ConnectWise has shut down customer access to its Cloud Backup service (formerly SkyKick Cloud Backup) after hackers accessed application identities and compromised Microsoft 365 tenants. Reports of the malicious activity began emerging on Friday, with administrators observing unauthorized access to client data in Microsoft 365 tenants due to a potential “SkyKick/CW breach.” Later on the same day, managed cybersecurity and threat detection platform Huntress confirmed the worries, saying that it had identified at least 162 compromised tenants in its environment. In a post today, Microsoft also confirmed malicious activity involving ConnectWise’s Cloud Backup service, saying it identified unauthorized authentication attempts from an IP address on October 15. ConnectWise’s cloud backup solutions provide backup and recovery services that help managed service providers (MSPs) and IT teams protect and restore customer data, such as emails and files, in cloud environments including Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace.
Drupal has patched two critical vulnerabilities that could allow attackers to execute code remotely on websites running any supported version of the content management system. The security issues impact the software core's Field UI module and the contributed Entity List module. Drupal issued an advance warning at the beginning of the week, urging administrators to apply updates promptly because attackers could develop exploits shortly after the vulnerabilities’ disclosure. “The Drupal Security Team urges you to reserve time for core updates at that time because exploits might be developed within hours or days,” the project's security team warned. “We recommend updating to the latest supported patch (bugfix) release for your site's version of Drupal before October 14, so that you can address any other upgrade issues before the security window.”
U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) adds Fortinet Multiple Products and BeyondTrust Remote Support flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the following vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog: CVE-2025-61624 Fortinet Multiple Products Path Traversal Vulnerability CVE-2026-102764 BeyondTrust Remote Support Authentication Bypass by Spoofing Vulnerability This week, Palo Alto Netwoks researchers reported that PEERSTITCH malware exploited FortiManager to expose 500+ firewalls, evade detection inside FortiOS memory, and maintain stealthy access. The attackers exploited CVE-2025-61624, a path traversal flaw in the FortiOS auto-script engine, to deploy a new implant called PEERSTITCH. The flaw CVE-2026-102764 is an input validation vulnerability in internal components of BeyondTrust Remote Support. BeyondTrust Remote Support is a remote technical support tool that allows IT help desks and support teams to securely access and troubleshoot users’ computers and other devices over a network. From a cybersecurity perspective, the software is important because it can provide privileged access to systems and allow technicians to perform sensitive operations. The components do not properly validate the origin of incoming messages, potentially allowing an attacker to perform file operations on the appliance under certain conditions. “CISA is aware of critical authentication bypass vulnerability CVE-2026-102764 , affecting BeyondTrust Remote Support (formerly Bomgar) versions 26.2.3 and earlier. Patches are available for supported versions (24.3.1 and later); organizations using older versions must upgrade first.” CISA warns. “Cyber threat actors are actively exploiting the vulnerability to gain initial access, then establishing persistence, escalating privileges, and moving laterally. “ According to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, FCEB agencies have to address the identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect their networks against attacks exploiting the flaws in the catalog. Experts also recommend that private organizations review the Catalog and address the vulnerabilities in their infrastructure. CISA orders federal agencies to fix the flaws by October 19, 2026. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
A cyber incident at a BAE Systems subsidiary just stopped every bankruptcy court in the US from sending notices, and the problem started a week ago. A security incident at BAE Systems Inc., the US subsidiary of British defense contractor BAE Systems, has taken the Bankruptcy Noticing Center offline since October 9. The Bankruptcy Noticing Center (BNC) is the system that federal bankruptcy courts use to send official notices. It handles court notices, messages to creditors, and deadline notifications that keep everyone involved in a case informed. “BAE Systems IT and websites that support the operations of the Bankruptcy Noticing Center (BNC) have been impacted by a cybersecurity incident.” reads the official judiciary statement. “As a result of the incident, all access to the BNC systems and websites that BAE operates on behalf of the judiciary and the related bankruptcy noticing process are unavailable at this time, including bnc.uscourts.gov, bankruptcynotices.uscourts.gov, notices.uscourts.gov, and the National Creditor Registration Service. The incident has also halted the BNC’s production and distribution of bankruptcy notices for bankruptcy courts.” The disruption has prevented the center, which BAE operates on behalf of the federal judiciary, from generating and sending notices to creditors, courts, and attorneys in federal bankruptcy cases across the country. This is not a minor service disruption. The entire notification system used by federal bankruptcy courts across the country is down. “Several online services supporting US federal courts’ bankruptcy systems have gone offline following a cybersecurity incident involving a court contractor, the Administrative Office of the US Courts (AOC) said on Thursday.” Reuters reported. The US judiciary explained that the BNC sends bankruptcy