The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) has disrupted the Famous Chollima threat group’s operations by arresting two suspects, charging 14 individuals, and seizing nearly 187 laptops used in North Korean remote IT worker schemes. Famous Chollima (a.k.a. WageMole) is commonly tracked as a North Korean threat actor associated with fraudulent IT-worker schemes that generate revenue for the DPRK regime. Because North Korea is subject to extensive international sanctions, its operatives seek technology jobs at companies worldwide, often using stolen, rented, or fabricated identities. In some cases, they also attempt to compromise employers’ networks to steal sensitive data, deploy malware, or obtain cryptocurrency and other assets. As part of an operation in Texas codenamed “Lonestar Roundup,” the FBI searched 40 residences suspected of hosting laptop farms between September 21 and 25.
Attackers are exploiting a critical flaw in Cisco Secure Email Gateway that lets a sender with no login write files to the appliance's operating system, Cisco said in an advisory on Wednesday. The attacker sends an email with a crafted attachment through the gateway and, if it succeeds, could then run commands as root. The appliance filters an organization's email for spam, malware,
Ledger is asking resellers and distributors in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong to halt wallet sales and remove products from shelves while it investigates hardware implant incidents. The company announced the decision in response to discovering that devices purchased from CryptoBilis had been modified to steal seed phrases used to access crypto assets and send them to an unauthorized party over an LTE connection. Ledger sells physical cryptocurrency wallets that securely store private keys used for managing and authorizing digital asset transactions. Following reports of cryptocurrency losses from multiple users, Ledger launched an investigation on October 9 and confirmed that some devices sold by CryptoBilis had been tampered with. Yesterday, Ledger’s Donjon security arm shared more details about the hardware implant found inside devices from the reseller , largely confirming earlier reports by Mark Karpelès and Tibane Labs.
Cisco has patched another actively exploited zero-day flaw in its Secure Email Gateway (SEG) that lets remote unauthenticated attackers execute commands with root privileges. Tracked as CVE-2026-76519, this vulnerability stems from a relative path traversal weakness in SEG's Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) feature, caused by improper handling of email attachments. Threat actors can exploit this issue by sending an email with a maliciously crafted attachment through an unpatched device. "A successful exploit could allow the attacker to write arbitrary files and execute commands with root privileges on the underlying operating system," Cisco said in a Wednesday advisory. "In October 2026, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of active exploitation of this vulnerability." CVE-2026-76519 affects SEG instances where the File Reputation service is enabled and assigned to a mail policy, and the Content Scanner Tools version is earlier than 25.3.0.5525.
Microsoft Patch Tuesday security updates for October 2026 address a record 1,415 vulnerabilities. Prioritize the exploited zero-day, critical bugs and potentially wormable vulnerabilities. Microsoft just shattered every patch record in the book. October 2026 brought us a staggering 1,415 new CVEs from Microsoft alone. “Well, it’s a new record release from Microsoft, again. This is also the first four-digit volume we have ever seen and includes six-digit CVEs. As always, counting this load is tricky, but I see 1,415 new CVEs from Microsoft. That puts this month at a greater volume than any previous YEAR from Microsoft. I’m starting to think I don’t like this new normal.” states ZDI. “As for the products affected by this release, we have Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Developer Tools and .NET, SharePoint, Linux kernel, Skype for Business and Microsoft Lync, SQL Server and Dynamics, Azure and cloud services, and Exchange server.” This is the first time Microsoft has reported more than 1,000 vulnerabilities in a single month. To help security teams handle