed product.” the researchers continues. Operators distribute modified versions of Telegram-X, Telegram-Web and other messaging apps, integrating modules through LSPatch or loading them from an asset called TgJarPine.dex. WeChat can instead run inside a VirtualApp container, including the va_vx or Onion Box host. LSPatch also stores the original APK under cache/lspatch/origin/*.apk. The presence of this path or the specific asset can help identify an infected device. The approach differs from GodFather, a banking trojan documented by Zimperium that runs apps in a virtual container and displays fake overlays to capture credentials. uCreater operates inside the real application without relying on an overlay. It uses XposedBridge hooks, reflection and access to the app’s own database interfaces. This allows it to reach beyond login screens and potentially support any application for which the vendor develops a module. Ovi found no evidence linking the two platforms. One distinguishing feature is a local command server embedded in each hooked application. It exposes around 40 numbered handlers, with descriptions and parameters that allow operators to discover available functions. The code supports device monitoring, contact and SMS collection, installed-app enumeration, message sending, chat-history retrieval, session management and account-related actions. The Telegram module can execute SQL queries directly against the application’s live database through its own interface. Its Db_MessagesStorageRawQuery handler accepts operator-supplied SQL and returns results through compatibility classes that recreate Telegram objects. This can expose information that would otherwise be protected in the app’s encrypted or locally stored data while the application is running. The module also hooks Telegram’s SRPHelper.getX routine, capturing the two-step verification password in cleartext before hashing and storing it for exfiltration. The code provides functions to list or reset sessions, change or confirm a linked phone number, delete an account and lock users out. It can also remove its own session from the victim’s device list, potentially concealing the operator’s access. Ovi stresses that the source code demonstrates these capabilities, not that every action has been successfully performed against victims. The implant retrieves its control-server address from Redis using the Domain key, optionally selecting a value for a particular channel. It caches the address and can fall back to a hardcoded value, explaining why callback domains differ between builds. Signed JSON beacons report to endpoints under /api/callback/Tg*, while command requests include a device fingerprint and signature and use retries with increasing delays. Updates and additional code arrive through Alibaba Object Storage Service (OSS) and MinIO. The Telegram module retrieves an update manifest and hooks from designated storage paths, while a contacts.vcf file can supply contact information. The WeChat component subscribes to a Redis channel identified by a device-specific machine ID, with its host and credentials embedded in a child code file. The WeChat module focuses on account access rather than chat-history collection. Its _2_0_UploadAppLoginInfo command retrieves login identity information, after which the app data can be packaged, uploaded to OSS and used in account cloning. Ovi found no evidence that the examined sample accessed WeChat’s encrypted database. Ovi tested uCreater on a Pixel 10 Pro running Android 17 and found that its bundled Pine engine fails because of changes to Android’s internal APIs. The latest sample, dated July 29, 2026, still uses the outdated engine. Although this creates obstacles for operators, updating Pine could restore functionality, and other devices remain untested. Ovi also identified five samples that successfully contacted the control server, confirming active deployments targeting Telegram, Telegram-X and WeChat. Ovi and researcher Jurre discovered the platform’s source code after finding an exposed GitLab server. Other infrastructure was protected by IP allowlists, but this server contained the control platform’s source code, configuration and operational details. The repositories revealed Spring Cloud services for command dispatch, authorization capture, data collection, backups and message bridging, alongside a Vue-based administration console. Thirteen repositories contained commit histories identifying roughly three dozen developers, with activity timestamps consistent with China time. At least one commit used a corporate email domain associated with Tanzhou, a Changsha software firm. uCreater’s backend is a rented, multi-tenant platform that lets operators manage infected devices, steal account data and automate contact collection. Kafka, RocketMQ, Redis and Nacos coordinate commands and schedule activity to avoid triggering security controls. The infrastructure runs on Aliyun and Huawei Cloud, with control services and storage hosted in China. Although GitLab records identify developers behind key components, Ovi stresses they are not confirmed operators. The recovered backend did not appear to support Telegram, and some callback domains are no longer active. Ovi attributes the platform to a vendor in Changsha and Hunan operating through three companies, each linked to a different technical or infrastructure artifact. The reseller model, focus on mobile wallets and theft of authentication codes suggest financially motivated crime, but the researcher presents this as an assessment rather than a proven fact. The technical findings show that uCreater goes beyond a conventional banking trojan or a tool that merely steals credentials. By embedding code inside legitimate applications, it can manipulate sessions, access account data, collect contacts and potentially take control of messaging accounts. Its rented, multi-tenant architecture also allows different operators to use the same underlying platform. The scale of the infrastructure indicates a substantial operation, but neither the number of customers nor the number of compromised devices has been established. Likewise, infrastructure overlaps and developer records provide investigative leads, not conclusive proof of who operated the spyware or who was responsible for individual attacks. “Mapping points to a commercial resale structure, and targeting driven by wallets and OTPs. My assumption is financially-motivated crimeware.” concludes the report. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, newsletter)
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a Microsoft 365 campaign that has been observed leveraging an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) relay to capture sign-in sessions and then replay the stolen tokens to break into email accounts at 79 organizations. Huntress, which observed the activity between July 14 and September 22, 2026, said it detected 497 successful Microsoft 365 sign-in events across
In an update, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 said it's retracting its earlier assessment that the post-compromise activity targeting the European government agency involved the exploitation of the PHP2Shell flaws. "What researchers saw was an attack against a European government agency executed in the context of a vulnerable PHP application," a spokesperson for the company told The Hacker News via
Capcom disclosed a data breach exposing 11.7 million email addresses and account details after hackers accessed its CAPCOM ID service. Japanese gaming company Capcom has disclosed a data breach discovered on October 19 involving its CAPCOM ID service, which provides access to online services and games. As of October 22, attackers stole 11,774,247 email addresses, along with account details including creation dates, last login dates, login counts, and the IP addresses used for the latest logins. “We have recently discovered that unauthorized access by a third party occurred to our online membership service “CAPCOM ID” (*1) , resulting in the leakage of some customer information.” reads the company’s notice. “Number of leaked email addresses and system-specific identification information: 11,774,247 (worldwide total)” In 43 cases, hackers exposed date of birth, gender, country/region, and nickname. Capcom also reported that attackers illegally changed passwords on 196 accounts, and the company has already reset them. The company said the incident exposed personal information belonging to a small number of individuals. Capcom has activated its incident response procedures and confirmed that services using CAPCOM ID remain operational. The company has notified the relevant authorities, is investigating the breach, and has begun contacting affected customers through a dedicated support channel. The company also urges users to watch out for phishing attempts involving emails impersonating Capcom or its partners, particularly those containing suspicious links or attachments. It says it will investigate the incident, address the identified causes, and strengthen its security measures to prevent similar breaches. “In response, we implemented emergency measures and began identifying and addressing the attack method.” states the notice.”A task force was established within the company to gather information and take measures to prevent further damage. The investigation revealed that some customer information registered with “CAPCOM ID” had been leaked. In addition, unauthorized password changes were confirmed for some accounts. On the same day, the incident was reported to the Security Oversight Committee, our external advisory organization.” Capcom was previously targeted by the Ragnar Locker ransomware gang in November 2020. The attackers claimed to have stolen 1 TB of data, potentially affecting up to 390,000 people. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, data breach)
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