notices for every federal bankruptcy court in the country. Affected domains include bnc.uscourts.gov, bankruptcynotices.uscourts.gov, notices.uscourts.gov, and the National Creditor Registration Service. With that last one down, attorneys using the electronic filing system can’t generate the creditor mailing lists they normally need to serve documents. Courts are still accepting new case filings and electronic notifications to registered attorneys are still going out, but anything tied to the noticing pipeline itself has been dark since last Thursday. A BAE Systems spokesperson said that the company is “aware of a security incident that is isolated to the BNC system” and has taken immediate steps to address it. BAE Systems is “coordinating closely” with the courts on the response, the spokesperson said. Neither BAE nor the judiciary disclosed tachnical details of the incident, whether it was a deliberate cyber attack or a different kind of incident, or whether any data was accessed or taken. The Eastern District of Texas bankruptcy court’s own public notice adds a useful detail: BAE first told the Administrative Office about the problem late on October 9, which means the court system’s administrative leadership knew by that evening. “Late on Friday, October 9, 2026, BAE Systems, the contractor that services the Bankruptcy Noticing Center (BNC), notified the Administrative Office of a service disruption impacting BAE systems that process notices as well as the following websites: bnc.uscourts.gov, bankruptcynotices.uscourts.gov, notices.uscourts.gov, and the National Creditor Registration Service website that supports CM/ECF access to address labels (the mailing matrix).” reads the notice. “Because of this disruption, the court polling and certification drop-off process that supports the delivery of electronic and paper notices has been interrupted and the BNC is unable to provide noticing services to the courts at this time.” Courts started posting disruption notices on October 13, but none of them mentioned a cybersecurity incident at that point, several framed it as a service interruption. The public acknowledgment of the word “cybersecurity” didn’t come until October 15. Summarizing, the incident started on or before October 9. The judiciary’s administrative office learned about it that day. Courts informed users of the problem on October 13, and the public announcement confirming a cybersecurity incident came on October 15. That’s six days between the contractor discovering the problem and the public announcement. During that time, bankruptcy cases across the country continued without the system that sends notices to keep courts, creditors, and lawyers informed. No one has announced when the service might be restored, suggesting the investigation is still at an early stage. This incident highlights a recurring problem: critical systems operated by contractors can fail in a single incident, disrupting services across every federal court handling a specific type of case. The public also waited nearly a week for an official statement. This is not a new pattern, but it keeps happening. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, BAE Systems)
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a malicious npm package that's part of a recently disclosed software supply chain attack campaign dubbed MALFEX. The package, named "imgdecode," was uploaded to the package registry on September 30, 2026, by a user named "malfexteste8." It has been downloaded 979 times as of writing and is still available on npm as of writing. The latest version of
Cybersecurity researchers are sounding the alarm related to an active campaign in which unknown threat actors are abusing a compromised Microsoft 365 (M365) credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) to gain unauthorized access to customers' M365 environments. ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a cloud-based backup and recovery service built for managed service providers (MSPs
Candiru spyware was delivered to devices at Al Jazeera Media Network via targeted online advertisements in a zero-click attack that required only rendering the malicious ads on the victim's device. Researchers at Citizen Labs investigating the attacks referred to this technique as AdFection, noting that their report is the first public technical confirmation of mercenary spyware delivered through targeted ads. A similar method was documented in late 2025 by Amnesty International, involving ads that infected targets with Predator spyware without them clicking anything. That infection mechanism was called Aladdin and surfaced due to a collection of marketing files and documents leaked from the Intellexa surveillance company that researchers studied and corroborated with technical details from forensic investigations.
Employees using personal ChatGPT accounts at work can expose sensitive company data, even when their organization provides an approved Enterprise workspace. NordLayer explains how IT teams can investigate unauthorized AI use and block sensitive information before it reaches personal accounts.
Burger King Japan, the Japanese subsidiary of global fast-food giant Burger King, disclosed a major data breach after attackers accessed a server containing 11.18 million customer records. Founded in 1953 in Florida, Burger King is now a multinational fast-food chain with nearly 20,000 locations worldwide, including 350 in Japan. In a Thursday press release, Burger King Japan said it concluded a follow-up investigation on October 13 and apologized to customers whose data was stolen in early October and leaked online. The breached servers stored the personal information for users of the company's official smartphone app, including their names, dates of birth, gender, email addresses, phone numbers, and order history. "We identified a potential unauthorized third-party access to the system that manages member information for our official app and conducted an investigation," Burger King Japan said.