this huge number of flaws, Microsoft introduced “risk cohorts” to group related vulnerabilities, similar to the old security bulletin system. AI is clearly helping researchers find bugs faster, both for attackers and defenders. The good news is that vulnerabilities are still being discovered faster than attackers are exploiting them. Security teams should focus on the most serious threats first instead of trying to patch every low-risk flaw at once. Instead, focus immediately on what’s actively burning in the wild. The single zero-day under active attack this month is CVE-2026-96951, a Windows Shell security feature bypass used to dodge Mark of the Web protections. “An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could evade Mark of the Web (MOTW) defenses.” reads the advisory. “In an email or instant message attack scenario, the attacker could send the targeted user a specially crafted file that is designed to exploit the vulnerability. In any case an attacker would have no way to force a user to view attacker-controlled content. Instead, an attacker would have to convince a user to take action. For example, an attacker could entice a user to either click a link that directs the user to the attacker’s site or send a malicious attachment.” Other high-priority threats include a critical unauthenticated SharePoint privilege escalation bug (CVE-2026-102866), a high-scoring SQL Server remote code execution flaw (CVE-2026-65674), and a massive wave of 59 potentially wormable vulnerabilities spanning core network services like DHCP, Remote Desktop Gateway, and DNS. Below are the descriptions for the above issues: CVE-2026-96951 (CVSS score of 8.8) is a Windows Shell command injection vulnerability that allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass security protections over a network. Exploitation can evade Mark of the Web (MOTW) defenses, which help protect users from potentially dangerous files downloaded from the internet. Microsoft confirmed that the flaw is being actively exploited. CVE-2026-102866 (CVSS score of 8.1) is a Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerability caused by improper verification of cryptographic signatures. It allows an unauthenticated attacker to elevate privileges over a network, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive information or modifying data. CVE-2026-65674 (CVSS score of 8.8) is a Microsoft SQL Server remote code execution vulnerability caused by the deserialization of untrusted data. An authorized attacker with the required privileges could exploit the flaw over a network to execute code on the affected server. “I may be wrong about some of these – there are a few where the description is somewhat…er…ambiguous, but regardless, this number of wormable bugs in 2026 should cause some level of concern. Not panic.” concludes ZDI. “There’s no need for that, but it is disconcerting to see this many juicy targets sitting out there. Please do your best to test and deploy these fixes in a timely manner.” Prioritize the proven, public, and exploited flaws first, and take a deep breath before diving into the rest of the patch mountain. Make sure your operational priorities remain laser-focused on real risk rather than chasing vanity metrics. Make every effort to test and apply these patches as soon as possible. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Patch Tuesday)
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) urged security teams to immediately patch an Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) flaw exploited in zero-day attacks since at least October 1st. Tracked as CVE-2026-104935, this high-severity authentication bypass vulnerability lets remote threat actors without privileges execute arbitrary commands on targeted ICS systems in low-complexity attacks that don't require user interaction. Ivanti released ICS versions 22.8R2.5, 25.1.3.0, 25.1.3.1, and 25.1.1.2 on Tuesday to address this security flaw and warned customers to "act immediately" because of "limited exploitation in the wild." While Ivanti didn't share additional information about ongoing attacks targeting CVE-2026-104935, cybersecurity firm Volexity reported that an unknown threat actor it tracks as UTA0576 has been chaining this security issue with two other flaws in attacks since at least October 3rd.
