Google tracks three Russia-linked espionage clusters using phishing and legitimate authentication tools to target researchers, diplomats and defense staff. Google’s Threat Intelligence Group tracked three separate suspected Russia-linked cyber espionage clusters. All three focus on the same thing: abusing authentication features that are supposed to protect accounts to access them instead. Threat actors target researchers, academics, government officials, think-tank analysts, and defense sector personnel across Europe and the United States. The three clusters are tracked as UNC6293, UNC7005, and UNC5976, and while they operate differently and with different tools, Google published them together for a reason. “These clusters engage in persistent, adaptive phishing campaigns, using sophisticated social engineering tactics to compromise personal accounts across multiple platforms.” reads the report published by GTIG. “Because these operations abuse legitimate authentication flows which may not immediately seem like phishing attempts to users, GTIG is raising awareness about these social engineering campaigns targeting individuals so that targets can more readily recognize malicious outreach.” UNC6293 is the oldest of the three and the most precisely attributed. Google assesses with moderate confidence that it’s a sub-cluster of ICE RELIC, the group also tracked as APT29, responsible for initial access operations. Its operations are narrow by design: typically fewer than five targets at a time, with themes built around diplomatic events and upcoming conferences. Since it was first documented in June 2025, UNC6293 has consistently impersonated US State Department officials to run app password phishing. The technique is simple but effective. The attacker convinces a target to set a specific app password on their account, one that the attacker already knows, and then uses it to log in without triggering two-factor authentication. By October 2025, UNC6293 was still reusing screenshots from its June phishing lures, including the ms.state.gov reference, while only changing the surrounding text. By June 2026, the group had added OAuth phishing. After logging in to a legitimate service, victims were asked to share a URL or “verification code,” allowing attackers to obtain valid access tokens. The trick works because the login itself is legitimate, while the attackers hide the malicious step elsewhere. UNC7005, tracked by Microsoft as STORM-2945, is a related but separate cluster first identified in February 2026. Google assesses it’s also connected to ICE RELIC, but notes it operates with lower technical sophistication and worse operational security than UNC6293. It compensates with a wider toolkit. UNC7005 runs app password phishing, device code phishing against both Microsoft and WhatsApp, malware distribution, and OAuth phishing operations, sometimes in the same month. “UNC7005 also conducts device code phishing operations for both Microsoft and WhatsApp accounts.” continues the report. “The themes of these phishing waves often involve invitations for calls with individuals from notable organizations related to the target’s field or, most recently, invitations to diplomatic events and conferences. “ The GLOBSEC conference spoof is a useful illustration of how UNC7005 works. The actor built a landing page mimicking an invitation to the legitimate GLOBSEC forum in May 2026, collected detailed registration information from targets including, not for the first time in ICE RELIC-linked operations, a wine selection for a fictional dinner, and then presented a Microsoft device code for the target to enter. The registration form still contained a reference to “Embassy security policy” rather than GLOBSEC, a leftover from the previous lure template that the actor hadn’t cleaned up. When Google flagged the page quickly, UNC7005 revised the template within days, citing “technical difficulties” to explain the change to anyone still watching. UNC7005 also used WhatsApp phishing pages to trick victims into linking their accounts to an attacker-controlled device. The fake pages offered options such as joining a call, opening an encrypted chat or downloading a file. If victims chose the call option, malicious JavaScript asked for microphone and camera access, recorded them, and sent the footage to the attackers. In late May 2026, UNC7005 ran a broader phishing wave targeting US-based academics, diplomats, and Russia researchers. The lure was a fake “Summit Companion App” to read a document supporting Ukraine. “In May and June 2026, UNC7005 conducted social engineering operations spoofing WhatsApp. The phishing pages distributed by the attacker lure targets into linking their WhatsApp accounts with an attacker controlled device in order to join a secure WhatsApp call, chat, or document share.” states the report. “The attacker also attempts multiple other methods of compromise after the device is linked.” Windows