An unpatched vulnerability in Calix GS7 XGS (GS5239XG) residential routers used by multiple U.S. broadband providers allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to create port-forwarding rules that can expose local network devices to the public internet.
Hackers are attempting to exploit two critical authentication bypass vulnerabilities in the miniOrange SAML 2.0 Single Sign On plugin for WordPress that can be used to forge SAML responses and log in as administrators. The miniOrange SAML SSO plugin turns a WordPress site into a SAML service provider, letting users log in through corporate identity platforms such as Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace, or OneLogin instead of separate WordPress credentials. Created by Xecurify, miniOrange is a family of seven plugins, with a free version that has 10,000 downloads and 30,000 customers for the other six. The two vulnerabilities observed in exploitation attempts are tracked as CVE-2026-61979 and CVE-2026-15981 and can be chained together to bypass authentication. Because the miniOrange SAML SSO plugin accepts the signature algorithm from incoming SAML responses instead of enforcing the configured one, an attacker can leverage CVE-2026-61979 to select HMAC-SHA1. This causes the plugin to treat the RSA public key from the identity provider (IdP) as the shared secret.
Cybersecurity company ReliaQuest has confirmed that one of its employees was targeted in a social engineering attack after hackers impersonated a member of the security team. In a statement over the weekend, ReliaQuest said that an attacker called multiple employees and tried to trick them into accessing "a fake ReliaQuest single sign-on (SSO) page behind a content delivery network." Last week, ReliaQuest's Threat Research team shared in a now-deleted post, that the ShinyHunters extortion gang was registering .claims domains to impersonate company's help desks and IT teams. "ReliaQuest is tracking a widespread ShinyHunters campaign using domains that follow the company[.]claims pattern. These domains incorporate the targeted organization’s name or abbreviation under the .claims TLD," read the company's post on X.
iAuthFlow v2 phishing toolkit uses a phished Google session to enroll an attacker-controlled passkey that survives password resets. Abnormal Security researchers have published an analysis of iAuthFlow v2, a phishing toolkit sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum for $10,000 base price. The author also offers for sale additional capability modules separately. The headline feature is not the phishing itself. It’s what happens after the phishing succeeds. “Once the target completes a phishable Google login, the toolkit uses the authenticated session to enroll a passkey controlled by the operator.” reads the report published by Abnormal Security. “In the seller’s recorded demonstration, the account owner later changes their password, invalidating the active session—but the operator authenticates with the newly enrolled passkey and returns to the mailbox.” That’s the architecture. The phishing flow gives the attacker a temporary window. iAuthFlow v2 uses that window to create a permanent key that doesn’t close when the window does. The toolkit uses a browser-in-the-middle attack. The victim sees what looks like a real Google login page, while iAuthFlow v2 runs another browser on the attacker’s server. Everything the victim types, including their email, password and two-factor code, is sent to that remote browser, which logs in to Google. The victim provides the credentials, while the attacker gets the authenticated session. In the demo, the fake login page used a trycloudflare.com subdomain, giving the link a valid TLS certificate and a more trustworthy appearance. Once the relay gives the attacker’s browser Google’s session cookies, iAuthFlow v2 holds the target on a “Verification, Processing” page while the toolkit works inside the account. This pause is a named state in the software, not a recording artifact. The session log timestamps tell the story precisely: login at 21:37:18, passkey created and saved at 21:37:24. Six seconds to establish persistent access. The passkey module navigates the target’s Google passkey settings through the authenticated browser and requests a new credential. Google may ask for identity re-verification before allowing the enrollment; the demo shows the toolkit handling this. The enrolled passkey is then stored on the attacker’s side, and the toolkit records “Passkey created and saved.” “The log records “Passkey created and saved.” At this point, the operator no longer has only the authenticated session created through the phishing flow.” continues the report. “The newly enrolled passkey is a separate authentication credential registered to the target’s Google account. The subsequent demonstration shows Google offering that passkey during a later sign-in, consistent with the operator retaining the credential needed to use it.” This is more serious than simply stealing a session cookie because a password reset does not remove a passkey. Changing a Google password ends active sessions, revokes app passwords and invalidates some OAuth tokens. A passkey is different: it is a separate cryptographic credential linked to the account and remains active until it is manually removed. The demo shows the risk clearly. After the victim changes their password, the attacker’s session stops working. But the attacker can choose “Try another way,” use the passkey they