OpenAI employee charged with planting hidden audio recorders to capture sensitive discussions about AI research and company strategy. On September 30, OpenAI staff found a small audio recording device jammed into a USB port on the back of a television in an executive conference room in their San Francisco office. The device had been there since September 28, its contents were encrypted, and whoever put it there had wrapped it in toilet paper to hide it. Federal prosecutors named the man as Abdulrahman Alfozan, 35, a Saudi national who’d been working on OpenAI’s product team since July 2025. Alfozan was fired and arrested on October 9. He faces up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine if convicted. “An employee of OpenAI has been arrested for and charged with using or endeavoring to use an electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept oral communications.” states DoJ. “Abdulrahman Alfozan, 35, a national of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was arrested on Oct. 9, and made his initial appearance in federal court today.” The executive conference room hosted meetings about confidential research, product plans, business deals, government relations, and OpenAI’s technical progress. These were clearly sensitive discussions. FBI Director Kash Patel said the alleged goal was to spy on conversations about the company’s intellectual property. “According to the complaint unsealed today, Abdulrahman Alfozan allegedly concealed a covert recording device inside his employer’s executive conference room to secretly capture sensitive communications about the company’s super intelligence technology,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “Protecting American SI innovation is essential to safeguarding our nation’s economic strength and national security, and the FBI views that mission as one of our highest counterintelligence priorities. Thank you to Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton and our law enforcement partners for their support — and we will continue working closely with our partners across the U.S. government and private sector to keep American businesses and citizens safe and to ensure our country maintains its competitive edge.” Alfozan had no permission to enter the room or attend meetings there. CCTV footage showed him near the conference room several times before the recording device was discovered. On October 5, five days after OpenAI found it, cameras captured him looking behind the same television where the device had been hidden. He appeared to be checking on it or preparing to retrieve it. Before the device was installed on September 28, Alfozan used an internal OpenAI tool to search for office addresses, meeting rooms and their capacity, room calendars, the locations of executives and senior leaders, and schedules for meetings with external partners. These searches suggest he was gathering information about the company’s facilities and activities. Investigators also found a series of chatbot prompts submitted between September 24 and 30 through an account linked to Alfozan’s spouse. The account shared several identifiers with his own. The prompts covered how to build a continuous audio recorder, configure Wi-Fi, improve recording and live listening quality, encrypt an SD card, and enable remote access. Prosecutors also noted that on September 27 and 28, the account submitted prompts referring specifically to the custom header and unique MAC address of Recording Device 1. This happened just one day before the device was installed. On October 5, the same day Alfozan was caught on camera looking behind the television, he also left a bag unattended in a different room in an OpenAI building. Security staff opened it and found another recording device similar to the first one, along with his wallet and ID. So either he was planning to plant a second device, or he was already carrying a spare. “If convicted, Alfozan faces a maximum penalty of 5 years in prison and a $250,000 fine, followed by 3 years of supervised release.” concludes DoJ. OpenAI said it used its own internal AI models to help analyze the device, which TechCrunch reported “contained advanced encryption, audio monitoring capabilities, and a mechanism for transferring data designed to evade monitoring.” OpenAI also confirmed there’s no indication that Alfozan accessed or exfiltrated model weights, source code, or customer data through any other channel. This case is being prosecuted under National Security Presidential Memorandum 11, specifically tied to protecting American superiority in what the government is now formally calling “super intelligence” technology. The Director of National Intelligence, Jay Clayton, weighed in personally, calling AI development a national security prerogative. That framing, a straightforward wire tap case dressed in super intelligence language, tells you something about where this administration sees AI in the broader geopolitical picture. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, OpenAI)
Microsoft has confirmed that non-admin users may be unable to connect to devices via Remote Desktop after installing recent Windows updates if the "Administrator protection" security feature is enabled.
