Microsoft says Windows Server 2016 will stop receiving security updates after it reaches the end of support in January 2027. Windows Server 2016 was released in September 2016 at Microsoft's annual Ignite conference and reached general availability one month later, on October 12, 2016 It reached the end of mainstream support in January 2022, and extended support will end in roughly three months, on January 12. "The January 2027 Windows security update will be the last update available for this version. After this date, devices running Windows Server 2016 will no longer receive monthly security updates containing protections from the latest security threats," Microsoft said in a message center update. "This end of updates in 2027 applies to all editions of Windows Server 2016: Datacenter, Essentials, MultiPoint Premium and Standard."
The PHP security team has shared mitigation measures for a new remote code execution vulnerability that affects systems with non-default configurations and has no patch. PHP is an open-source web development language used by nearly 70% of all websites on the Internet. According to VirusTotal estimates, more than 5.1 million PHP hosts are exposed online, and roughly 3.8 million have at least one port open to attacks. According to a Friday advisory, this security flaw (tracked as CVE-2026-115560) can only be exploited when targeting systems "with an unusual combination of configuration and application code." "An application must set session.serialize_handler to php_binary or php_serialize in its configuration and then switch it to php at runtime with ini_set() before calling session_start(). Session upload progress must also still be enabled," the PHP team explained.
AI agents can be manipulated through malicious emails, websites, and plugins into executing commands, stealing data, or deleting files using their legitimate permissions. Gen Digital explains how its Agent Trust Hub helps protect agents through skill verification, secure connectivity, and runtime controls that intercept dangerous act
Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) released security updates to patch 72 vulnerabilities in the Aruba Operating System (ArubaOS), including eight maximum-severity authentication bypass and code execution issues. Also known as AOS, ArubaOS powers Aruba Networking enterprise wireless infrastructure, including mobility conductors, access points, controllers, and gateway devices. The eight maximum-severity security flaws patched today affect multiple AOS-8 and AOS-10 software versions, and they can be exploited by remote threat actors without privileges through low-complexity attacks that don't require user interaction. HPE warned customers to patch these security issues as soon as possible and provided mitigation measures, including restricting access to AOS management interfaces. "Customers are strongly urged to patch their instances due to the complexity, breadth, and impact of these vulnerabilities," the company warned in a Thursday security advisory.
A New Mexico judge ordered Meta to pay $25 billion for misleading users about privacy, setting a record penalty. Meta plans to appeal. This week a New Mexico judge ordered Meta to pay the state $25 billion. The order follows a jury finding that the company deceived Facebook users about their privacy, and it’s the biggest fine ever imposed on Meta. State District Court Judge Francis J. Mathew wrote that Facebook’s deception was intentional and that executives consistently misled users about how the platform worked. “Facebook promised users that they (the users) controlled their data. This was false,” he said, as reported by the Associated Press. This is a case about promises, not about a breach. Jurors found in September that Meta committed over 43 million violations of New Mexico consumer protection laws by making misleading public statements about how it handled users’ personal data. The case grew out of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which a political consulting firm harvested Facebook data to build targeted political ads for the 2016 election. New Mexico had asked the court to fine Meta between $35 billion and $40 billion, arguing that only a large penalty would push the company to change its behavior. Meta’s lawyers said the fine should not exceed $3.4 billion and argued that any higher amount would be unconstitutional. The jury found more than 43 million violations, including 2.1 million under specific claims. Each violation can carry a fine of up to $5,000. New Mexico Attorney General Raúl Torrez said the ruling sends a clear warning to technology companies that they must follow the law. Under the state’s constitution, fines for consumer protection violations go toward education. However, the money may remain tied up while Meta appeals the decision. Meta plans to appeal the $25 billion ruling. The company argues that the decision and the way New Mexico is enforcing consumer protection laws make it almost impossible to operate in the state. Meta’s chief legal officer, C.J. Mahoney, says the case is an attempt to restrict free speech and impose new rules on what people can say online. The company says it is confident it will win the appeal. Meta’s lawyers also argued that the state failed to prove that residents had actually seen the misleading statements or suffered harm as a result. Meta is worth $1.8 trillion and brought in more than $200 billion in revenue last year, and its shares rose 2% after the announcement, with earnings due that day. A nonprofit director called $25 billion a drop in the bucket for Meta, though he said it shows people want accountability. Both can be true: the company says doing business in New Mexico is all but impossible, and Wall Street shrugged. The history explains why the number is so large. Cambridge Analytica got data through a personality quiz app that around 300,000 people took, and the app also pulled data on their friends, building a dataset of 87 million profiles. Meta banned the app in 2015 and asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the data, and the firm shut down in May 2018. The company later agreed to pay $725 million in December 2022 to settle a class action over sharing with Cambridge Analytica, and the FTC fined it $5 billion in 2019, a fifth of today’s award. New Mexico was not part of the $18 billion settlement Meta reached in August with almost all other US states and territories. The deal includes stronger child-safety measures and $459 million related to the Cambridge Analytica scandal. This is Meta’s second legal defeat in New Mexico in six months. In March, a jury ordered the company to pay $375 million for misleading users about children’s safety. Meta’s appeal could reduce the $25 billion fine if a court lowers the number of violations. The case also sends a warning to companies: privacy promises have legal consequences. As the judge stated, Facebook told users they controlled their data, but this was not true. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Cambridge Analytica Scandal)