previously added and regain access to the mailbox. The victim may have no idea this happened. Abnormal notes a technically plausible mechanism for how iAuthFlow v2 stores and uses the passkey: Chromium’s software-based virtual authenticators, which support WebAuthn registration and retain private keys without requiring the target’s physical device. The researchers don’t confirm this is what the toolkit uses, since the demonstration doesn’t reveal the implementation. What they confirm is that the behavior shown is consistent with how passkeys work, and there’s an available path to produce it. The toolkit targets Google in the build Abnormal examined, but the seller advertises versions for Microsoft, iCloud, and LinkedIn. The same post-authentication persistence logic applies wherever passkeys can be enrolled. Containment after an iAuthFlow v2 compromise needs to go further than incident response teams are often used to going. “That cleanup is particularly important with iAuthFlow v2 because neither a password reset nor session revocation removes an attacker-enrolled passkey.” states the report. “Restore the account only after unauthorized authentication methods and other persistence mechanisms have been removed.” The full sweep should cover unauthorized passkeys and security keys, malicious Gmail filters and forwarding rules, delegated access, OAuth grants and app permissions, and recovery settings. Organizations running Google Workspace can use the Security Investigation Tool to audit the account before declaring it clean. The best way to prevent these attacks is to rely on authentication methods that cannot be easily stolen through phishing. WebAuthn-based authentication is tied to the real website, so stolen passwords or codes cannot be used through a relay attack. Google Workspace can enforce this with the “Only security key” option for 2-Step Verification and through the Advanced Protection Program. These settings also disable app passwords, which the toolkit may target on less protected accounts. The toolkit’s price and professional sales channels suggest this is an ongoing business, not a one-time release. If a Google account is compromised but appears clean after a password reset, security teams should also check the account’s passkeys and security keys before closing the case. “iAuthFlow v2 illustrates how phishing has evolved beyond stealing credentials or even hijacking a single authenticated session. Once an attacker gains legitimate access to an account, that access can become a starting point for establishing new authentication methods, modifying account settings, and creating other forms of persistence.” concludes the report. “Response and recovery cannot end with a password reset or session revocation. Organizations must also examine what changed after authentication—especially newly enrolled credentials, recovery methods, OAuth grants, and mailbox settings—and remove anything the attacker left behind. “ Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, iAuthFlow v2 phishing toolkit)
A package gets installed. A login prompt opens. A box sits exposed to the internet. Nothing looks unusual yet. That’s roughly the mood this week. Trusted tools turn hostile, old weak spots get fresh attention, AI makes exploit work cheaper, and researchers keep finding attacks that sound harder than they actually are. Plenty to clean up. Here’s the short version. ⚡ Threat of the Week U.S.
Red Hat and the Keycloak project have released patches to address a critical security flaw in the open-source identity and access management server that could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to take over any user account by forcing a password reset. The vulnerability, assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2026-18963, is rated 9.1 on the CVSS scoring system by Red Hat, which acts as
The ToxicPanda Android malware has evolved with new malicious functionality, expanding its targeting to 349 applications and adding support for 167 remote commands. The malware now requests VPN service permissions to create a local interface that allows it to control network traffic passing through it. The feature enables ToxicPanda 2.0 to block communication from Google Play and Google Play Services. Control at the network level permits the malware to interfere with various security checks and actions, such as app verifications, updates, Play Protect communication, or legitimate disruptions designed to protect users. After obtaining VPN service permissions, ToxicPanda 2.0 blocks communications to Google Play before extracting and installing its payload, then requests Accessibility Service permissions.
A supply-chain attack targeting Android-based car head units is using a legitimate device-update app to spread malware that enlists compromised devices in a proxy botnet or uses them for ad fraud. Kaspersky researchers analyzed the malware and attributed the operation to the MoYu group, a threat actor previously associated with the BadBox malware botnet. The researchers note that this is the first documented case of a malware infection chain specifically created for the targeted car head unit. MoYu's operation targets systems from DoFun, a Chinese automotive software and hardware provider owned by Shenzhen Driving Control Technology Co., Ltd. DoFun is an automotive software, cloud services, and hardware provider that sells generic Android-based head units, which act as the command center for a car's infotainment, navigation, and settings systems.