Ivanti VPN zero-days let attackers gain root access, steal credentials, evade detection, and prepare for wider network compromise. On October 5, Volexity started investigating suspicious activity at one of its monitoring customers and traced everything back to an Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliance running version 22.8R2.4, the latest build available at the time. Three chained zero-days gave an unknown attacker unauthenticated root access. “n the first week of October 2026, Volexity discovered an unknown threat actor, UTA0576, abusing a zero-day exploit chain to compromise a fully patched (at the time, version 22.8R2.4) Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) VPN appliance.” states Volexity. “This exploit chain combined an authentication bypass, a remote code execution (RCE), and a privilege escalation vulnerability to achieve unauthenticated root-level code execution. The RCE and authentication bypass vulnerabilities are tracked under CVE-2026-104935.” The attacker, tracked as UTA0576, had been inside the device since at least October 3, two days before anyone noticed. Ivanti released a patch for two of the three vulnerabilities on October 13; the privilege escalation fix is still coming in a future release. The first flaw affects welcome.cgi, the public login page. An attacker sends a request to this page that passes the authentication checks but includes the path to a protected internal script in an HTTP header. The system checks the URL to decide whether to allow the request, but uses the header to decide where to send it. This mismatch allows the attacker to bypass authentication. The attacker then uploads a Perl script disguised as a ZIP file through another endpoint. The server saves the file, checks whether it is a valid ZIP archive, and schedules it for deletion when the check fails. Before the file is deleted, the attacker sends multiple requests to its predictable location on disk. If a request reaches the file in time, the script executes. Both the authentication bypass and the race-condition flaw that enables remote code execution are tracked under CVE-2026-104935. The third step escalates from the limited web server user to full root. A privileged background service called dsinvoked runs maintenance tasks as root and looks up which programs to execute in a shared configuration store. UTA0576 patches that store in memory, redirects a legitimate task to the Perl interpreter instead, triggers the task, and gets root execution. Then everything gets silently restored to its original state. Volexity found that the attack changed code in memory but restored the configuration data, which explains why Ivanti’s Integrity Checker Tool did not detect anything suspicious. The tool checks files stored on disk, but this attack left no permanent changes there. Each time UTA0576 ran a command, the attackers repeated the entire exploit chain. They received the results through normal HTTPS responses instead of using a persistent backdoor or web shell. They also deleted selected entries from Ivanti debug logs and Linux audit logs covering the attack. Temporary files were removed automatically after use. The attackers hid a packet capture tool under a renamed executable in a directory not shown in normal file listings. They also used eight rotating capture files, allowing older network traffic to be overwritten. Once inside, UTA0576 went straight for credentials. The attacker deployed a custom Python LDAP tool that authenticated to an internal domain controller using the VPN appliance’s own service account and searched Active Directory specifically for LAPS local administrator passwords, BitLocker recovery keys, and any attributes containing passwords in plaintext. Results were compressed and encoded before being exfiltrated back through the same exploit channel. The attacker also ran a packet capture tool to harvest cleartext credentials from LDAP traffic already flowing through the device, built a custom Kerberos implementation capable of Kerberoasting attacks, and ran password-spraying campaigns against Active Directory accounts. “Volexity’s forensic investigation revealed that, immediately after exploiting an ICS VPN appliance, UTA0576 began conducting reconnaissance, stealing credentials, and exfiltrating data. Because the operation was detected and disrupted, the threat actor’s ultimate objectives could not be determined.” Volexity continues. “However, Volexity assesses with high confidence that UTA0576’s actions signaled preparation for lateral movement and a broader compromise of the victim network.” Volexity believes with medium confidence that UTA0576 uses large language models (LLMs) to develop exploits and carry out post-exploitation activities. That’s not a certain finding, but it’s the kind of attribution detail that’s starting to appear more regularly in incident reports, and it fits the pattern of a single operator producing work that would previously have required a team. “Volexity’s forensic investigation revealed that, immediately after exploiting an ICS VPN appliance, UTA0576 began conducting reconnaissance, stealing credentials, and exfiltrating data.” concludes the report. “Because the operation was detected and disrupted, the threat actor’s ultimate objectives could not be determined.” The attackers’ motives remain unclear, but the targets suggest a possible criminal motive rather than espionage. Apply the patches immediately, and don’t assume your appliance is safe just because the Integrity Checker found no problems. This week, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the Ivanti Connect Secure FortiMail flaw CVE-2026-104935 (CVSS score of 8.6) to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Ivanti)