PEERSTITCH malware exploited FortiManager to expose 500+ firewalls, evade detection inside FortiOS memory, and maintain stealthy access. PEERSTITCH, a stealthy implant deployed during a prolonged intrusion, helped attackers maintain access to a telecom managed service provider after compromising its FortiManager appliance. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 documented the operation, which began in September 2024 and exposed credentials and configurations for more than 500 downstream firewalls. “Unit 42 investigated a multi-stage network intrusion against a telecommunications organization that occurred in September 2024, which we are tracking as cluster CL-STA-0954 (aka UNC5820). The attackers behind CL-STA-0954 achieved an initial compromise by exploiting CVE-2024-47575 against a centralized FortiManager appliance.” reads the report published by Palo Alto Networks. “From that single appliance, our observations are that the attackers exfiltrated an archive containing running configurations, cryptographic material and database files containing information about more than 500 managed FortiGate firewalls. Those firewalls protected the target’s own infrastructure and the networks of its clients.” The initial access relied on CVE-2024-47575, known as FortiJump, which allowed an unauthenticated attacker to register a rogue virtual device with the central management platform over TCP port 541. Within minutes, the attackers extracted a configuration archive containing serial numbers, public IP addresses, routing tables, VPN credentials, and cryptographic trust material for every managed firewall. One compromised management system had effectively handed them the keys to hundreds of networks. The targeted 500 devices didn’t all belong to the same organization. They protected the managed service provider’s infrastructure and its clients’ networks. The attackers got running configurations and private keys for firewalls belonging to organizations that had no idea any of this was happening. Unit 42 was clear about the scope: the investigation covered only the provider’s own environment, not the downstream clients. Armed with decrypted credentials from the stolen configuration files, which stored passwords as reversible ciphertext, the attackers then established unauthorized SSL/VPN sessions into internal network management segments from external staging addresses. That’s the moment reconnaissance turned into active access. In the second stage, attackers exploited CVE-2025-61624, a path traversal flaw in the FortiOS auto-script engine, to deploy a new implant called PEERSTITCH. The implant is a 64-bit ARM64 binary written in C, but what it does is unusual. Unit 42’s researchers put it plainly: “PEERSTITCH leaves no persistent binary on disk, opens no listening ports and initiates no outbound network connections. Instead, it communicates through traffic generated by legitimate processes on the infected host, which makes the malware resistant to conventional endpoint and network detection.” the report continues. “The attackers also impersonated the FortiManager platform to pull from managed firewalls of other hosts in the targeted network.” Instead, it injects itself into two legitimate FortiOS daemons, the logging process and the VPN service, and creates a covert communication bridge between them using memory that’s already allocated to those running processes. When traffic passing through the logging daemon matches two specific markers, a port number embedded in data and a link-local IP address, it extracts a session token and writes it directly into the VPN daemon’s memory using Linux’s /proc filesystem. When the VPN daemon processes a subsequent session carrying that same tag, it takes an alternate execution path, bypassing FortiOS security checks entirely. PEERSTITCH is hard to detect because it leaves no persistent file on disk, opens no listening ports, and initiates no outbound network connections. The only way to detect it is by inspecting live process memory for anomalous read-write-execute (RWX) regions in the two targeted daemons or identifying NOP patches at specific offsets in their code. Fortinet’s Integrity Checker Tool cannot detect the implant because it scans files on disk, which remain untouched. The attackers also established a secondary command channel by abusing Apache’s built-in certificate management module on the firewalls. They embedded shell commands in the domain name field of certificate validation requests and configured Apache to retry them continuously, creating a persistent outbound reverse shell through a legitimate system process. Before running their malicious auto-scripts, the attackers killed the logging and syslog daemons to suppress any trace of what was about to happen. Crash logs were wiped. Rogue administrator accounts and script objects were automatically deleted shortly after execution. The malicious ACME configuration file was overwritten with innocent-looking text. The PEERSTITCH injector unlinked its own binary from disk after completing execution. “The cryptographic trust material governing the platform’s relationship with every managed device leaves with the attacker and remains valid until it is rotated. Defenders must treat edge management interfaces with the highest level of zero trust isolation.” Palo Alto Networks states. “They must also treat the credentials and certificates those interfaces hold as compromised the moment the platform is.” Patching FortiManager doesn’t reverse the data theft. The stolen cryptographic keys remain valid until the trust material on every managed device is individually rotated. A firmware update alone won’t invalidate them. The broader lesson goes beyond Fortinet: management platforms are high-value targets because compromising one can expose an entire network. As Unit 42 noted, “the management platform is the highest-value target on the network.” When that platform belongs to a managed service provider, a single breach can affect hundreds of downstream customers, turning a local compromise into a supply-chain security incident. “For organizations that manage infrastructure on behalf of others, the management platform is the highest-value target on the network. Compromising the management platform is not contained by the boundary of the organization that owns it.” the report concludes. “That compromise also does not end when the platform is patched.” Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, PEERSTITCH malware)
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