users who downloaded it received VIDAR, an off-the-shelf infostealer sold as a service that pulls saved credentials, cookies, and payment data from browsers. Mac users received ATOMIC, also known as AtomicStealer, a macOS infostealer operating the same business model. Neither is custom tooling. The actor’s email address in this operation was nearly identical to one used by UNC6293 a year earlier. The hospitality captive portal campaign, previously reported by Reliaquest and Microsoft and attributed to Midnight Blizzard, connects directly to UNC7005. Google traces the infrastructure back to April 2026: domains spoofing Microsoft authentication resources, which Google added to Safe Browsing blocklists as they appeared. By mid-July 2026, those same domains were receiving redirects from captive portals at hotels and conference centers. The IP resolution trail links the captive portal infrastructure to the GLOBSEC device code phishing operation and to ENGINELIGHT, a Go-based malware used in a separate limited UNC7005 operation in May 2026. CHERRYPIE, also known as ChocoShell, is a PowerShell infostealer that adds another interesting detail. Google found comments and code references that appear consistent with AI-generated code, suggesting the attackers may be using an LLM to develop malware. The data it targets overlaps with the commercial infostealers already used by UNC7005, leading Google to suspect that CHERRYPIE could be a customized version of a malware-as-a-service tool. UNC5976 is the third cluster and the most distinct. It focuses on military, aerospace, defense industrial base, and NGO targets, concentrating geographically on Ukraine and Armenia. Instead of residential proxies for post-compromise access, as UNC6293 and UNC7005 use, it runs dedicated infrastructure. Its OAuth phishing is more automated: the actor registers file-sharing-themed domains, creates Google Cloud projects behind them, and uses cloud-hosted scripts to collect authentication tokens from targets who log in through what looks like a Google sign-in prompt on a fake file-sharing page. Within three months of Google disrupting this infrastructure, UNC5976 had built at least twelve new domains and was already migrating toward non-Google hosting providers. In April 2026, UNC5976 also distributed HEADRUSH, a malicious Excel plugin, through a domain impersonating a Ukrainian research institute, potentially targeting a Ukrainian aerospace and imaging company. HEADRUSH eventually leads to an HTA downloader, though Google wasn’t able to recover the full infection chain. The defender challenge that runs through all three clusters is the same one Google names directly. ” The accounts these groups target are often personal, rather than corporate domain-joined accounts, creating a visibility gap for monitoring compromise from an organizational perspective. The likely use of encrypted messenger applications instead of email for initial outreach also presents a challenge to defenders hoping to track and remediate abuse.” concludes the report. “The combination of these tactics not only enables the attacker to conduct quick-turnaround exfiltration operations, but also presents opportunities for the attacker to further phish targets of interest from compromised, legitimate accounts. “ Security teams watching corporate email and endpoint telemetry won’t see the initial contact. By the time a compromised personal account starts being used to phish the target’s contacts, the original access event is already cold. Google’s practical guidance for individuals: don’t set app passwords for anyone who asks, revoke existing ones you don’t recognize, check WhatsApp’s linked devices list, and treat any OAuth authorization prompt from an unsolicited message as suspicious regardless of how polished the surrounding page looks. High-risk individuals should consider Google’s Advanced Protection Program, which blocks app password creation entirely. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Russia)
Microsoft has patched a maximum-severity vulnerability in the Entra ID identity and access management (IAM) platform that has been exploited in attacks.
Threat actors are abusing FTP banners to hide commands that deliver two previously undocumented remote access trojans named E4del and PINHOLE. MalwareHunterTeam observed this unusual technique in July in an attack that used shortcut files (.LNK) and FTP server banners as dead-drop resolvers (DDR) to retrieve commands. FTP banners are text strings the server uses as a greeting message for connecting hosts before they log in. By embedding commands in the initial response sent when a compromised system connects to an FTP server, a malware stager can receive instructions from a remote server. After discovering FTP banners being used to deliver malicious commands during an investigation, researchers at threat intelligence platform SOCRadar expanded their hunt and found that the technique remains in use.