China-linked Storm-0940 used AI tool ARTEX to target 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants, exploiting stolen ConnectWise credentials at machine speed. Microsoft published a detailed technical report naming Storm-0940, a China state-aligned group, as the actor behind the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply chain compromise. The group used ARTEX, an open-source AI-driven penetration testing framework, to run attacks at machine speed against hundreds of organizations across aerospace, defense, energy, financial services, government, manufacturing, and more. “Several of these Storm-0940 ARTEX-driven attacks have resulted in the actor obtaining privileged access to an organization’s cloud infrastructure – including multiple instances where the time from initial targeting to privileged access was less than 3 hours.” reads the report. “Microsoft assesses that Storm-0940 was responsible for the recently disclosed ConnectWise supply chain compromise of a multi-tenant application.” Storm-0940 has been active since 2021 and has historically relied on password spraying and OAuth application abuse to get into Microsoft 365 environments. Adding ARTEX changed the scale of what they could do. In some attacks, the time between initial targeting and achieving privileged cloud access was under three hours. Before obtaining the ConnectWise credentials, Storm-0940 launched a password spraying attack between October 10 and 14. The attack came from the IP address 144.172.64[.]99. Microsoft recorded more than 151,000 failed login attempts against 327 accounts at eight organizations. Activity peaked on October 11, with 2,900 failed attempts per minute. Forty-eight accounts each received more than 1,000 failed attempts. None of these attempts succeeded. The situation changed on October 15, one day after the ConnectWise breach became public. The AI agents stopped trying passwords and switched to a different attack method. By then, Storm-0940 had obtained the credentials of several ConnectWise cloud application accounts. The agents used these credentials to log directly into customer Microsoft 365 environments. “Storm-0940’s use of ARTEX accelerated the speed of compromised application abuse to authenticate to Microsoft 365 customer environments through applications that had already been granted access.” Microsoft continues. “This allowed the threat actor to operate without requiring an interactive user sign-in. “ The agents used applications that already had permission to access their targets. This allowed the attackers to enter customer environments without requiring users to sign in interactively. In a subset of environments where authentication succeeded, the agents didn’t stop there. They moved into Microsoft Graph and ran directory reconnaissance, modified application credentials to establish persistence, and attempted changes to identities, groups, and privileged roles. Microsoft identified multiple customer environments with evidence of this follow-on activity. The persistence mechanism is the part defenders need to act on now, even if they’ve already disabled the ConnectWise connections. “These changes can remain active as a backdoor even after the original compromised application is mediated.” says the IT giant. An attacker who added their own credentials to a trusted application before you revoked access still has a working key. Reviewing all service principal credential additions since at least October 1 is the right starting point, not October 15 when the public breach was announced. ARTEX is not a tool used only by Storm-0940. Microsoft says threat actors in several regions have used the same framework. Originally open-source, ARTEX was written in Go and can use different AI models to plan and carry out tasks. Researchers at Zscaler and Recorded Future also found a Chinese-speaking group using it to target South Korean financial institutions. The setup used DeepSeek, GLM, and Grok as coordinated AI agents, with GLM checking DeepSeek’s work. After these attacks became public, the project went closed-source. However, anyone who already has a copy can still use it. The speed point is what Microsoft keeps coming back to in its report. Agents don’t take weekends, don’t sleep, and can run multiple attack paths simultaneously. “This activity demonstrates how threat actors are integrating agentic AI into existing offensive security workflows and allows them to scale their operations exponentially.” Microsoft concludes. “Agents are not constrained by factors affecting humans – they can work around the clock, on weekends, and on holidays and attempt multiple breach paths simultaneously enabling significantly reduced time from selecting a target to achieving objectives, increasing the speed and impact of complex attacks like supply chain compromises.” When Storm-0940 had valid application credentials, they didn’t have to iterate slowly. They hit 2,250 tenants with 2,900 sign-in attempts per minute, a pace at which manual detection and response simply can’t keep up. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, ARTEX)
Hackers compromised the LiteLLM project’s PyPI package and published malicious Docker images with a payload that steals credentials, secrets, and environment variables. The supply-chain attack affected all PyPI wheels (.whl installation packages) for LiteLLM version 1.107.0, impacting Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. LiteLLM is an open-source Python SDK and AI gateway that enables applications to access AI models from different providers through a common API. It is a massively popular project with 61,800 GitHub stars, 92 million monthly downloads on PyPI, and is used by high-profile companies like NVIDIA, Netflix, AT&T, and Okta. The project says that the release pipeline was compromised on October 21 and a threat actor pushed version 1.107.0 to the Docker registry and PyPI. "This version contained compiled malware which steals credentials and loads remote-code execution tools," the maintainer says, adding that customers running the private enterprise were not impacted.
