Two flaws in the Xen hypervisor allow a malicious guest virtual machine (VM) to read and write the memory of other VMs on the same host, including dom0. Dom0 is the VM that, by default, has full permissions and manages the others. Patches are out, and there is no known mitigation, the Xen Project said in an advisory on November 3. All Xen versions from 4.6 onward are vulnerable,
Nearly every agent security pitch now ends on the same promise: the product stops the bad action in real time. The promise holds for one kind of agent, the kind whose traffic passes through a gateway the enterprise owns. Most agents never touch one. One recent case shows what that gap looks like in practice. An employee asked an AI assistant to trigger a mass-email automation. The automation
A China-aligned threat actor known as SlippyNunchucks has been attributed to a Domain Name System (DNS) hijacking operation abusing insecure HTTP communications in Windows versions of Sogou Input Method as part of a surveillance campaign designed to deploy an implant called DarkVigil (aka FDMTP). The campaign, observed starting July 1, 2026, is assessed to have targeted organizations and
Russian authorities have arrested three suspected members of a threat group known as VasyGrek and dismantled its criminal infrastructure. Also known as Fluffy Wolf, the threat actor has a history of targeting Russian and international companies since 2016. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (MVD) said members of the group are "suspected of embezzling funds from the
A critical Android flaw could allow an attacker to run code on a phone without any user action remotely, Google said in its November security bulletin. The flaw, CVE-2026-58868, affects Android 14 through 17. Phones get the fix with security patch level 2026-11-01 or later, which phone makers and carriers send on their own schedules. As of November 4, Google's bulletin did not report
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added a security flaw in WordPress Core to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation. The high-severity vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-119977 (CVSS score: 8.1), is a case of Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition that could be exploited to achieve arbitrary code
Attackers have compromised the update infrastructure for the cPGuard web security suite to distribute a backdoor and a data-stealing script. OpsShield, the cPGuard developer, published an alert earlier today saying the attack began on November 2 at 02:06 UTC and affected versions 5.88.12 through 5.88.19. The vendor says that it detected the compromise and stopped the malicious distribution within 12 hours after the attacker pushed the compromised cPGuard versions. Although the company could not confirm, it said that some servers may have not received and run the malicious script due to update checks occurring at specific intervals. The attacker leveraged legitimate credentials to gain initial access, although it remains unclear how they were obtained. “On 2 November 2026 at 02:06 UTC, an unidentified attacker used compromised credentials to gain unauthorized access to OpsShield’s update distribution infrastructure (CDN),” OpsShield said.
Cryptocurrency exchange Binance says North Korean hackers used a fake job interview to trick an employee into installing malware that ultimately let them compromise the company's wallet infrastructure and steal about $6.34 billion in digital assets. This new information was shared in an incident report published today, which details how the attackers used social engineering, malicious software, and compromised internal systems to carry out the October 29 crypto theft. As previously reported by BleepingComputer, the FBI attributed the attack to North Korean state-sponsored hackers known as TraderTraitor, also tracked as Lazarus Group, Jade Sleet, and APT38. Binance says the attack began in September when a software engineer was contacted through a legitimate job-hunting platform by someone impersonating a Project Director at a fictitious company.
Binance reveals how fake job interviews, malware and internal AI abuse enabled attackers to steal $6.34 billion. The Binance security incident on October 29 shows how a fake recruitment process can become the entry point to critical financial infrastructure. The attackers combined social engineering, compromised developer tools, stolen credentials and abuse of an internal AI application to reach the cryptocurrency exchange’s wallet signing systems. “Woah – so the Binance hack was indeed via a dodgy job interview for one of its developers who was tricked into downloading malware as part of the “interview” – costing the company >$3bn…” the popular best seller author and cybercrime expert Geoff White wrote on LinkedIn. “Worth noting: – The 2016 hack of Bangladesh Bank also attributed to North Korea’s Lazarus Group of hackers was via a job application – The 2022 theft of $625m from video game Axie Infinity happened via offering an employee a juicy job offer RECRUITMENT IS RISK. If you’re not educating employees on this, start now… – The 2024 heist of $1.5b from Bybit relied on tricking an employee of its supplier into downloading a dodgy share trading app onto the work machine (so not using a recruitment lure, but still deceiving a target into downloading malware)” In its initial findings and response update, published on November 3, Binance described the operation as a “sophisticated, multi-stage campaign.” The company estimates that approximately $6.34 billion in digital assets were affected. The FBI attributed the incident to the North Korea-linked APT “TraderTraitor,” also tracked as Lazarus Group and APT38. “Our current investigation indicates that this was a sophisticated, multi-stage campaign. It was not a single isolated breach or a simple phishing incident.” reads the update published by the crypto firm. “The attackers combined a range of techniques, including social engineering by fake recruitment interviews, malicious software downloads, compromised internal AI tooling, endpoint compromise, and an advanced transaction-authorisation method.” The operation began months before the theft. In June 2026, an engineer from Binance’s Wallet DevOps team downloaded a tampered Homebrew installation while searching online for a popular AI coding tool. Binance detected the suspicious activity, replaced the device and rotated the associated credentials, but information about the engineer’s role and colleagues had already been exposed. The attackers then targeted another software engineer through a legitimate job-hunting platform. In September, someone posing as a Project Director arranged two interviews: first with an HR representative, then with someone claiming to be the CEO of a fictitious company. During the first video interview, the supposed HR representative shared a social media account containing personal photos and videos to establish credibility. At the end of the second interview, the engineer was asked to download a technical assignment containing a malicious code repository