Cl0p claims over 40 organizations fell victim to attacks exploiting a PTC Windchill and FlexPLM vulnerability. Cl0p is using a familiar strategy again: exploit one flaw in enterprise software to attack many companies, then publish the victims’ names if they refuse to pay. The group claims it has targeted more than 40 organizations through a vulnerability in PTC’s Windchill and FlexPLM platforms, which manufacturers and engineering companies use to manage product and design data. CVE-2026-12569 (CVSS score of 9.3) is a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in PTC Windchill PDMlink and PTC FlexPLM. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability through the deserialization of untrusted data. The flaw impacts all CPS versions and Windchill and FlexPLM releases prior to 11.0 M030. In June, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. German police reportedly warned organizations directly that attacks were coming, which tells you the exploitation window here wasn’t exactly subtle to security researchers watching it unfold. Cl0p group’s tooling for this campaign goes well beyond a basic web shell. Security firm ReliaQuest found the group deployed a custom implant built for full data theft on its own, no additional tools required to actually pull data out once inside. A class loader like that turns a single web shell into an open-ended backdoor, useful for lateral movement, ransomware deployment, or just quietly sitting there for months. “ReliaQuest identified the web shell as a fully equipped extortion platform: it maps sensitive vault data, decrypts every credential in the Windchill keystore, and includes a custom Java class loader that lets Clop execute any additional code inside the application process, extending the shell into an unlimited backdoor for follow-on activity such as lateral movement, ransomware, or persistence.” reads the report published by ReliaQuest. “The web shell gives attackers a direct path to credential theft and large-scale data exfiltration, with no additional tooling required. Unlike generic command shells, this implant decrypts credentials, delivers malware, and maps stored files for exfiltration.” Cl0p’s naming strategy followed its usual slow build. The group initially posted partial company names on its leak site, then switched to full names starting August 12, and the victim count has climbed steadily since. For each organization, the listing includes what type of data got stolen and roughly how much, ranging anywhere from a single gigabyte up to multiple terabytes depending on the target. The stolen data includes databases, project files, backups, engineering documents, blueprints, diagrams and corporate files, as well as images. The victim list reads like a cross-section of major manufacturing and industrial names: Shell, Philips, Fiserv, Zebra Technologies, Ingersoll Rand, Toast, Mindray, and Largan Precision, the company that supplies camera lenses for Apple’s devices. Researchers noticed that GE was on the list briefly before quietly disappearing from Cl0p’s site, a move that usually signals either a ransom payment or at least resumed negotiations behind closed doors. Shell, Philips, Fiserv, and GE have all publicly acknowledged awareness of the claims and said they’re investigating, though none has confirmed a significant breach so far. None of this is a new pattern for Cl0p specifically; it’s the same mass-exploitation-then-extortion model the group has run repeatedly against Oracle E-Business Suite, MOVEit, Cleo, and GoAnywhere over the past few years. What’s different this time is the target: enterprise PLM software sits deep inside manufacturing supply chains, holding the exact kind of engineering data that competitors and nation-states alike would pay real money to see. If your organization runs Windchill or FlexPLM and hasn’t checked for this specific CVE yet, that’s the item to move to the top of today’s list. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Cl0p )
A newly disclosed security flaw in GitLab has come under active exploitation within days of public disclosure, according to watchTowr. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-19478 (CVSS score: 9.4), a case of code injection that allows an unauthenticated attacker to modify or delete publicly accessible GitLab projects and rewrite their data under certain conditions without requiring
Microsoft on Thursday warned of a maximum-severity security flaw in Entra ID that it said has been exploited in the wild, but noted that no customer action is required. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-69836 (CVSS score: 10.0), is a case of remote code execution impacting the tech giant's cloud-based identity and access management service. It was previously called Azure Active Directory
Manic Android malware combines banking fraud and spyware, using a Bluetooth relay to steal data even when devices are offline. ThreatFabric’s Mobile Threat Intelligence team has identified a new Android malware, dubbed Manic, which has been active in the wild since at least February 2026. The researchers state that the malware is still under development as of July. “Manic sits at the intersection of Android banking malware and mobile spyware, combining financial-fraud capabilities with broader surveillance and device-control features.” reads the report published by the ThreatFabric’s Mobile Threat Intelligence team. “Its targeting is strongly focused on Ukraine, covering Ukrainian banks, government and identity services, and messaging applications, while also extending to Russian and European financial institutions, global fintech and cryptocurrency services, and military-focused communications.” The malware monitors 169 different Android apps, including banking and payment apps across several European countries, government and eID services, crypto exchanges and wallets, 2FA tools, messaging apps, browsers and email clients. This wide coverage appears deliberate. By targeting both financial and communication apps, the attackers can track a victim’s money, messages, location and files from the same device. ThreatFabric traces the first infrastructure registrations back to February 2026, with development and production services appearing in late March and April. By July, an updated build had added stronger anti-analysis