Attackers are exploiting a zero-day SQL injection flaw in Arista's VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO), the central management system for VeloCloud SD-WAN networks, the company said in an advisory on October 22. The flaw lets anyone who can log in to the orchestrator, even with a read-only customer account, gain operator privileges, the top level of control over it. For
A critical Signal flaw could keep calls active after hang-up, exposing microphone or camera. Update to a fixed version immediately. A critical vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-113380 (CVSS score 9.3 of 10), in Signal ’s calling library could allow a malicious caller to interfere with call termination, potentially leaving the victim’s microphone and camera active after they believe the conversation has ended. The flaw affects versions before 2.72.0 of the library RingRTC, which the messaging app uses to provide voice and video calling. It highlights a security problem that deserves attention beyond a single messaging application: ending a call should be an immediate control action, not something that can be delayed by traffic coming from the other participant. According to the technical report published on GitHub, the vulnerability stems from how RingRTC handles events in the finite-state machine (FSM) that manages a call. The application places events in a queue for processing, but a malicious peer can flood that queue with events and prevent the local hang-up operation from being handled in a timely manner. “A local hang-up is not a kill switch: it is just one more event placed at the back of the call’s finite-state-machine event queue. The remote peer is trusted with that queue — there is no rate limit on peer-originated events and no priority lane for hang-up.” reads the technical report published on GitHub, “Flood the queue with junk and the hang-up waits behind attacker noise forever, so the call (microphone, possibly camera) is never torn down.” People expect that pressing the hang-up button ends the call and turns off the microphone and camera. But if the system is too busy processing other events, it may delay the command to end the call, leaving the audio or video active longer than expected. The report explains that someone taking part in a call could exploit this weakness by sending enough events to overload the system’s queue. This could stop the other person from ending the call properly, potentially keeping the microphone active and possibly the camera too. The underlying problem is not that Signal’s end-to-end encryption has been broken. Rather, it concerns the handling of call state and the reliable termination of a session. Encryption cannot protect users from every flaw in the software that controls when a communication session begins or ends. The vulnerability concerns RingRTC versions earlier than 2.72.0 and can affect Signal clients that embed a vulnerable build of the library. According to the CSIRT Toscana advisory, the affected application versions are Signal for Android before 8.27.0, Signal for iOS before 8.30.0, and Signal Desktop before 8.29.0. The official RingRTC fix and the comparison between versions 2.71.0 and 2.72.0 document the software changes. Users should install the latest available Signal release for their device rather than relying on the library version alone. The technical report also includes a conceptual Python proof of concept. It models the difference between a queue in which a flood can bury a hang-up event and one in which critical events receive priority. The demonstration is synthetic and offline, with no network activity or real calls, so it illustrates the underlying logic rather than providing a working exploit. This is an important distinction. The fact that the vulnerability has been made public does not mean attackers are already exploiting it. However, because it could expose private conversations, updating Signal promptly is a sensible precaution, especially for people who use it to discuss sensitive matters. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini (SecurityAffairs – hacking, mobile)
eMudhra, an Indian certificate authority (CA), will withdraw from its global SSL/TLS certificate business, its board decided on Thursday. The decision came five days after a researcher reported recovering the private keys of eight of its intermediate CA certificates. eMudhra said it will replace affected customers' certificates with free ones from partners, though its
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