Malware is abusing car infotainment updates to install proxy software, turning Android head units into nodes for the BADBOX network. Kaspersky researchers found something in June 2026 that made them stop and look twice: an Android app with no interface at all, installed like any ordinary app but making zero effort to disguise itself as legitimate. Their report documents the first known malware infection targeting car head units, the Android-based infotainment and control systems built into many modern vehicles, spread through the vehicle’s own official update mechanism. Head units run Android for practical reasons, since manufacturers can build on existing source code and add their own custom system apps during production. That flexibility cuts both ways. Because head units are just Android devices under the hood, most apps built for smartphones can technically run on them too, including malware, even though something like a banking trojan would be wasted effort on a device nobody uses for mobile banking. Kaspersky researchers found something unusual in June 2026: an Android app with no visible interface that was installed like a normal app but did not try to look legitimate. Their report describes what they say is the first known malware infection targeting car head units, Android-based systems used for infotainment and vehicle controls, delivered through the car’s official update system. “We identified new Android malware: a multi-stage downloader whose ultimate purpose is ad fraud and creation of a proxy botnet.” reads the report published by Kaspersky. “The malware spread through the built-in updaters of Android-based automotive head unit firmware. This is the first documented case of malware found on a car head unit with an infection chain specific to that type of device.” Car head units often use Android because it is flexible and lets manufacturers add their own software. But this also creates a security risk. Since these systems are basically Android devices, many apps designed for smartphones can also run on them, including malware. The infection chain here starts inside TWCore, a completely legitimate system app responsible for analytics and firmware updates on DoFun head units. An MQTT message broker sends TWCore instructions about which APK files to download and install, and a specific configuration flag called installNotExists controls whether the app checks if something is already installed before pushing it. “TWCore only checks whether an app is already installed on the device when installNotExists = false The APK file is downloaded to <TWCore external cache dir>/push/apk/ for installation.” which means setting that flag the other way turns a routine update channel into a silent installation pipeline for anything the attackers want to push. What gets installed through that channel is a small dropper called JarService, carrying zero user interface and doing nothing but decrypting and loading the next stage. That stage is a loader that phones home to a command server, reports basic device details, and receives a download link for the actual payload, a third-stage module researchers found could be pulled in at least seven different versions simply by trying different version numbers in the download URL. That third stage turns out to be a clicker and reverse proxy component, checking in with its server every 90 minutes by default and waiting for new instructions. “In this stage, the malware sends a POST request to /cpc/api/task every 90 minutes by default, containing information about the infected device (display resolution, device model, the SSID of the connected Wi-Fi network, MAC address, and so on) along with the Trojan’s configuration version.” continues the report. “If the configuration is outdated, the C2 server returns an updated configuration containing new C2 addresses and new paths for sending HTTP requests.” The command system behind the malware is more powerful than you might expect from something running silently on a car’s dashboard. Researchers found nine commands, including ones that can change the clipboard, send HTTP requests, load web pages, and run JavaScript. In practice, attackers mainly used two: one to download and run new code, and another to send web requests. The extra module they deployed, called “zhima,” was a reverse proxy. This means the main goal was not to attack or control the car. Instead, the attackers wanted to use infected cars’ internet connections as part of a larger proxy network. Tracing the malware’s naming conventions and infrastructure led researchers to attribute the campaign, with high confidence, to MoYu Group, an actor connected to the BADBOX botnet that’s been documented previously by other researchers. A thread inside the second-stage loader carried the internal name “mosdk-host-loader,” which pointed toward malware previously found on TV set-top boxes tied to the same group, and overlapping network infrastructure independently spotted by a separate research team around the same time backed up the connection. The command system behind the malware is more powerful than you might expect from something running silently on a car’s dashboard. Researchers found nine commands, including ones that can change the clipboard, send HTTP requests, load web pages, and run JavaScript. In practice, attackers mainly used two: one to download and run new code, and another to send web requests. The extra module they deployed, called “zhima,” was a reverse proxy. This means the main goal was not to attack or control the car. Instead, the attackers wanted to use infected cars’ internet connections as part of a larger proxy network. There is also a strange detail in the network’s infrastructure. The proxy service’s admin panel allows people to create accounts if they have a valid invite code. Its copyright text and login page also look similar to those used by at least two commercial residential-proxy services. This suggests the network may be linked to a business-like proxy service, while also using infected cars to provide internet connections. BADBOX has survived several takedown attempts by researchers and law enforcement. This campaign shows why: the people behind it keep changing how they spread the malware and are moving into new types of devices. Cars are now joining smart TVs and set-top boxes as devices that can be quietly added to a botnet. As cars become more like computers, they also need the same kind of security protection. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Android Car)
Using the same email, phone number, payment method, and other identifiers makes it easier for data brokers and attackers to profile your activity. Anonyome Labs explains how separate digital personas can reduce correlation and limit the impact of breaches, spam, and identity theft.
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