checks, in-memory DEX loading, and a technique the researchers call lock-secret phishing, which extracts the device PIN or pattern by presenting a fake prompt before the victim reaches the real lock screen. Once installed, Manic requests Accessibility and notification access, then uses the Accessibility service as a UI keylogger. It classifies everything it captures before logging it: lock-screen input, recovery phrase candidates, four-to-six-digit SMS codes, passwords, long messages, email logins, and ordinary text. “Manic uses its Accessibility service as a UI keylogger. It classifies captured text before recording it, distinguishing lock-screen input, recovery-phrase candidates, four- to six-digit SMS codes, passwords, long messages, email logins, and ordinary text.” continues the report. “Each key log record includes the app and package, captured text, timestamp, whether the input came from Autofill or manual entry, and whether the app is on Manic’s target list “ Each log record includes the app name and package, the captured text, a timestamp, whether input came from autofill or manual entry, and whether the app is on Manic’s target list. The PIN theft technique works differently from a typical banking overlay. When Manic detects a numeric keypad in a targeted app, it places an invisible layer over the keys and records each tap. It then briefly passes the tap to the real keypad using Android’s Accessibility features, so the banking app works normally while Manic captures the PIN. Another function, called autoEnterPin, can try to enter a stored PIN or pattern on the Android lock screen. This gives attackers two options: capture a PIN during a banking session and later use it to unlock the device without the victim being present. According to the researchers, Manic stands out for its offline relay. “Manic uses a store-and-forward relay mechanism to exfiltrate data even when the infected device cannot reach the C2 server directly.” continues the report. “Collected files and command results are encrypted with AES-GCM and placed in a local queue, allowing the source device to remain offline while the malware searches for another infected device that can provide a route to the C2 infrastructure.” Manic searches for nearby infected devices over Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth RFCOMM, or BLE GATT, and supports chains of up to four relay hops. Cutting an infected phone off from the Internet doesn’t cut it off from exfiltration, as long as another infected device is within radio range. It’s a store-and-forward mesh built out of other people’s compromised phones. Manic gives attackers remote control of the device through WebRTC, allowing them to view the screen and interact with it using Android’s Accessibility features. It can hide its activity with black screens, fake screens or fake update messages, while also covering permission requests. The July version goes a step further by removing itself from the device’s app launcher. This keeps it out of the normal app list and lets attackers activate it through its wrapper or a deep link. For defenders, the combination here is complete in an uncomfortable way: credential theft, live screen monitoring, authentication interception, device takeover, and an exfiltration path that doesn’t require the infected device to have Internet access at all. Monitoring for unusual Accessibility service grants and unexpected Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Direct connections from phones that aren’t actively transferring files are the most practical detection starting points. “Manic is an evolving Android fraud platform designed for Device Takeover (DTO), combining credential and authentication theft with live screen monitoring and remote control. Its targeting spans banks, payment and cryptocurrency services, eID applications, and messengers, with a strong focus on Ukraine.” concludes the report. “A particularly distinctive capability is its offline mesh relay, which allows collected data to move through nearby infected devices over Wi-Fi Direct or Bluetooth when direct C2 access is unavailable. “ Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Android Malware)
Hackers compromised the maintainer account behind the widely used Rust crate arrayref to introduce malware that executed on developers’ systems during compilation. Within a 23-minute window, the attacker also poisoned two other crates, append-only-vec and internment, in the same supply-chain attack. The arrayref crate is a popular Rust library with more than 53 million downloads over the past 90 days that is used by cryptography, graphics, and blockchain tools. A report from application security company StepSecurity notes that the malicious Rust crate releases were arrayref 0.3.10, append-only-vec 0.1.9, and internment 0.8.7, all maintained by the same account. The hacker injected a dependency on a package called proc-macro1, a typosquat impersonating the popular proc-macro2 crate, while retaining the rest of the upstream source code completely unchanged.
A new Android malware named Manic targeting users in multiple European countries has a fallback mechanism for exfiltrating data through nearby infected devices. The malware has been active since at least February and combines spyware, banking fraud, and remote control capabilities. It targets at least 169 banking, government/eID, payment, crypto wallet, messaging, and authenticator/2FA apps, with users in Ukraine being the primary focus. Mobile security company ThreatFabric analyzed the Manic malware and found that it uses transparent overlays on the numeric keypads of legitimate applications to capture victims' taps and reproduce them through Android Accessibility, allowing the legitimate applications to continue functioning normally. After obtaining Accessibility and notification access permissions, the malware can capture the lock PIN/password, intercept notifications and SMS messages, collect files and location data, monitor the screen, and provide remote control to operators via WebRTC sessions.
Unit 42 details how attackers exploit enterprise collaboration tools for identity phishing and credential theft. Discover key defense strategies. The post Identity Abuse Through Trusted Communication Channels appeared first on Unit 42.
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