Netskope tracks four XWorm versions in the wild, 46 plugins, and new tools for location, audio and live browser control, with detections up fourfold. Netskope Threat Labs has been following XWorm since September 2024, and its latest report shows the malware has changed a lot. Over the past year the team identified four distinct versions running at the same time in the wild. Detection volume is still high, with 1,236 events across more than 100 customer organizations in the third quarter of 2026, four times the number from the same quarter in 2025. The leak fueled the surge. In June 2025, a cracked version of the XWorm builder was released publicly. In August, the source code for a modified version, 6.4, also leaked. These leaks gave XWorm more exposure and helped drive its growth. Netskope’s data shows how long the impact lasted. Detections more than quadrupled between the third and fourth quarters of 2025. In the first quarter of 2026, they reached seven times the original level and stayed there through the second quarter. Detections fell to 1,236 in the third quarter of 2026, but September alone accounted for 601, matching the monthly average during the peak in the first half of the year. The victims skew toward money. Financial services make up about 35% of affected customers, and activity is concentrated in India, Brazil, Italy, Panama and the United States. “The public leak of the V6.4 builder in mid-2025 drove this initial surge, keeping activity consistently above pre-leak baselines ever since.” reads Netskope’s analysis. “The financial services sector accounts for approximately 35% of affected customers, with activity concentrated in India, Brazil, Italy, Panama, and the United States.” Since Netskope published its report on version 6.0 in July 2025, four new versions of the malware have been discovered: V6.4, V6.5 (“XWorm Reborn”), V7.2, and V7.4. Three of these versions were released after the malware generator tool became publicly available. The number of known plugin features has also increased from 35 to 46. This includes new modules, such as SteamTokenRecovery, Rootkit, ResetSurvival, and Cmstp-Bypass, as well as several plugins that were previously removed in V6.0 but have now been brought back. Each new version includes small but significant updates: V6.4 includes file details that link it to celestialproject.org. V6.5 updates its branding link to c3lestial.fun, adds five new plugins, and introduces a built-in license check for the tool itself. V7.2 adds stronger code protection to hide its activity, uses six different tricks to avoid running in virtual analysis environments, and disguises its file details as the software Voicemod. V7.4 introduces a new file delivery system (dropper), uses a technique to bypass Windows security monitoring, switches to a new communication channel for commands, and reinstates license checks. The surveillance side is where it gets uncomfortable. Netskope says XWorm has moved from an infostealer to a full surveillance platform. Three plugins matter most: Maps, Microphone and HBrowser, and webcam capture is also available on demand. HBrowser changes how account theft works. Starting with version 6, it gives the operator a live view of the victim’s running browser, relays the operator’s mouse, keyboard and paste actions into it, and streams the screen back. The commands travel over XWorm’s usual encrypted channel and run on the victim’s machine. This creates a full remote browser session for the attacker. Because every logged-in tab remains open, the attacker can access accounts directly without needing to steal passwords or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA). Netskope notes that this plugin grants full account access without ever extracting login credentials. The location-tracking feature bypasses the standard Windows permission prompt. It first modifies a Windows system setting to suppress consent requests, then attempts to fetch precise GPS coordinates within 15 seconds to send to the attacker. If GPS is unavailable, it falls back to IP-based location tracking. Because the modified setting remains in place, future location requests continue to bypass user permission. “XWorm continues to evolve and has now added surveillance capabilities. It can track geolocation and record the victim’s audio without requesting the victim’s permission.” continues the report. “The HBrowser plugin gives operators direct control of the victim’s live browser session, granting access to accounts without needing to exfiltrate credentials and making MFA irrelevant.” Microphone does what the name says. It captures audio from any device on the machine, with the operator choosing which one, and streams it back in half-second chunks that are compressed, encoded and encrypted, so audio reaches the operator with about half a second of delay. The microphone stays active for as long as the operator keeps the session open, and both Maps and Microphone run without privilege escalation or a visible prompt. Netskope expects more of the same. Since the builder and source code were leaked, it expects continued upgrades and use of the toolkit. Its indicators of compromise are on the team’s GitHub, and its protection flags the samples as Gen:Variant.Application.Lazy and Trojan.Generic. The key lesson for security teams is that multi-factor authentication (MFA) cannot protect accounts once an attacker has already gained access to an active browser session. This vulnerability applies to any account currently logged in on an infected computer. The HBrowser plugin clearly demonstrates this risk: from the attacker’s perspective, it provides a complete, live remote browser session with full access to open accounts. “Since its builder and source code were leaked, we expect continued upgrades and use of this toolkit. Netskope Threat Labs will continue to monitor XWorm.” NetSkope concludes. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, CISA)
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