onto his work computer. The malware executed during setup, replacing a legitimate development tool component with a malicious version. It used obfuscation to evade detection, executed commands and established communication with an attacker-controlled server. Binance said its endpoint security tools didn’t detect the malware at the time. “The second interview was conducted in a popular social chat app, near the end of the interview, Engineer B was instructed to download an “assignment” containing a malicious code repository onto his work computer.” states the firm. “The repository contained malicious code that executed during the setup process, initiating a series of unauthorized activities.” The compromise then moved beyond the affected workstation. On October 20, attackers used the compromised computer to abuse an internal AI tool and gain access to the systems of two other employees, including the Wallet DevOps engineer initially targeted in June. They discovered that his computer contained a token with container deployment permissions. This is one of the more significant aspects of the incident. The report doesn’t identify a vulnerability in the AI model itself. Instead, it shows how an internal application can become an attack pivot when an adversary gains access to a compromised employee’s environment and the permissions available to that user. “The attacker leveraged the compromised computer of engineer B and used an internal AI tool to gain control over the Wallet DevOps Engineer A and another Wallet Software Engineer C.” states the report. “The attacker soon discovered Wallet DevOps Engineer A had a container deployment permission token on his computer.” On October 29, the attackers used stolen credentials to access another engineer’s computer, deploy a container and execute a malicious script. This gave them access to Binance’s internal wallet signing service, allowing them to initiate transactions outside the normal withdrawal process. The transfers involved several blockchain networks. Five Binance hot wallets sent 233.46 million XRP to an attacker-controlled address, while other transfers involved approximately 970,500 SOL, 44.2 million OP and 18,270 BTC. The attackers also exploited Ethereum’s EIP-7702 authorization mechanism to grant a malicious smart contract partial execution rights over a Binance hot wallet. “EIP-7702 allows an account to delegate certain execution rights to a smart contract without exposing the private key. In this case, the attacker used that mechanism to give an attacker-controlled smart contract partial execution rights over a Binance hot wallet.” the company states. Suspending withdrawals wasn’t enough to stop the transfers because the malicious authorizations already existed on-chain and operated independently of Binance’s normal withdrawal infrastructure. Binance had to develop a specific procedure to revoke them. The use of Multi-Party Computation (MPC) meant there was no single private key that could immediately invalidate the unauthorized permissions. The final unauthorized transfer, involving 2,961.9 ETH, was finalized at 23:56 UTC. Binance cleared the malicious authorization at 00:10 UTC on October 30. The company estimates that approximately $6.34 billion in assets were affected, of which around $2.85 billion had been frozen or intercepted as of its November 3 update. Binance says it will absorb the financial impact and has already replenished 98% of the affected token assets, based on figures reported on October 31. The exchange has rebuilt the affected wallet infrastructure and internal AI tool, replaced compromised devices, revoked associated credentials and tokens, and strengthened endpoint monitoring and wallet-service controls. It is also engaging independent cybersecurity firms to review the incident. The attack highlights the need to treat recruitment processes, developer workstations and internal AI applications as part of the corporate attack surface. Technical assignments should run in isolated environments, deployment credentials should be short-lived and tightly restricted, and internal AI tools should never inherit unnecessary access to sensitive systems. Binance also said its security team had detected and prevented 57 suspected North Korea-linked cyber threat cases during 2026. These included fake job interviews, malicious developer tools, compromised software packages and browser extensions, fake video-conferencing applications and campaigns designed to steal credentials or deploy remote-access malware. The incident is another reminder that attackers don’t always need to break directly into critical infrastructure. Sometimes, compromising the people and tools that manage it is enough. “We are sharing this initial report because security improves when the industry learns together.” concludes the update. In September, Japan’s National Police Agency, the FBI, the US Department of Defense’s Cyber Crime Center, and intelligence agencies from Australia and Germany published a joint advisory about a group called WaterPlum, better known as Contagious Interview. The name says it all. The job interview is the infection vector. The numbers in the advisory are hard to shrug off. At least 30,000 devices infected across more than 100 countries, funds or credentials stolen from over 7,000 cryptocurrency wallets, and a total of 1.7 billion yen, roughly $10.71 million, funneled back to North Korea. The victims are almost always the same type: freelance developers and specialists in blockchain and Web3 work. Japan’s NPA and the FBI assess that both WaterPlum operators and some North Korean IT workers report to the same place, the 313 General Bureau of the Munitions Industry Department, under the Workers’ Party’s Central Committee. That’s not a loose affiliation. It’s an org chart. The trap itself is almost embarrassingly simple. WaterPlum actors pose as recruiters or hiring managers, often impersonating real AI, crypto, or NFT companies, and reach out on social media, job boards, and freelance platforms. Candidates get invited to a technical interview, then told to download a file to complete a coding test or fix a supposed bug on the video call. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Binance)
Large language model hijacking attacks, also known as LLMjacking, are generating large fraudulent cloud charges, with some organizations losing more than $100,000 per day. Companies can record costs as high as $1 million due to fraudulent calls using stolen API keys, researchers at Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant in analyzed incidents. Based on their observations, there are "two distinct operational clusters coordinating to compromise and monetize enterprise LLM infrastructure." The researchers identified two categories of threat actors: those who scan for publicly exposed LLM endpoints and those who steal valid API keys from unprotected machines. After gaining initial access, the attackers sell it to services known as LLM mixers, which provide their subscribers with unauthorized access to LLMs.
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